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CHINA’S CORPORATE TAX MANAGEMENT AND ITS ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES 
ABSTRACT 
Since economic reforms began in 1978, China’s enterprises have undergone considerable 
changes. So too have the taxation system have experienced major reforms over the last 
three decades to closely resemble those of the market economies, which included the 
introduction of corporate income taxes in the country. Since corporate tax is a significant 
cost to enterprises, firms have introduced corporate tax management to strengthen 
financial decision-making. The extant theories on corporate tax management have not 
always been consistent, which is more so with the empirical evidence from China given 
its unique transition from a socialist structure to one where the market have gradually 
increased its role in the economy. Given the complexity of the economy and still 
paramount role of the state in the economy there are still loopholes that corporations often 
exploit to their advantage, which may make tax management in Chinese listed companies 
inefficient and unpredictable. The central objective of this study is to analyze the 
economic consequences of corporate tax management in China. In doing so, the study 
posits the following three research questions: firstly, what is the impact of corporate tax 
management on firm performance and how tax management can help maximize firm 
value?; secondly, what are the market outcomes of corporate tax management and how 
does government ownership influence these outcomes?; and thirdly, what is the impact of 
corruption and marketization on corporate tax management, and how do they affect firm 
performance? The results show that that corporate tax management has a negative direct 
impact on firms’ market value, which support the agency theory of tax management. 
Nevertheless, corporate tax management can promote market value through the indirect 
improvement of firms’ profitability and growth, which suggests that tax management can 
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help but they need the deployment of a sound and effective corporate governance 
mechanism. Next, the findings show that corporate tax management has the potential to 
cause adverse future market outcomes so as to cause stock price crashes, which support 
the bad news hoarding theory. The evidence shows that state ownership cannot alleviate 
this crash risk. Indeed, municipal listed state-controlled enterprises are more likely to face 
future crash risks than other enterprises. Finally, the findings show that corruption affects 
corporate tax management non-linearly in China, which support the theories of “grabbing 
hand” and “helping hand”. Moreover, corruption positively affects the performance of 
corporate tax management. Furthermore, marketization helps to mitigate the impact of 
corruption on corporate tax management at both phases of the inverted U-shaped curve. 
Overall, the thesis shows that corporate tax management is an important financial strategy 
that can be designed to enhance the wealth of shareholders. However, due to agency 
problems, the real consequences of tax management have remained uncertain. The 
solution to addressing agency problems is to bolster enterprise management with sound 
internal corporate governance through effective coordination with external markets and 
institutional development. 
Key words: Corporate Tax management, Economic performance, China’s listed 
enterprises, Socialist structure, Marketization 
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PENGURUSAN CUKAI KORPORAT CHINA DAN KESAN-KESAN 
EKONOMINYA 
ABSTRAK 
Sejak reformasi ekonomi China bermula pada tahun 1978, perusahaan China telah 
mengalami perubahan yang besar. Begitu juga dengan sistem cukai yang telah mengalami 
perubahan mendadak sejak tiga dekad yang lalu, termasuk perlaksanaan cukai pendapatan 
korporat di negara ini. Oleh kerana cukai korporat merupakan satu kos yang signifikan, 
firma-firma telah memperkenalkan pengurusan cukai korporat untuk mengukuhkan 
pembentukan keputusan hal ehwal kewangan. Teori-teori yang wujud sekarang tidak 
konsisten, terumatanya disebabkan struktur unik China yang mengalami peralihan 
daripada sistem sosialis untuk menerima sifat-sifat pasaran. Memandangkan kompleksiti 
ekonomi dan peranan pemerintah yang utama dalam ekonomi China, masih terdapat 
kekurangan yang dapat dieksploitasi oleh syarikat demi faedah mereka, yang boleh 
menjadikan pengurusan cukai antara syarikat yang berdaftar kurang cekap dan tak pasti. 
Objektif utama kajian ini adalah untuk menganalisis kesan-kesan ekonomi pengurusan 
cukai korporat di China. Dengan itu, kajian ini menegaskan tiga persoalan kajian berikut: 
pertamanya, apakah kesan pengurusan cukai korporat pada prestasi syarikat dan 
bagaimanakah pengurusan cukai boleh membantu memaksimumkan prestasi syarikat? 
keduanya, apakah hasil ekonomi daripada pengurusan cukai korporat dan bagaimanakah 
hak-milik kerajaan mempengaruhi hasil tersebut? ketiganya, apakah kesan rasuah dan 
pengpasaran ke atas pengurusan cukai syarikat, dan bagaimanakah ia mempengaruhi 
prestasi syarikat? Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahawa pengurusan cukai syarikat 
membawa kesan negatif terhadap nilai pasaran firma, yang disokong oleh teori agensi 
pengurusan cukai. Namun demikian, pengurusan cukai syarikat boleh mendorong 
peningkatan nilai pasaran firma melalui pengingkatan keuntungan secara tak langsung 
yang menunjukkan bahawa pengurusan cukai korporat boleh membantu tetapi ia perlukan 
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mekanisme tadbiran urus syarikat yang berkesan. Seterusnya, hasil kajian menunjukkan 
bahawa pengurusan cukai korporat mempunyai potensi untuk memudaratkan hasil 
pasaran masa depan untuk menyebabkan kemuncupan harga saham, yang menyokong 
teori penimbunan buruk. Penemuan menunjukkan bahawa hak-milik pemerintah tidak 
boleh mengelakkan risiko pengecutan ini. Sesungguhnya, perusahaan yang dikawal 
diperingkat bandar lebih cenderung untuk menghadapi risiko pengecutan daripada 
perusahaan lain. Akhirnya, dapatan menunjukkan bahawa rasuah menjejaskan 
pengurusan cukai syarikat secara tidak linear di China, yang menyokong teori grabbing 
hand dan helping hand. Rasuah didapati mempengaruhi prestasi pengurusan cukai 
syarikat secara positif. Maka, proses pengembangan peranan pasaran adalah penting 
untuk mengurangkan kesan rasuah dalam pengurusan cukai syarikat pada kedua-dua fasa 
keluk terbalik “U”. Pada keseluruhannya, tesis ini menunjukkan bahawa pengurusan 
cukai syarikat adalah satu strategi penting dalam pengurusan kewangan yang boleh 
digubal untuk meningkatkan kekayaan pemegang saham. Walau bagaimanapun, 
disebabkan masalah agensi kesan benar pengurusan cukai korporat masih tak pasti. 
Penyelesaian untuk menangani masalah agensi adalah untuk meningkatkan pengurusan 
syarikat dengan tadbir urus korporat dalaman melalui penyelarasan yang berkesan dengan 
pasaran luar dan pembangunan institusi. 
Kata kunci: Pengurusan cukai korporat, Prestasi ekonomi, Perusahaan berdaftar China, 
Struktur sosialis, Pengembangan peranan pasaran 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
This first chapter sets the stage for understanding the importance and nature of the 
subject to be studied in this thesis. It begins by providing the background of this study, 
including China’s tax system reforms, and presents the motivation for undertaking this 
study. In light of the background and motivation of the study, this chapter presents the 
problem statement and research questions. In this process, the term of corporate tax 
management defined. The organizational structure of this thesis is summarized in the last 
section of this chapter. 
1.1. Background of Study 
Corporate taxation has a multiple role for stakeholders including governments and 
enterprises. From the perspective of government, corporate taxation is important to 
generate fiscal revenue, which is necessary to finance infrastructure construction, and the 
provision of public goods. From the perspective of enterprises, corporate tax management 
can help generate significant cost reduction and manage better cash flows available to the 
enterprises. Thus, there are incentives for enterprises to manage better taxes, and 
corporate tax management has thus been introduced in enterprises as a strategy to reduce 
the corporate tax burden, which is a key strategy used by modern enterprises.  
Research on corporate tax management in China is still in its infancy. From a 
traditional view of corporate tax management, it represents an activity of transferring 
wealth from the state or government to shareholders (Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika 
Dharmapala, 2009). But it is too idealistic to assume that such management activities can 
always increase firm value as there can be agency conflicts between principals and agents 
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inherent in public listed firms. Therefore, corporate tax management can be employed to 
facilitate managerial opportunism (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Mihir A. Desai & 
Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009), causing uncertainty in the outcomes of such management 
activities. Hence, the consequences of tax management have generated widespread 
attention among stakeholders and researchers.  
Moreover, in the setting of modern corporations with separation of ownership and 
control, firms’ internal and external factors will influence the ultimate outcomes of tax 
management, such as corporate governance, institutional environment, and legislation 
protection (Lee, Dobiyanski, & Minton, 2015; Li, Luo, Wang, & Foo, 2016; Minnick & 
Noga, 2010). Compared to developed countries with a sound and comprehensive legal 
protection system, the undeveloped external environment in emerging countries would 
likely give rise to more uncertainty in the outcomes of corporate tax management.  
Since Chinese economic reforms and opening-up policy began in 1978, the economy 
has experienced remarkable changes and achieved a “growth miracle”. However, its 
corporate tax system is still at an early and exploratory stage, which is far from being 
complete (Hussain & Zhuang, 2013). Specifically, the collection of corporate income tax 
has become the second largest government tax revenue which started in 1980s, while 
before the 1980s China had in place a centrally-planned economy model modelled from 
the Soviet Union. The national economy was almost controlled by wholly state-owned 
enterprises, with all their profits enjoyed directly by the state instead of through taxes. 
Then in 1984, China implemented the “replacement of profit by tax” (ligaishui, see the 
following section) on state-owned enterprises. But at that time, China was still a command 
economy, which meant that Its enterprises income taxes were much different from their 
counterparts in a market economy. Because the government fully controlled wages and 
prices, there was no motivation to undertake rent-seeking.   
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To continue to deepen economic reforms and enhance efficiency of state-owned 
enterprises, China adopted enterprise reforms using a process of corporatization and 
privatization. A Company Law was promulgated in December 1993 to provide a legal 
framework for corporatizing state-owned enterprises, and to transform traditional state 
enterprises into modern corporations with clear property rights. Then, while maintaining 
the controlling rights of state enterprises, the government corporatized the largest state-
owned enterprises and “pillar industries” and promoted the privatization of small- and 
medium-size state-owned enterprises. At the same time, the government began to change 
the relationship between government and enterprises, eliminated monopoly in purchasing 
and marketing, and reduced direct administrative control, replacing it with 
“decentralization of power and transfer of profits” (fangquan rangli) to state owned 
enterprises and their managers. Thus, managers have been given decision-making 
authority, as well as, their salaries have been tied to enterprise's achievement. These 
changes have not only been significant in determining the amount of tax revenue 
generated, they have also opened up possibilities and motivations to enterprises to engage 
in tax management. Thus, the phenomenon of agent moral hazard has emerged in China. 
Thereby, corporate taxes have become an important topic among Chinese enterprises. 
Moreover, because the establishment and development of the modern Chinese tax 
system and market mechanism is still relatively new, it is beset by many problems and 
deficiencies, leaving ample room for opportunist behavior. Corporate tax management 
provides the tools to encourage such behavior. Therefore, the research of corporate tax 
management in China is relatively new and is still in its infancy so that more work needs 
be done to enrich it so as to provide useful guideline to investors, shareholders, and 
policymakers. In addition, because China is still a developing and transitional country, it 
may offer helpful lessons for other developing and transition countries.   
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Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 show Chinese national tax revenues collected from the top 
main tax categories during 2005 to 2015. The green line in Figure 1.1 shows that corporate 
income tax is the second largest national tax revenue in China, and that it increased 
sharply from 1.28 trillion to 2.71 trillion during 2010 to 2015.  
Table 1.1: National Tax Revenue from 2005 to 2015 
 
 
Domestic 
VAT    
(100 
million)
Business 
tax         
(100 
million)
State 
excise tax    
(100 
million)
 Tariff                  
(100 
million)
Personal 
income tax   
(100 
million)
Corporate 
income tax 
(100 
million)
2005 10792.11 4232.46 1633.81 1066.17 2094.91 5343.92
2006 12784.81 5128.71 1885.69 1141.78 2453.71 7039.60
2007 15470.23 6582.17 2206.83 1432.57 3185.58 8779.25
2008 17996.94 7626.39 2568.27 1769.95 3722.31 11175.63
2009 18481.22 9013.98 4761.22 1483.81 3949.35 11536.84
2010 21093.48 11157.91 6071.55 2027.83 4837.27 12843.54
2011 24266.63 13679.00 6936.21 2559.12 6054.11 16769.64
2012 26415.51 15747.64 7875.58 2783.93 5820.28 19654.53
2013 28810.13 17233.02 8231.32 2630.61 6531.53 22427.20
2014 30855.36 17781.73 8907.12 2843.41 7376.61 24642.19
2015 31109.47 19312.84 10542.16 2560.84 8617.27 27133.87
Table 1.1 National Tax Revenue from 2005 to 2015
Source from: National Bureau of Statistics of China
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Figure 1.1: National Tax Revenue from 2005 to 2015 
(Source from: National Bureau of Statistics of China) 
 
 
1.2. China’s Tax System Reforms  
Since China’s economic reform and opening-up begun in 1978, Chinese enterprises 
have started to modernize. The tax system reform as a main pillar of overall economic 
reforms has faced several significant breakthroughs during the last three decades. The 
development of China’s tax system has gone through three major stages since the 
founding of the Republic of China in 1949.  
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The first stage is from the early establishment of the Republic of China to opening-up 
and reforms (1949 to 1978), during which period China’s tax system experienced a 
bumpy road due to the political and economic conditions at that time. Especially during 
1957 to 1978, because of erroneous ‘Left’ policies and the impact of the former Soviet 
Union’s economic theory and fiscal system, the construction of China’s tax system 
suffered a serious disruption. The tax reform was characterized by unbalanced 
simplification. As a result, many tax organizations were merged into other organizations, 
and a large number of tax staff were compelled to change their jobs thereby, weakening 
the role of taxation in the economy and hindering the performance of the function of 
taxation.  
The second stage is from the opening-up and reforms in 1978 to 1993, during which 
time China focused on the establishment and consolidation of the new China tax system. 
Also from this period, China’s financial and tax departments studied the tax reform in 
China with a view to establish a modern tax system appropriate to the early economic 
conditions of the Chinese economic system under reform. Specifically, in 1984, the 
practice of “substitution of tax payment for profit delivery” (ligaishui) on state-owned 
enterprises was implemented, which established a strong relationship between the State 
and the enterprises within the taxation system. Up to then, state-owned enterprises started 
to pay income tax instead of turning over all profits to the State.  
From 1994, China started its third stage of tax system reforms, during which time the 
tax system was comprehensively deepened. Especially, two major reforms of corporate 
income tax were implemented in 1994 and 2008. At the end of 1993, China’s State 
Council enacted the Regulation on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income Tax Law 
of China, which became effective on January 1, 1994. The scale and scope of the 1994’s 
tax reform was the largest and most comprehensive since the Republic of China was 
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founded. The Regulation set the corporate statutory tax rate at 33%; at the same time, 
favorable tax incentives were provided in different regions and for specific industries. At 
that time, the state introduced the policy of first levying and then rebating taxes (FLTRT) 
for their local governments to attract capital investment. Corporate taxes in China were 
classified as central revenue and local revenue, collected by the National Taxation Bureau 
(guoshuiju) and Local Taxation Bureau (dishuiju), respectively. However, this policy 
brought about competition between local governments. To prevent this, the central 
government issued a formal ruling to prohibit local governments from providing local tax 
rebates. This took effect on January 1, 2002, together with requiring local governments 
to surrender 50% of the income tax revenue collected from local enterprises in 2001. Later 
in 2003, the proportion of corporate income tax shared by the central government 
increased from 50% to 60%1.  
The second major reform of corporate income tax was the 2008’s tax reform. On 
March 16, 2007, the fifth Session of the tenth National People’s Congress (NPC) 
approved the new Corporate Income Tax Law, which took effect on January 1, 2008. The 
new income tax law set a unified statutory tax rate of 25% for both domestic and foreign 
companies, and changed the current tax holiday, preferential tax treatments and 
transitional provisions. Under the previous tax law, domestic companies were assessed at 
a 33% statutory income tax rate; while certain foreign companies enjoyed preferential tax 
rates of 24% to 15%.  
Through the above described series of reforms, China’s tax system has been improved 
and has become more standardized, which has led to a significant growth of national tax 
                                                        
1 The sharing of corporate income taxes: except for the part belonging to the central government as ruled, 60% and 40% of the rest 
is shared by the central government and the local government, respectively. See more details from “Tax System of The People’s 
Republic of China” by Liu (2014). 
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revenue. It has provided a solid foundation for China’s economic reforms.  
1.3. Motivation of Study 
Corporate taxes represent one of the most substantial costs to a company resulting in 
a reduction in its distributable cash flows, so that reducing taxes is a powerful 
motivational strategy in corporate operations. And it motives shareholders to reduce their 
tax burden by means of tax management activities.  
Corporate tax management may imply either managerial value-maximizing behavior 
or a greater potential for agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Since 
corporate opacity could be exploited by opportunistic managers to extract private benefits 
at shareholders’ expenses, investigating the impact of tax management can help investors 
understand the degree of coupling between tax management and rent extraction (Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2006).  
At present, there are limited systematic studies on the consequences of corporate tax 
management in China as existing studies do not provide much guidance. Compared with 
research on developed markets, especially the U.S, studies of corporate tax management 
in emerging markets in general and China in particular are very limited. However, 
Chinese enterprises tend to show a concentrated ownership structure, limited information 
disclosure, highly politicized institutional arrangements, and incomplete legislation on 
investor protection (Svensson, 2005). These leakages and imperfections offer more 
opportunities to facilitate enterprises to engage in different kinds of corporate tax 
management to reduce their tax burden. But in the context of widespread tax management 
in Chinese enterprises, it may not be accompanied by a simultaneously beneficial 
consequence to enterprises. Hence, this thesis attempts to provide a robust and systematic 
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understanding of the economic consequences of corporate tax management in China. 
 Moreover, the reforms of state-owned enterprises took place stage by stage, revealing 
a process of corporatization and privatization in order to raise funds for expansion and to 
increase revenue. Those reforms have shaped “Chinese-style privatization”. This thesis 
takes the enterprise reform phased phenomenon of profit-oriented listed state-owned 
enterprises into consideration, which is a special kind of enterprises with China characters. 
The enterprise reform facilitates enterprises to pursue profits, which changed the 
traditional view of state enterprises with lower efficiency. However, partial privatization 
of wholly state-owned enterprises may carry institutional problems. Control rights are 
transferred to managers, which offer them opportunities to pursue self-interests, such as 
stealing state assets, thereby causing agency costs and increased risks. Thus, state 
ownership need also to be taken into account in this study.  
Most empirical literature on tax management in China focus on how firms’ internal  
characteristics, such as firm size, ownership and leverage, affect corporate tax 
management and its outcomes (Adhikari, Derashid, & Zhang, 2006; Badertscher, Katz, 
& Rego, 2013; Wu, Wang, Luo, & Gillis, 2012), while ignoring the special macro-
environment determinants specific to China. As the largest transition economy, China has 
gone through a gradual transition from a central-planned economy to a market-oriented 
economy and to achieve rapid GDP growth, which makes research in this market 
intriguing. Therefore, when we examine the determinants of corporate tax management, 
we should look beyond firm-level determinants to also take into account macro-level 
characteristics. A more comprehensive set of macro-factors of corporate tax management 
need to be considered. Therefore, the above discussion provides the motivation for this 
thesis to try to examine the consequences of corporate tax management taking account of 
the special features of China’s economy. 
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1.4. Problem Statement 
As mentioned above, from a traditional view of corporate tax management, it is 
regarded as an approach of corporate tax saving, which involves profits being transferred 
from government to shareholders thereby resulting in higher firm value. However, under 
modern corporations (especially listed corporations), one of the most marked 
characteristic is the separation of ownership and management, which gives shareholders 
and managers a different time horizon. Managers as direct operators, can always know 
the information earlier and better than shareholders, leading to a situation of asymmetric 
information. Thus, manager’s behaviors and decisions can directly influence corporate 
performance. Therefore, managerial rent extraction can consist of tax management 
activities (Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009; Kim, Li, & Zhang, 2011; 
Zhang, Cheong, & Rajah, 2016), which may lead to uncertain outcomes.  
On the plus side, if tax management activities indeed benefit enterprises through 
reducing corporate taxes accompanied by increasing a firm’s cash flow, how the increased 
cash flow acts are used to raise firm value is a question that needs to be examined.  
On the negative side, tax management can facilitate rent extraction behavior, 
increasing the costs of tax management and harming firm wealth. More specifically, 
managers also face short-term incentives, such as their employment contract, 
remuneration, and career concerns, which would motivate them to conceal negative 
operating performance. At this time, the complex and obscure nature of tax management 
practices provides a mask to help managers hide bad news and financial information from 
shareholders and the public. But in time the accumulated negative news would leave a 
huge future moral hazard. When such news reaches a certain level, it would suddenly be 
released to the market, which could cause extreme consequences, such as firms’ stock 
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price crash (Kim, Li, & Zhang, 2011; Li, Luo, Wang, & Foo, 2016). Hence, the outcomes 
of tax management as a function of time, and how they change over time are well worth 
exploring.  
Modern Chinese listed state-owned enterprises are a product of reform of former state-
owned enterprises, which have become partially privatized though they are still 
government controlled. The reform has transformed them to become more profit-oriented 
with modern corporate governance structures in place, and more profitable and efficient. 
At the same time, the reform also gives them more autonomy than before, which can 
cause conflicts of interests between the top executives (bureaucratic agency officials) and 
shareholders. The autonomy enjoyed by the executives motivates them to maximize their 
personal interests, such as political career or/and compensation, even if it may increase 
potential risk. However, the government as ultimate controlling shareholder of listed 
SOEs also may act to offer them the “helping hand”, when they meet serious crisis. Hence, 
it is interesting to explore the role of government ownership when a crisis comes. 
China’s economy has achieved significant growth and improvement during the past 
three decades, and is well on the way towards marketization. However, China is still a 
developing country undergoing economic and social transformation. It is still 
characterized by imperfect legal regimes, coupled with strong government intervention 
(Chen, 2015; Tu, Lin, & Liu, 2013). That is why with rapid economic growth, corruption 
in China is believed to be growing. Corruption, therefore, has become one of the biggest 
hidden dangers affecting China’s economic activities. Hence, research is needed to 
investigate how market development and corruption influence firms’ activities. How tax 
management and corruption are linked is another question to be explored.  
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1.5. Research Questions and Objectives 
Based on the research problems discussed above, this thesis seeks answers to the 
following three main research questions.  
Research Question 1: What is the relationship between corporate tax management and 
firm performance in China’s listed enterprises, and how does the after-tax cash arising 
from tax management benefit firms’ market value? (Chapter 3） 
Research Question 2: What are the extreme market outcomes of corporate tax 
management in China’s listed enterprises, and how does government ownership influence 
these extreme outcomes? (Chapter 4) 
Research Question 3: How does corruption and marketization impact corporate tax 
management in China’s listed enterprises, and how does corruption interact corporate tax 
management, which in turn impacts firm performance? (Chapter 5)  
The following research objectives are framed to answer the above research questions. 
Objective 1: To examine the relationship between tax management and firm 
performance through firm’s profitability, growth and market value, and to explore their 
interaction. 
Objective 2: To investigate the relationship between tax management and stock price 
crash risk in the current year and over the future, and to examine the moderating role of 
government ownership on this relationship.   
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Objective 3: To examine the impact of corruption on corporate tax management, and 
to test the moderating role of marketization on this relationship. An additional and related 
objective is to investigate the moderating role of corruption on the relationship between 
tax management and firm performance. 
1.6. Corporate Tax Management: Concept and Definition 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, p. 137) state that “if tax avoidance represents a 
continuum of tax planning strategies where something like municipal bond investments 
are at one end (lower explicit tax, perfectly legal), then terms such as ‘‘noncompliance,’’ 
‘‘evasion,’’ “aggressiveness,’’ and ‘‘sheltering’’ would be closer to the other end of the 
continuum.” Following Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), corporate tax management is 
defined broadly as any transaction that can reduce a firm’s explicit income taxes liabilities, 
resulting in a lower corporate effective income tax rate (ETR). This thesis covers tax 
management that is fully legal, and/or those that occupy a grey area, and may also include 
those that are illegal.2  
To minimize semantic confusion, the term ‘‘tax management’’ is used throughout the 
thesis, while the following terms may also be used interchangeably, for example, “tax 
avoidance”, “tax aggressiveness”, or “tax sheltering”. 
1.7. Organization of Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, theoretical and empirical literature 
related to corporate tax management is reviewed. Based on the literature review, the 
                                                        
2 There are at least two reasons that made this thesis did not distinguish between technically legal tax planning and illegal aggressive 
tax evasion. First, most of the behavior in question surrounds transactions that are often technically legal. Second, the legality of a tax 
management transaction is normally determined after the fact. Therefore, those avoidance activities may include both certain tax 
positions and uncertain tax positions that may or may not be challenged and determined illegal. 
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chapter will discuss the research gaps and opportunities. Chapter 2 introduces the 
theoretical and analytical framework of this thesis. At the end, a brief introduction of the 
research methodology is provided.  
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are the three analytical chapters, which show the empirical results 
and answer the three research questions of this thesis. Chapter 3 examines the relationship 
between tax management and firm performance via firms’ profitability, growth, and 
market value; and subsequently, explains how the additional after-tax cash arising from 
tax management would help expand firms’ market value.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the extreme market outcomes of corporate tax management. 
Chinese enterprises have experienced a series of reforms, but state shares still account for 
the largest part of shares of listed enterprises in China. Chapter 4 investigates the 
moderating role of different levels of government ownership (central-, provincial-, and 
municipal- listed SOEs) on the extreme outcomes.  
Chapter 5 explores the relationship between the macro determinants of corruption and 
marketization on corporate tax management in Chinese listed enterprises. It then 
discusses how corruption impacts corporate tax management and the relationship between 
tax management and firm performance.  
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of this thesis. The chapter also discusses the 
scientific contribution of this thesis to the body of knowledge. It draws implications for 
theory, policy and practice. Finally, the chapter ends up with recommendations for future 
studies.  
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews the existing debates on corporate tax management. There are 
eight sections in this chapter: Section 2.2 discusses the related key theories in this thesis, 
which are agency theory, bad news hoarding theory, helping and grabbing hand 
hypotheses. Section 2.3 reviews prior empirical studies of corporate tax management 
under the modern corporations, and presents three specific features of China’s market, 
which are government ownership, corruption, and marketization. Based on the above 
review, Section 2.4 discusses the research gaps and opportunities provided by the 
previous research. Then, Section 2.5 and 2.6 introduce the theoretical and analytical 
frameworks of this study. Section 2.7 provides a brief introduction of research 
methodology. Finally, Section 2.8 concludes the chapter.  
2.2.  Theoretical Underpinnings 
Various firm theories have been formulated in explaining the different behaviors of 
modern listed enterprises. Agency theory has been widely applied to explain the complex 
control problems in modern enterprises. In this section, the study firstly has a brief review 
of agency theory under the modern corporation system, which reflects the beneficial 
conflicts between agents and principals. Then, corporate tax management under such 
agent conflict environment will be discussed. Secondly, consistent with agency theory, 
the study describes another theory related to tax management, the bad news hoarding 
theory which suggests an undesirable market outcomes of tax management. Since 
governments play an important role in China’s economic market, the study will further 
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review two opposite hypotheses related to governments, which are “helping hand” and 
“grabbing hand”, to help to understand how governments and enterprises interact in a 
transition economy.  
2.2.1. Agency Theory 
In the theory of the firm, “the firm is a ‘black box’ operated so as to meet the relevant 
marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs, thereby maximizing profits, or 
more accurately, present value” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, pp. 306-307). Thus, the 
fundamental principle of the firms is maximizing behavior or more specific profit 
maximization. Yet, it had ignored the conflicts between individual participants. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) put forward the agency theory, employing the metaphor of a contract 
to describe the agency relationship of the separation between the principal and the agent. 
Meanwhile, the principal engages the agent to perform some work on its behalf, and at 
the same time, delegates some authority of corporate decision-making to the agent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, individuals have always been 
characterized as rational and self-interested pursuing value-oriented activities (Scott, 
2000). If both parties of principal and agent are utility maximizers, a conflict of interests 
between them will exist. It cannot guarantee that the agent will operate in the best interests 
of the principal, which may harm the wealth of principal. Accordingly, agency costs are 
generated. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency costs as the sum of expenditures 
of monitoring by the principal and bonding by the agent, and the “residual loss” 
representing the reduction of principal’s interests due to the divergence between the 
principal and agent.  
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2.2.1.1. Agency View of Corporate Tax Management 
The classic research of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) contributes to theoretical and 
empirical analysis on individual tax management. For individuals, the motivations of tax 
management is determined by both extrinsic motivation (the probability of detection and 
punishment, the penalty structure, and the risk aversion of the potential evader) 
(Allingham & Sandmo, 1972) and intrinsic motivation (civic virtue, and duty). Then, 
Slemrod (2004) argues that it also applies to closely-held small business without well-
diversified owners’ wealth. In this case, the tax situation of a firm and the tax situation of 
the owners are closely related. But Slemrod (2004) also points out the differences between 
individual and large, especially public listed enterprises, stressing that the feature of the 
separation between ownership and control should be taken into consideration. The 
Table 2.1: Agency Theory Overview 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient 
organization of information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions 
Self-interest; 
Bounded rationality; 
Risk aversion 
Organizational assumptions 
Partial goal conflict among participants; 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion; 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection); 
Risk sharing 
Problem domain 
Relationships in which the principal and agent have 
partly differing goals and risk preferences (e.g., 
compensation, regulation, leadership, impression 
management, whistle-blowing, vertical integration, 
transfer pricing) 
Source from: Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review by Eisenhardt (1989, p. 59) 
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following studies of Chen and Chu (2005) and Crocker and Slemrod (2005) further 
support that corporate tax management should be analyzed in the framework of principal-
agent problems.  
Under the separation of ownership and control, there are two alternative perspectives 
of corporate tax management. From one side, corporate tax management can be viewed 
as a worthwhile activity, as managers act on behalf of owners to reduce firms’ costs to 
achieve profit maximization. In this case, managers engaging in corporate tax 
management to reduce tax burden is a value enhancement activity. This relies upon 
corporate owners structuring appropriate incentives to ensure managers make tax-
efficient decisions. By being corporate tax efficient, the marginal benefits of the tax 
avoiding transaction exceed the marginal costs (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Phillips 
(2003) finds that compensating business-unit managers on an after-tax basis will reduce 
corporate effective tax rates.  
The following studies have introduced the agency costs into corporate tax management, 
known as agency perspective on corporate tax management. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
investigate the relationship between tax sheltering and corporate governance. They argue 
that the complexity and obfuscation of the tax sheltering activities would cause 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, providing opportunities to 
managers engaging in self-interests enhancement. Moreover, such complicated tax 
sheltering would also facilitate managerial opportunism and resource diversion (Mihir A 
Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009), which would further harm shareholders’ wealth. 
Simply put, corporate tax management can be viewed as a complement of managerial 
diversion. Thus, given the potential role of agency costs, the consequences of corporate 
tax management are inconclusive. 
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2.2.2. Bad News Hoarding Theory 
In practice, the market always suffers opaqueness and imperfect protection of property 
rights. Thus, how the limited information and poor protection of investors affect the risk 
bearing between inside managers and outside investors has drawn wide attention among 
researchers in recent years.  
Consistent with the nature of agency problems, Jin and Myers (2006) develop bad 
news hoarding theory by employing a theoretical model with country-average data. When 
firms are in a non-transparent market, the outside investors (outsiders) can obtain market-
wide information but limited firm-specific information, while the inside managers 
(insiders) as the party who manage day-to-day operations, can capture more firms’ cash 
flow and firm-specific information. Because of the conflicting interests between insiders 
and outsiders, the information asymmetry between the two parties motivates managers to 
pursue their self-interests and sacrifice shareholders’ interests. Thus, this would facilitate 
insiders to strenuously conceal firms’ bad news and show a perfect performance. Prior 
literature finds that both financial and non-financial incentives motivate managers to 
withhold bad news. Basu (1997) claims that if managerial compensation is correlated with 
reported earnings, managers will have higher motivation to conceal any adverse 
information. Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009) and Ball (2009) find that the incentive of 
achieving self-benefits, such as career concerns and empire building, facilitates managers 
to hide negative information in the firm and overstate financial performance.  
In an environment of information opaqueness, with the hidden bad news accumulating, 
the external market will overvalue the firms’ stock price. While, the amount of bad news 
that can be hidden by managers is limited, when the accumulated news reaches a certain 
threshold, all the bad news will be released to the market at once. This will cause an 
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onslaught on firms’ stock price resulting in a stock price crash (Hutton, Marcus, & 
Tehranian, 2009; Jin & Myers, 2006). Bleck and Liu (2007) further find that managers 
always potentially hide news of firms’ poor financial performance, which hinders 
shareholders’ and investors’ ability to distinguish bad projects from good at an early stage, 
resulting in asset price crashes.  
Therefore, Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) argue that the complex and opaque nature of 
corporate tax management can be employed by managers as a tool or mask to manipulate 
earnings and hide bad news, which may increase the probability of future stock price 
crashes. Therefore, under the theories of agency cost and bad news hoarding, corporate 
tax management can lead to potential market risks to enterprises.  
2.2.3. Helping Hand and Grabbing Hand Hypotheses 
For a country experiencing economic transformation, the government plays an 
important role, intervening in economic activities. There are two alternative hypotheses 
to explain the interactions between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs in the transition 
economy. These are the “helping hand” hypothesis and the “grabbing hand” hypothesis.  
Under the helping hand perspective (see Frye and Shleifer (1997)), bureaucrats can 
gain self-interests through promoting local business, such as providing help to some firms 
especially for those with political connection (Cheung, Rau, & Stouraitis, 2008). In this 
case, the legal system plays a limited role. Corruption is a pervasive behavior, but it is 
relatively limited and organized. Bribe becomes an efficient approach to help firms gain 
the helping hand from government; firms paying a bribe can bypass dysfunctional 
regulation and obtain more preferential treatment. Prior empirical studies also find that if 
a firm operates in a less developed governance and weak regulation environment, a 
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bribing mechanism can facilitate economic transactions (Jiang & Nie, 2014; Petrou & 
Thanos, 2014). 
On the other side, government may also play a role of “grabbing hand” in economic 
activities. In this scenario, government is more like an interventionist, which exhibits 
disorganized feature (Frye & Shleifer, 1997). The government loses its ability to provide 
legal protections to firms. Moreover, such government has a huge number of self-
interested bureaucrats expropriating wealth from firms to improve personal interests 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). In this case, corruption acts as a “grabbing hand”, which 
creates huge costs for economic activities and distorts resource allocation, destroying 
economic development (Jiang & Nie, 2014; Mauro, 1995; Petrou & Thanos, 2014). As a 
consequence, firms have to shoulder more costs and suffer heavy uncertainties. 
 Frye and Shleifer (1997) point out that the above situations are “ideal types”, which 
may not run independently. In reality, with unbalanced market development in different 
regions in China, the extend of government intervention and marketization may vary 
considerably across regions, which provides an opportunity to explore the both views. 
Table 2.2: Economic Role of the State During Transition 
Model Legal environment Regulatory environment 
Helping hand Government is above law but uses 
power to help business. State officials 
enforce contracts.  
Government aggressively 
regulates to promote some 
businesses. Organized 
corruption.  
Grabbing hand Government is above law and uses 
power to extract rents. The legal 
system does not work.  
Predatory regulations. 
Disorganized corruption.  
Source from: The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand by Frye and Shleifer (1997, 
p. 355) 
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2.3. Empirical Studies 
2.3.1. Motivations Underlying Corporate Tax Management  
Corporate tax management is becoming an universal economic phenomenon, arousing 
broad attention and research into the motivations of such management activities (Hanlon 
& Heitzman, 2010). From a traditional perspective, tax management is viewed as a 
financial strategy transferring profits from government to shareholders (Mihir A. Desai 
& Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009). Thus, the original motivation of firms pursuing tax 
management is to reduce corporate tax burdens and increase after-tax cash flow (Scholes, 
Wolfson, Erickson, Hanlon, Maydew, & Shevlin, 2015), which is beneficial to their 
bottom line by lowering the costs.    
However, as discussed aforementioned, under an agency view of corporate tax 
management, such obfuscatory tax management activities can shelter managers acting in 
various forms of self-interests activities by managerial rent extraction, such as earnings 
manipulation and insider transactions (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). Managers can 
disguise complex tax avoiding transactions under the ostensible objective of reducing 
firms’ tax obligations to conduct managerial opportunism and resource diversion (Desai 
& Dharmapala, 2006; Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009). Badertscher et 
al., (2013) support the idea that managers can use tax management to engage in shirking 
and rent extraction activities, which improve their self-interests. Thus, under the conflict 
of interests between shareholders and managers, corporate tax management becomes an 
useful instrument of managers to pursue self-interests, which would less benefit or harm 
the interests of shareholders (Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009; Desai, 
Dyck, & Zingales, 2007).  
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Furthermore, many studies reveal that due to incomplete and asymmetric information 
(Fama, 1980; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Scherer, 1988), “corporate myopia” has becoming 
a pervasive and severe phenomenon on the modern corporations (Chemmanur & Ravid, 
1999; Holden & Lundstrum, 2009; Lundstrum, 2002; Nyman, 2005). On one side, 
managers who control day-to-day operations have more private information about their 
firms, which encourage them to pursue short-term profits rather than firms’ long-term 
performance (Grant, King, & Polak, 1996). And top executives may set a “tone at the top” 
stressing short-term cost minimization and profit maximization. On the other side, 
shareholders, especially institutional investors of public listed enterprises are more like 
share traders shifting their focus towards a short time horizon, such as quarterly, half 
yearly, or annual profit, engaging in short-termism behaviors3 . Graves and Waddock 
(1990) argue that institutional ownership taking an active role in a firm’s strategic 
decision-making has limited knowledge of the firms, resulting in non-neutral decision 
and preference for short-term gains. Asker et al., (2014) argue that managers especially 
in listed enterprises tend to prefer short-term profits over long-term success because of 
pressure on short-term financial results. Ultimately, managers have to bear more pressure 
from such short-sighted shareholders to improve short-term performance.  
In the perspectives of “corporate myopia” and “short-termism”, it gives incentives to 
managers employing corporate tax management as a tool to engage in short-term actions. 
Unlike reducing operating costs, tax saving does not cause direct adverse consequences 
on a firm’s daily operation (Edwards, Schwab, & Shevlin, 2013; Koester, Shevlin, & 
Wangerin, 2016). More importantly, corporate tax management offers opportunities to 
managers and short-sighted investors for earnings manipulation and cover up corporate 
                                                        
3 Based on the report from ACCA “Myopic management”. Retrieved from http://www.accaglobal.com/za/en/student/exam-support-
resources/fundamentals-exams-study-resources/f9/technical-articles/myopic-management--causes-and-remedies.html  
24 
 
 
real operating performance to boost short-term stock price.  
2.3.2. Consequences of Corporate Tax Management 
Taxation as a significant cost affects corporate decision-making behaviors and the 
bottom-line performance. Reducing corporate taxes has become a powerful motivational 
force in a corporate life. While corporate tax management may have various impacts on 
the interests of various stakeholders, this thesis lays a strong emphasis on the shareholders’ 
wealth effects of tax management. Shareholders can encourage managers to reduce 
corporate tax liabilities increasing their benefits through designing effective 
compensation incentives (Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009). But complex 
tax avoidance activities would cause internal control system opaqueness, increasing 
information asymmetry between shareholders and managers (Lee, Dobiyanski, & Minton, 
2015). Information asymmetry can offer opportunities to managers pursuing personal 
gains, while shareholders are hardly able to observe the real outcomes of tax management. 
Hence, the consequences of corporate tax management are no longer entirely clear.   
From a theoretical perspective, corporate tax management represents potential value-
enhancement activities conducive to achieving shareholders’ wealth maximization (Mihir 
A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009; Mironov, 2013). But in the agency perspective 
of corporate tax management, the impact of corporate tax management on firm value can 
be extensive. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) find that although there are obvious gains in 
after-tax cash flow, shareholders still may not want managers to work for many tax 
sheltering activities, because such sheltering can create managerial rent diversion, which 
may not necessarily increase shareholders’ value.  
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To strengthen the above results, Wilson (2009) examines the stock return performance 
of tax shelter for the periods before, during, and immediately after sheltering activities. 
He finds that firms with good governance would have significantly higher abnormal 
returns, which is consistent with corporate tax sheltering creating shareholders’ wealth 
for well-governed firms. In addition, Mihir A. Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala (2009) 
find a positive but insignificant relationship between tax avoidance and firm value, but a 
positive relationship for firms with dominant institutional ownership. They argue that tax 
management per se should benefit corporate after-tax cash flow, but this impact would be 
potentially offset by a poor corporate governance mechanism. Moreover, the findings of 
Mironov (2013) support the view that managerial diversion can be concealed in the 
process of tax management, which hurts firm performance. Using a sample from China’s 
listed enterprises, Chen, Hu, Wang, and Tang (2014) find that corporate tax avoidance is 
inversely related to firm value and causes increase of agency costs, but this relation can 
be attenuated by information transparency. Thus, due to tax management fostering agency 
problems, if shareholders cannot fully understand the cost-benefit calculus, tax 
management activities could discount the value of firms. 
Beyond the unclear firm-level outcomes of corporate tax management, recently many 
high-profile corporate accounting scandals, such as Enron and Apple, were revealed and 
managers were accused of using complex tax management to pursue personal interests, 
causing stock price volatility (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009; Kim, Li, & Zhang, 2011; Rego 
& Wilson, 2012). Thus, an increasing number of studies start to investigate the market 
reactions to corporate tax management activities.  
In the study of Swenson (1999), corporate income taxes as a cost lower bottom-line 
profits, so that the stock market perceives low-tax paying firms as being better at 
controlling costs and more profitable firms. Similarly, Wang, Wang, and Gong (2009) find 
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that there is a positive market reaction in China to companies which succeeded in 
reducing tax liabilities. However, Desai and Hines (2002) examine the consequences of 
firms’ inversion announcements, and find that market does not react positively to 
ostensibly tax-saving moves, and often responds negatively. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) 
further support the argument that there is a negative reaction of stock market to news 
about firms involved in aggressive tax avoidance, which may lead to a stock prices 
decrease. At last, they point out that the market can react positively to firms’ tax saving 
activities, on the condition that such avoiding activities are not aggressive. Kim, Li, and 
Zhang (2011) examine the relationship between tax avoidance and future stock price crash 
risk using the data from U.S. market. They find that the complex and opaque nature of 
tax avoidance can be used to hide adverse news to mislead investors for an extended 
period, which may lead to a high likelihood of future stock price crashes. The following 
study of Li, Luo, Wang, and Foo (2016) find the similar answer that tax sheltering 
behaviors positively correlated with future stock price crashes based in China’s listed 
enterprises. But they supplement that the positive relationship can be mitigated by market 
development and external monitoring mechanisms, while strengthened by information 
opacity. Hence, the aggressive tax management can be considered as a risk-engendering 
corporate financial activity.  
In sum, the prior studies show that the consequences of corporate tax management are 
significant variations. Their opposite arguments provide evidences challenging the 
traditional perspective of tax management, which is a value enhancement activity 
benefiting corporate shareholders. Under the agency perspective of tax management, 
opportunistic managers can use tax management as a tool to extract rents, which harms 
firms’ profits and leads to extremely market returns.  
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2.3.3. Specific Characteristics Relevance to China’s Enterprises   
China is changing from a central planned system to a market-oriented economy, 
achieving a notable economic growth during the last three decades. Paradoxically, the 
market shows an obvious characteristic of relationship-based (guanxi) rather than rule-
based, with excessive government interventions coupled with weak legal system (Chen, 
2015). For example, Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) state that China represents an 
significant counterexample to the uneven development of law, finance, and economic 
growth, which is the economic miracle with arguably poor legal protection and financial 
mechanisms. Piotroski and Wong (2012) further find that China’s financial market and 
listed firms are operating in an environment of poor information and highly politicized 
institutional arrangements. The relationship-oriented contracting and social connections 
attenuate the information quality and the protection of property rights. As a result, China 
is ranked among the least transparent economies, where many loopholes in legislation 
exist. Hence, it provides numerous opportunities to managers engaging in managerial 
opportunism in response to such loopholes.  
Given the unique nature of economic, political and institutional environment in China, 
the incentives and consequences of corporate tax management may differ greatly from 
those in developed countries. Thus, to capture the impact of such different macro 
environment, this study takes three distinctive features into consideration, which are 
government ownership, corruption, and market development.   
2.3.3.1. State Ownership 
Given the important role played by state controlled/owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
China’s economy, it is essential to explore the impact of state ownership on the 
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consequences of corporate tax management. Intuitively, SOEs’ managers mostly are 
appointed by government (ultimate controlling shareholders) to act on behalf of the 
government in corporate decision-making. They shoulder more social and political 
responsibilities, such as employments and social security (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Ross, 1973; Xu, Zhu, & Lin, 2005). Compared with managers in private enterprises, SOEs’ 
managers have more incentives to seek future political advancement. The higher level of 
political hierarchy will garner more privileges even after they leave their position (Tu, 
Lin, & Liu, 2013). Since tax is one of the main sources of fiscal revenues, the amount of 
tax paid by SOEs is employed as a key factor to evaluate the performance of SOEs’ 
managers. Hence, the managers have strong incentives to pay more taxes to achieve social 
objectives, which may help them to get greater chances of political promotions (Lin, Lu, 
& Zhang, 2012). Under the above assumption, SOEs would be less likely to avoid taxes, 
which is called bureaucratic incentive effect (Jian, Li, & Zhang, 2013).  
However, the reforms of state-owned enterprises have significantly enhanced the 
efficiency of the managerial labor market, established performance-based bonus policy 
giving the incentives of SOEs’ managers to perform an outstanding performance. The 
Performance Evaluation Guideline for State-Owned Enterprises, published by Chinese 
government in 2002 and 2006, explicitly states that firms’ economic performance is one 
of the key evaluation factors. Therefore, SOEs’ managers have incentives to pursue a self-
serving agenda (for political career advancement and higher compensation) by using tax 
management to conceal adverse operating outcomes and dress up their performance.  
Jian, Li, and Zhang (2013) claims that SOEs may have more incentives to engage in 
tax management, because of their direct connection with governments. Government 
ownership can help SOEs gain a “helping hand” from the government through tax 
incentives, at the same time, reducing the likelihood of tax audits, and even avoiding or 
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limiting being punished in the event of tax evasion (Jian, Li, & Zhang, 2013; Li, Wang, 
Wu, & Xiao, 2016; Wu, Wang, Luo, & Gillis, 2012). Simply put, managers of SOEs have 
more opportunities to take advantages of the preferential treatment from the government 
to avoid taxes for personal interests. In addition, Tang and Firth (2011) argue that listed 
local state-owned/controlled enterprises (including provincial level and municipal level 
listed SOEs) have more incentives to seek earnings and tax management. This is because 
local governments as the largest shareholders are the largest beneficiaries of high after-
tax profits. In addition, the tax-sharing policy in China requires local governments to 
share the income tax paid by the local SOEs with central government. Hence, local 
governments have strong incentives to encourage local SOEs to boost earnings. 
As above discussion shows, managers of SOEs have more space and motivation to use 
their political connection to pursue self-interests agenda, such as a political career, 
compensation contract. But in the meanwhile, such behaviors may cause potential risk. 
Thus, a question is raised as to whether governments as ultimate controlling shareholders 
of SOEs will protect them when they meet crisis. In addition, are there any different 
impacts among firms controlled by different government administrative ranks is another 
question to ask. 
2.3.3.2. Corruption  
Officials and businessmen are rational people with self-serving characteristics. 
Generally, officials’ bribe-taking or enterprises’ bribery will be conducted when they 
believe that their benefits exceed the costs and penalty in the process of corruption. 
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China represents a worthy study for the topic of corruption because of its specific 
cultural characteristics in social and business behaviors. China has undergone dramatic 
reforms of economy and market, but the market still has its noteworthy characteristics of 
relationship-oriented ( also known as “guanxi”) rather than rule-based applied widely in 
the western countries (Martinsons, 2005). This causes the paradoxical phenomenon of 
rapid economic growth with a rising corruption in China (Wedeman, 2012). Corruption 
in China is deemed as a “normal” behavior (Jain, 2001), or even been viewed as 
“qianguize” (“hidden rules of the game”), which existed in social, political, and economic 
activities (Faure & Fang, 2008). Recent research also demonstrates that corruption in 
China is more “intensified” and “institutionalized” (Jianming & Zhizhou, 2008; 
Wederman, 2004), growing in sophistication and complexity, relating to greater economic 
interaction (Gong, 2002).   
Besides the above cultural traditions in China, research also attributes corruption to 
the incompleteness of China’s economic reforms (Oi, 1989). During China’s fiscal 
decentralization reform, the central government has granted more autonomy and authority 
to local governments, giving local officials more discretionary power. Thus, the increased 
discretionary power simultaneously provides more opportunities for local officials to 
pursue bribe-seeking (Ngo, 2008). Under a high rate of government intervention, Ngo 
(2008) finds that firms are more prone to bribe their local government officials for extra 
preferential policies and economic advantage, including direct subsidy such as tax 
benefits, tax break or tax reduction, and grants. Manion (1996) examines the corruption 
in Chinese enterprise licensing system, and finds that problematic institutional design, 
bureaucratic discretion, and ambiguity of government regulations, have enabled officials 
to bribe in the process of licensing.  
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In recent years, scholars have begun to consider the impact of corruption, while the 
results are contested shown two opposite views. From a traditional view of corruption, it 
acts as a “grabbing hand”, representing a significant cost for economic activities that may 
distort resource allocation, which results in a negatively effects on growth and 
development of economic activities (Jiang & Nie, 2014; Mauro, 1995; Petrou & Thanos, 
2014). On the other hand, some studies support the hypothesis of “helping hand” or 
“grease the wheels”, in which they argued that if a country suffers poor governance, ill-
functioning institutions, and heavy regulation, a bribing mechanism can help circumvent 
such inefficiency and facilitate economic activities (Egger & Winner, 2005; Jiang & Nie, 
2014; Sharma & Mitra, 2015). In this scenario, the margin benefits of corruption are 
higher than its margin costs. The above opposite views suggest that the effect of 
corruption on economic activities may be more complicated.  
In the context of a transition economy, whether corruption is harmful is becoming an 
interesting and important empirical question. Presently, a large number of studies of the 
impact of corruption have been done in macro literature, such as economic development 
and FDI (Barassi & Zhou, 2012; Gunter, 2017; Petrou & Thanos, 2014; Saha & Ben Ali, 
2017). However, at firm level, only few studies have addressed this issue, especially in 
the case of transition countries. China as the largest transition economy serves as an 
important case. To the incomplete market mechanism in China, we cannot simply put 
corruption into a black or white box. Moreover, corruption plays a complicated role that 
would influence interests of different parties, both at the micro-level and macro-level. 
Thus, this study will examine the impact of corruption on corporate tax management and 
its impact on the link of tax management – firm performance as a starting point to explore 
the deep-rooted incentives behind the corruption. 
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2.3.3.3. Marketization 
From a typical view, institutional variation exists across countries with many in-depth 
cross-country comparative analysis (Chen, Zhai, Wang, & Zhong, 2015). But those 
studies assume that institutional environments are similar across different regions within 
a country, in other words, they assume institutional homogeneity within a country 
(Aguilera, 2005). However, recent studies find that the institutional environment is 
heterogenous across different locations within a country, especially in a transition 
economy (Chen, Zhai, Wang, & Zhong, 2015; Hong, Wang, & Kafouros, 2015; Ma, Tong, 
& Fitza, 2013).  
Since China implemented economic reforms and the open-door policy in the last three 
decades, some notable changes of institutional environment have taken place. More 
specifically, China is conducting the changing of structure from a central-planned system 
to a market-oriented economy, showing a disparity in regional marketization (Hong, 
Wang, & Kafouros, 2015; Su & Wan, 2014; Wei, Wu, Li, & Chen, 2011). A survey by 
Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2007) find that due to the factors of different regional histories, 
nature environment, regional development, and social culture, there are significant 
variations of regional institutional environment, such as an uneven pace of regional 
market development.   
In a higher degree of marketization region, the market function is more efficient, the 
legal protection mechanism is relatively robust, government interventions and 
interruptions are less, and information asymmetry is reduced (Chen, Zhai, Wang, & 
Zhong, 2015). In a lower degree of marketization region, the role of government 
interference is more influential, facilitating grabbing behaviors by the government, 
especially among the lower administrative government officials (Hong, Wang, & 
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Kafouros, 2015; Su & Wan, 2014). The degree of marketization as an inherent external 
governance mechanism (Wei, Wu, Li, & Chen, 2011), would impact macroeconomic 
development and corporate behaviors directly and indirectly.  
Although Chapter 3 to Chapter 5 contains literature on the above topics, the chapter 
reviews relate to study more specific to the themes of the chapters.  
2.4. Research Gaps 
Based on the above review of related theories and past empirical studies, there are 
some research gaps, which provide opportunities to examine the different consequences 
of corporate tax management in the context of China. 
Firstly, most prior studies are based on the samples from cross-country or developed 
countries, which may fail to control for the systematic differences among economies at 
different stages of development. This may impede the researchers to explore the potential 
real outcomes of corporate tax management in developing countries, and to make 
meaningful inferences. Therefore, this study focuses on intra-country information 
choosing the China’s market as the target sample, which can avoid the above problem.  
Secondly, prior studies that examined the economic consequences of tax management 
have shown mixed results. On the one stream, corporate tax management is viewed as a 
corporate financial strategy that is potentially value-enhancing. Nevertheless, how does 
tax management achieve value enhancement remained largely unexplored. On the other 
stream, corporate tax management is viewed as a tool to managers pursuing self-interests 
which exposes firms to different uncertain risks, such as reducing firm value and causing 
extreme market outcomes. Unfortunately, too, most recent studies focused on the 
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developed countries, leaving considerable room to explore the linkages in emerging 
countries like China each with their unique characteristics.  
Thirdly, with regard to state-owned/controlled enterprises (SOEs), most previous 
studies argue that SOEs are inefficient, but are able to borrow based on preferential 
treatment from government. However, China’s reforms have transformed SOEs to 
become more like modern enterprises, giving greater autonomy and decision-making 
power to SOEs’ executives. Executives, then, have incentives to use their political 
connections to pursue their self-interests agenda, such as a political career and 
compensation contracts, all of which may cause hidden crisis for SOEs. Most extant 
studies have concentrated on the impact of government ownership on firm decision-
making or firm performance. The empirical research on whether government ownership 
influences the probability of extreme outcomes is scarce. In addition, the question of 
whether there are different impacts among firms controlled by different government 
administrative levels is again lacking. 
Fourthly, there is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of 
corruption on macro and mezzo economic levels, such as GDP growth, FDI and industry 
development. Until recently, however, there have been relatively few studies on the 
effects of corruption at the micro firm-level. Despite the conventional wisdom about the 
harmful effect of corruption, in the context of Chinese relationship-based society, the 
impact of corruption is relatively unclear. More specifically, the causal pathways linking 
political corruption and corporate tax management are little known. Therefore, this study 
will investigate the impact of corruption on corporate tax management. The results will 
provide a more rigorous understanding of how corruption impacts firm-level financial 
activities in China or other emerging countries without a perfect market mechanism. 
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Finally, compared with developed countries with well-developed legal and social 
systems, the impact of external institutional development is much more important in 
transition economies (Chen, Lee, & Li, 2008). In the context of China, because of 
differences in the history, natural, social and even cultural environments between regions, 
large regional institutional gaps including the uneven process of marketization exist. Most 
empirical research examines the impacts of firm-level governance characteristics on 
corporate tax management, but overlooked the macro institutional characteristics. Hence, 
China represents a worthwhile research to explore the impact of institutional development 
on corporate tax management.  
2.5. Theoretical Framework  
Achieving shareholders’ wealth maximization is the main goal of a firm. Corporate tax 
as a motivating factor of corporate financial decisions impacts corporate performance. 
Managerial actions designed to minimize corporate tax obligations are thought to an 
increasingly important feature. There is an argument of the economic consequences of 
corporate tax management. In traditional theory, tax management activities are costless 
to investors, the avoidance activities result simply in the transfer of value from the state 
to shareholders.  
However, the above view overlooks an important feature of modern corporations that 
is the separation of ownership and control. According to rational choice theory, an 
individual is referred to as homo economicus, characterized as rational and pursuing self-
interests. Shareholders (principals) are the owners of enterprise resources. Managers 
(agents) are the persons in charge of the enterprise resources. If the managers are also the 
owners of enterprises, the principals and agents have a common interest that is 
maximization of profits. However, if the agents are not the owners of enterprise resources 
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or only have an employment relationship with principals, they only sign a contract that 
specifies what the agents do with the resource, and how the returns are divided between 
agents and the principals. From this point of view, the managers can use their control 
rights to pursue self-serving maximization rather than maximizing shareholders’ wealth, 
which causes interest conflicts between principals and agents. In the context of the 
information asymmetry and information opaqueness between principals and agents, 
agents as the party having more information have more tendency to engage in managerial 
opportunism. Thus, the deviation from the principals’ interests by the agents results in 
agency costs. As an example, Desai, Dyck, and Zingales (2007) propose a situation in 
which self-interested managers structure the firm in a complex manner in order to 
facilitate transactions that reduce corporate taxes and divert corporate resources for 
private use. Therefore, under the agency theory framework, the consequences of tax 
management are inconclusive. 
Furthermore, the bad news hoarding theory reinforce the agency view of corporate tax 
management, which points out that managers have incentives to conceal negative 
corporate news for their personal interests. When the managers’ incentives for conceal 
bad news collapse or when the accumulation of the bad news reaches a tipping point, all 
of the undisclosed negative information will be suddenly released to the stock market, 
resulting in a stock price crash. The complex and opaque tax management activities can 
be used as an effective means for managers to manipulate earnings and hide bad news for 
an extended period, which can cause a high likelihood of future crashes. Thus, the 
aggressive and complex form of corporate tax management can lead to future extreme 
outcomes of in the financial market. 
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To extend and contribute to the literature on corporate tax management in China and 
other transition economies, the macro-level characteristics should be taken into 
consideration. Due to economic reforms and fiscal decentralization, China’s regional 
economic development has shown different speeds, concurrently with high corruption. 
Hence, the helping hand and grabbing hand theories have been introduced to explain how 
macro environment influences corporate tax behaviors and its consequences. On the view 
of “helping hand”, firms can make profits by paying a bribe premium, such as managers 
bribe local officials to achieve corporate tax saving. On the other view of “grabbing hand”, 
if firms operate in an environment with widespread and rampant corruption, which means 
the governments are sufficiently disorganized and the bureaucrats extremely engage in 
rent-seeking activities. Firms have to expend much more financial and human resources 
to seek rent via corruption. In this case, covert bribing system acts as a “grabbing hand”, 
where the firms’ net losses/costs via bribing are higher than their net profits. As a result, 
it may affect negatively the enthusiasm of firms for avoiding tax or obtaining tax-related 
benefits via bribe. Therefore, the impact of corruption on economic activities may not be 
linear in that both theoretical arguments, which may be compatible with different levels 
of corruption.  
The theoretical framework is shown in Figure 2.1, which illustrates the three research 
questions with related theories in this thesis. 
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Figure 2.1: Theoretical Framework 
Note: RQ is research question 
(Source From: Author) 
 
2.6. Analytical Framework 
Following the above review, this study investigates the economic consequences of 
corporate tax management in the context of China. Firstly, under the perspective of 
agency theory, corporate tax management can provide tools and masks to managers to 
achieve their self-serving objectives, as a result harming the firm value (Chen, Chen, 
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Cheng, & Shevlin, 2010; Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009). Hence, 
Chapter 3 tests the relationship between tax management and firm value to provide a 
preliminary understanding of the firm-level consequence of corporate tax management in 
China’s listed enterprises. Then, the chapter investigates the flow of how firms through 
corporate tax management increase firms’ market value.  
In Chapter 4, the study is motivated by both agency theory and bad news hoarding 
theory, and investigates the extreme market outcomes of corporate tax management. In 
the context of China, political promotion is an effective incentive mechanism for SOEs’ 
managers (Chen et al. 2011), which facilitates such managers to conceal adverse operating 
outcomes. This chapter further investigates the effect of different levels of government 
ownership on the relationship between tax management and stock price crash risk.  
To explore how do macro-level characteristics impact corporate tax management and 
its economic consequences, Chapter 5 examines the impact of corruption and 
marketization. Firstly, the study examines the direct impact of regional corruption on 
corporate tax management. The results will be used to explain whether corruption acts as 
a “grabbing hand” or “grabbing hand”. Then, to explore the effect of market reforms, the 
study further examines how does marketization moderate the impact of corruption on 
corporate tax management. At the end, the chapter examines how does corruption 
influence the consequences of corporate tax management. 
2.7. Research Methodology 
This study uses the quantitative research approach to investigate the economic 
consequences of corporate tax management coupled with Chinese specific characteristics. 
All the three research questions use the secondary data. The study gathers the relevant 
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data involving corporate tax management, firm performance, stock price crash risk, 
Chinese specific characteristics, and other related firm determinants of China’s listed 
enterprises. For modeling purposes, method of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) is 
employed to test the relationship between corporate tax management and firm 
performance in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, Ordinary Least Square regressions and dynamic 
system Generalized Method of Moments regressions are adopted to analyze the second 
research question, which is the market outcomes of corporate tax management. And, 
Chapter 5 uses Ordinary Least Square, Fixed-effect, and Non-linear regressions to 
examine the third research question of this thesis, which is the relationship between 
macro-level factors, tax management, and firm performance. 
Because the sampling size and the specific research models adopted vary by research 
questions, the detailed descriptions of the methodology will be discussed in each 
following analytical chapter (Chapters 3, 4, and 5), which includes research design, 
research models, variables, sample selection, and statistical techniques for hypothesis 
testing purposes. 
2.8. Chapter Summary 
This chapter firstly reviewed the key theories related to corporate tax management, 
which formed the theoretical pillars of this study, helping to understand the incentives and 
consequences of corporate tax management. In a nut shell, corporate tax management can 
serve as a tool to managers engaging in managerial opportunism activities, which affects 
firm performance and causes future crashes. The chapter then reviewed past empirical 
research and finds potential research gaps in existing studies. This has led to the decision 
to investigate the economic consequences of corporate tax management in China’s listed 
enterprises. More specifically, in the unique economic setting of China, the economic 
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consequences of tax management will be further moderated by government ownership, 
corruption, and degree of marketization. At the end, the analytical framework and a brief 
introduction of research methodology have been provided.   
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CHAPTER 3:  CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE AND PERFORMANCE: 
EVIDENCE FROM CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES 
 
3.1. Introduction 
To the extent that taxation impacts a firm’s bottom line, the textbook argument that tax 
imposes a burden on firms has been subject to extensive research, mainly by linking it to 
firm characteristics. To reduce this burden, corporate tax management can be employed 
as a useful method, with salutary effects on the firm.  
If successfully deployed, a tax management strategy would transfer wealth from the 
state or government to shareholders (Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009). 
Therefore, it should result in relatively low taxes payable (that is, low effective tax rates), 
and higher after-tax cash flows, which will show up in analysts’ financial reports and 
ultimately, stock prices. According to Swenson (1999), the stock market perceives firms 
that pay lower taxes as being better at controlling costs. However, in practice, empirical 
evidence on tax management shows the opposite is the case. In modern corporations, the 
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders (Chen & Chu, 2005; Crocker & 
Slemrod, 2005) create opportunities for managerial diversions which discount the value 
of firms (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009).  
Further, even if shareholders’ wealth is maximized, tax management can nevertheless 
have both adverse firm- and macro-level effects (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010; Hanlon & 
Slemrod, 2009; Robinson, Sikes, & Weaver, 2010). At the firm level, tax management 
diminishes the firm’s discharge of its social irresponsibility (Erle, 2008). At the macro-
level, tax avoidance represents the loss of resources to the government that can finance 
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the provision of public goods (Sikka, 2010). 
This chapter examines the relationship between tax management and firms’ 
performance, manifested through the firms’ value, in the context of China. More 
specifically, this chapter seeks to answer the first research question of this thesis, viz. 
what is the effect of corporate tax management on firm performance, and how tax 
management achieves firm value improvement, which divides into three sub-questions. 
The first sub-question is whether there exists a link between tax management and firm 
value in China and the associated objective is to explore this link in China’s companies. 
The second sub-question is whether the country’s transition and corporate reforms have 
moved China’s enterprise environment closer to the norm of the developed countries so 
that the tax management – firm value linkage in China converges with what is found in 
the latter countries. To the extent gaps in convergence remain, the third sub-question and 
objective are respectively to ask why and to explain these gaps in terms of China’s reform 
experience. 
In undertaking this chapter, existing studies do not provide much guidance. Compared 
with research on developed markets, especially the US, studies of tax management in 
emerging markets especially China, are very limited. Most extant research on China 
examines the relationship between tax management and firm characteristics, such as firm 
size, ownership and leverage (Adhikari, Derashid, & Zhang, 2006; Badertscher, Katz, & 
Rego, 2013; Wu, Wang, Luo, & Gillis, 2012). This chapter, however, focuses on the 
impact of tax management activities on a firm’s market value improvement through 
improving growth and profitability. 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 presents a brief literature review 
and the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.3 displays the methodology, which lays out 
measures of four latent variables, model specification, data characteristics and data 
analysis. Section 3.4 discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 3.5 summarizes the 
chapter by drawing several implications. 
3.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Corporate tax management is traditionally viewed as a tax-reducing device that 
transfers interests from the government to shareholders to maximize shareholders’ value, 
although an expanding body of work on agency theory emphasizes that tax management 
is closely related to corporate governance because of the agency cost implications. In 
practice, the complexity and ambiguity of tax management can shelter managers who 
engage in various forms of managerial rent extraction such as earnings manipulation and 
insider transactions which would reduce after-tax cash flows (Mihir A. Desai & 
Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009; Desai, Dyck, & Zingales, 2007). Enron’s case is a striking 
example. In the 1990s, Enron made use of structured financing transactions to evade tax, 
leading to government prosecution and its collapse. Beyond that, firms also need to 
shoulder the combined tax avoidance costs, which include direct tax planning, compliance 
and non-tax costs. Lee, Dobiyanski, and Minton (2015) suggest that if shareholders 
cannot fully understand the cost-benefit calculus, tax management activities could reduce 
firm value. 
Empirical research on the impact of corporate tax management on firm value has 
produced mixed findings. Mihir A. Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala (2009) found no 
significant relationship between tax avoidance and firm value, but a positive relationship 
for firms with dominant institutional ownership. They suggest that shareholders consider 
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that ability to control the managers can add value to tax avoidance. Hanlon and Slemrod 
(2009) examined the market reaction to news about a firm’s application for tax shelters. 
They find that such news dampened stock price. Chen, Hu, Wang, and Tang (2014) 
showed that tax avoidance is also inversely related to firm value, but this can be mitigated 
by information transparency. 
In comparison with the research focused on developed countries, Claessens and Fan 
(2002) argued that the agency problems in Asian countries are compounded by a lack of 
corporate transparency that permitted rent seeking and insider transactions. China 
represents a special case because of the important role played by the government. 
Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang (2015) reported that China’s financial market and listed firms 
are operating in an environment of poor information. In addition, China’s taxation system 
started to open up only in the last three decades, is not comprehensive and has many 
loopholes. These factors provide more space for managers to engage in managerial 
opportunism and finally to maximize their self-serving objectives. 
Given the above, and further in the context of the Chinese institutional setting, 
corporate tax management may not necessarily increase firm value. Reflecting this, the 
first hypothesis in this chapter is: 
Hypothesis 3.1 (H3.1). Corporate tax management has a direct negative relationship 
with firms’ market value. 
Extensive empirical literature has shown that firms with good profitability and growth 
performances are generally associated with better firm value. Varaiya, Kerin, and Weeks 
(1987) found that firm profitability and growth significantly impact shareholders’ value. 
Naceur and Goaied (2002) investigated the relationship between value creation and 
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profitability in the Tunisia stock exchange. They found that future value creation is 
significantly and positively related to a firm’s profitability. Furthermore, Fama and 
French (1998) argued that if firms have a good record of profitability, a positive 
relationship exists between taxation of dividends and firm value. For these reasons, good 
profitability and growth performance should be important factors in firm value 
maximization. 
Literature also shows corporate governance has a significantly positive association 
with profitability and growth. Durnev and Kim (2005) found firms with better governance 
to grow faster and be more profitable. In addition, Peni and Vähämaa (2012) reported that 
large publicly traded US banks with stronger corporate governance mechanisms have 
higher profitability. Moreover, Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2012) indicated that firms 
with low shareholder rights spend cash more quickly than those with stronger governance. 
Besides, Yen (2005) stated that firms with a management-friendly board structure would 
choose projects for which growth prospects are promising. 
The above suggests that corporate governance impacts a firm’s profitability and 
growth. Therefore, profitability and growth performance are posited as two mediators in 
the relationship between tax avoidance and firm value. The following are Hypothesis 3.2a 
and 3.2b: 
Hypothesis 3.2a (H3.2a). Profitability performance mediates the relationship between 
tax management and market value. (Path cd, shown in Figure 3.1.) 
Hypothesis 3.2b (H3.2b). Growth performance mediates the relationship between tax 
management and market value. (Path ab, shown in Figure 3.1.) 
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Profitability performance reflects firms’ history of generating returns (Miller, 
Washburn, & Glick, 2013). Growth performance represents firms’ past ability to grow in 
size (Whetten, 1987). Firm size is positively related to economies of scale and market 
power, both of which result in higher future profitability. Moreover, the market value of 
firms is based on their expected performance, which should be correlated with firms’ 
profitability and growth performance (Santos & Brito, 2012). 
Therefore, corporate tax avoidance would have an indirect effect on market value 
through improving its growth and then profitability. Hence, Hypothesis 3.3: 
Hypothesis 3.3 (H3.3). Corporate tax management is positively but indirectly related 
to market value through growth and profitability. (Path aed, shown in Figure 3.1.) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Model of Structural Equation Model 
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(Source: Plotted by Author) 
 
3.3. Research Methodology 
3.3.1. Measures 
Four constructs are used in the model to examine the relationships between corporate 
tax management, growth, profitability and market value performance. The constructs and 
their indicators (observed variables) are discussed below. Figure 3.2 shows the 
relationship between the observed and latent variables. 
3.3.1.1. Corporate Tax Avoidance 
Previous research had considered the corporate effective tax rate (ETR) as a proxy for 
the corporate tax burden (Gupta & Newberry, 1997; Richardson, Wang, & Zhang, 2016; 
Wu, Wang, Luo, & Gillis, 2012). It is simultaneously an important index used to measure 
the effectiveness of tax avoidance. This chapter adopts two corporate effective tax rates 
(ETRs) to represent tax management (risky and non-risky strategies) (Badertscher, Katz, 
& Rego, 2013). The first measure is the ETR1 defined under GAAP as total corporate 
income tax expenses divided by pre-tax income. The second measure is the ETR2 defined 
on a cash basis as corporate income tax expenses minus deferred tax expenses dividend 
by pre-tax income. The lower effective tax rates represent a lower corporate tax burden, 
which refers to firms with a higher level of corporate tax management. To provide a direct 
and intuitive understanding of the relationship between corporate tax management and 
firm performance, in the model process, the chapter uses the opposite number of the two 
ETRs, denoted by ETR1_neg and ETR2_neg. (See Table 3.1) 
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All ETR measures are well understood by financial statement users. Specifically, 
GAAP ETR is affected by changes in tax reserves and the valuation allowance, while 
Cash ETR is influenced by the timing of tax payments, settlements with tax authorities 
and some type of earnings management (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). However, in 
focusing on ETRs as the proxy for tax avoidance and its link with firm value, this chapter 
does not investigate the differences between the two measures.  
3.3.1.2. Profitability Performance 
Profitability is one of the major performance dimensions of concern in this chapter. It 
is defined as the firm’s earnings net of costs and is commonly measured by the measures 
return on assets (ROA), return on invested capital (ROIC), and return on sales (ROS). The 
ROA is the most often used accounting measure of performance in financial research 
(Cable & Mueller, 2008), because it has been shown to represent a firm’s performance 
well (Peng & Luo, 2000; Rowe & Morrow, 1999). It represents the ability of firms to use 
their assets to generate profit. The ROS is also used by many researchers (Delen, Kuzey, 
& Uyar, 2013; Jang & Park, 2011), because it can reflect the profits from a company’s 
sales in the short-term. The ROIC is a measure of the return earned on the invested capital. 
Damodaran (2007) notes that ROIC is a key input in both corporate finance and valuation. 
This chapter employs all the three measures to make up the latent variable of profitability. 
(See Table 3.1) 
3.3.1.3. Growth Performance 
In this chapter, a firm’s growth performance is measured by the growth rates of sales 
revenue (SALG), sales income (SIG), and net income (NIG). Sales growth has become a 
common measure of firm growth rate in many studies (Anthony & Ramesh, 1992; Brush, 
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Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 2000; Jang & Park, 2011; Serrasqueiro, 2009). Wang and You 
(2012) believed that the growth rate of sales income would yield more reliable estimation 
results in the case of China. Moreover, net income growth represents the rate at which 
firms have grown profits. Stocks that experience faster net income growth are generally 
favored over those with slower net income growth. Therefore, the chapter employs 
growth rate of net income (Delen, Kuzey, & Uyar, 2013). Table 3.1 describes the variables’ 
definitions. 
3.3.1.4. Market Value Performance 
This chapter measures firms’ market performance using three market-based measures 
of return. These are Price-to-book (PB) ratio, Tobin’s Q (TobinQ), and Market 
capitalization improvement (MCI). The PB is the ratio of stock price to book value per 
share (Brealey & Myers, 2000; Montgomery, Thomas, & Kamath, 1984). In addition, 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of a firm’s debt and equity to the ending total 
assets (Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009; Yu, 2013). It is widely used 
because it takes account of the book and market values of equity and the value of debt 
(Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009; Firth, Gong, & Shan, 2013). Moreover, 
market capitalization reflects the stock market’s valuation of a firm (Abdolmohammadi, 
2005) and is defined in this chapter as the improvement of the total market value of the 
shares outstanding. (See Table 3.1) 
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3.3.2.  Model Specification 
Figure 3.2 shows the structural model which underpins the causal relationships among 
four latent constructs: corporate tax management, growth, profitability, and market value. 
Table 3.1: Variable Names and Definition 
Constructs Causes-Effects Definition of Indicators 
 Causes  
A. Tax Management 
 ETR1_neg Opposite number of Effective tax rate 1 
(ETR1);  
ETR1_neg = - Tax expenses / pre-tax income 
ETR2_neg Opposite number of Effective tax rate 2 
(ETR2); 
ETR2_neg = - (Tax expenses-deferred tax 
expense) / pre-tax income 
 Effects  
B. Firm performance    
1. Profitability ROA Return on Total asset;  
Net income / total assets 
ROIC Return on invested capital;  
Net operating profit after taxes /Invested 
capital 
ROS Net profit margin; 
Net incomei,t / revenues 
2. Growth SIG Sales income growth rate;  
(Sales incomei,t -Sales incomei,t-1)/Sales 
incomei,t-1 
SALG Sales growth rate;               
(Salesi,t-Salesi,t-1)/Salesi,t-1 
NIG Net income growth rate; 
(Net incomei,t-Net incomei,t-1)/Net incomei,t-1 
3. Market 
value 
TobinQ Tobin’s Q* 
PB Price-to-book ratio;  
MCI Market capitalisation improvement 
* In China, due to the special split-share structure, some shares are non-tradable in the 
stock market. This chapter adopts the same method as to set the market value of non-
tradable shares as their book value (Qian & Wu, 2003, p. 31). The calculation of Tobin’s 
Q is the ratio of the market price per share multiplied by the number of tradable shares 
plus the book value of equity per share multiplied by the number of non-tradable shares 
plus book value of total debt over the book value of total assets. 
Source: Prepared by author 
52 
 
 
The direct relationship between tax management and firms’ market value (Hypothesis 
3.1) is first examined using China’s listed enterprises (Figure 3.2., Path f). Given the 
existing evidence on the profitability, growth and corporate governance relationships and 
the impact of their relationships on firms’ market value as explained in Section 3.2., this 
chapter then investigates the mediating roles of profitability and growth in the tax 
management - firm market value relationship. Paths ab, cd, aed (Figure 3.2.) represent 
three different specific indirect relationships between tax management and firms’ market 
value, which are Hypothesis 3.2a, 3.2b, and 3.3.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Structural Model 
(Source: plotted by Author) 
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3.3.3. Data and Sample Selection 
The annual time series data is for the period 2004-2012. For ETR1, the deferred tax 
expenses were calculated based on the previous year’s data, which means that the period 
of analysis begins with 2005. All data were obtained from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Database (CSMAR)4. 
Data used for estimation exclude the following: (1) financial industry firms which, 
according to the China Securities Regulatory Commission Industry Classifications 
(CSRCIC), are heavily regulated and their tax incentives differ from firms in other 
industries; (2) “Special Treatment” (ST) stocks5 ; (3) both of ETR1 and ETR2 with 
negative values or values larger than one (Gupta & Newberry, 1997; Wu, Wu, Zhou, & 
Wu, 2012); and (4) observations with missing values. Finally, a sample of 7651 firm-year 
observations is employed over the period 2005-2012. The sample selection process is 
shown in Table 3.2. 
Because the bootstrap method is sensitive to extreme values (Ette & Onyiah, 2002), 
this chapter winsorises data at the 2.5% level to reduce the effect of outliers (Zhang, 
Farrell, & Brown, 2008). All estimation was done using AMOS Version 21. Table 3.3 
shows the correlation coefficients between all variables. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 The CSMAR database is developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Corporation Limited. Co., Ltd., and designed by 
the China Accounting and Finance Research Centre of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. 
5 All stocks labeled ST have seen their business in the red for two consecutive years representing the firms with financial problem or 
other abnormal conditions, which are technically on the brink of delisting. ST or Special Treatment shares and the original idea behind 
this classification is that it would act as a warning to investors. 
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Table 3.2: Sample Selection 
Non-financial China’s A-share listed companies Total sample 
Initial observations 19,184 
Less: observations with ETRs1 less than 0 or over than 1 17,330 
Less: ETRs with missing value 10,183 
Less: MV2 variables with missing value 8,556 
Less: GP3 variables with missing value 7,653 
Less: PP4 variables with missing value 7,651 
Number of observations in the final analysis  7,651 
1 ETRs includes ETR1 and ETR2  
2 MV, latent variable of Market value performance, including P/B ratio, Tobin’s Q and 
MCI;  
3 GP, latent variable of Growth performance, including sales growth, net income 
growth, and sales income growth; 
4 PP, latent variable of Profitability performance, including ROA, ROS, ROIC. 
Source: Prepared by author 
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Table 3. 3: Correlation 
 ETR1_neg ETR2_neg NIG SALG SIG ROA ROIC ROS TobinQ MCI PB 
ETR1_neg 1           
ETR2_neg 0.773*** 1          
NIG 0.102*** 0.092*** 1         
SALG 0.044*** 0.024** 0.394*** 1        
SIG 0.046*** 0.062*** 0.823*** 0.405*** 1       
ROA 0.277*** 0.297*** 0.238*** 0.196*** 0.192*** 1      
ROIC 0.162*** 0.173*** 0.163*** 0.172*** 0.122*** 0.709*** 1     
ROS  0.231*** 0.244*** 0.147*** 0.064*** 0.109*** 0.627*** 0.498*** 1    
TobinQ 0.127*** 0.119*** 0.135*** 0.052*** 0.132*** 0.420*** 0.334*** 0.231*** 1   
MCI 0.027** 0.018 0.307*** 0.211*** 0.303*** 0.174*** 0.114*** 0.100*** 0.481*** 1  
PB 0.058*** 0.041*** 0.213*** 0.170*** 0.203*** 0.364*** 0.317*** 0.178*** 0.772*** 0.579*** 1 
Note: t statistics in parentheses.  
     *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
     All variables are defined in Table 3.1.  
Source: Computed by author. 
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3.3.4. Data Analysis 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is used in this chapter for hypothesis testing. The 
SEM methodology is used for three reasons. First, this chapter examines tax avoidance 
and firm performance by looking at three parts of firm financial performance, implying a 
series of causal relationships, which the SEM is well suited to handle. Second, the chapter 
uses 14 observed variables in which are embedded four latent variables which traditional 
multivariate techniques cannot deal with but SEM can (Byrne, 2009). Third, the chapter 
tests mediation effects, which again can be done using SEM (Anderson & Gerbing, 1992; 
Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
The SEM consists of the measurement model and the structural model. Firstly, this 
chapter tests the measurement model so as not to be affected by possible interactions 
between the models. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted on the full 
measurement model to examine model fit. Then, the structural model was used to estimate 
the causal relationships among the four latent constructs. 
Where the data are found to follow a multivariate non-normal distribution, the 
bootstrap (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) and Mackinnon PRODCLIN2 methods (MacKinnon, 
Fritz, Williams, & Lockwood, 2007) are used in the analyses. The chi-square (x2) is used 
as the first fit index. Where x2 is found to be heavily influenced by sample size, other 
goodness-of-fit indices are used (Byrne, 2009; Jr., Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009; 
MacCallum & Austin, 2000). This chapter employs several other model fit indices. These 
include the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), root mean square residual 
(RMR), goodness of fit index (GFI), adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), comparative 
fit index (CFI), and normed fit index (NFI). In a model with good fit, the GFI, CFI, AGFI 
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and NFI should be above 0.9 (Byrne, 2009; Jr., Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009). The 
RMSEA and RMR should be less than 0.08 to signify acceptability (Hu & Bentler, 1998). 
3.4. Empirical Findings 
This section shows the goodness-of-fit for both the models, which are measurement 
model and structural model. In addition, this section also presents the hypothesized 
relationships between latent constructs. 
3.4.1. Measurement Model 
Table 3.4 shows the fit indices for the overall measurement model which indicate that 
the model was acceptable (Jr., Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009). All the indices have 
statistically significant relationships with their factors. 
 
Table 3.4: Summary of Model Fit Indices for CFA Model 
Model  χ2 df GFI AGFI CFI NFI RMSEA RMR 
CFA 1790 38 0.961 0.933 0.957 0.956 0.078 0.024 
Note: 5,000 bootstrap samples (Patricia M. Dechow, Richard G. Sloan, & Amy P. 
Sweeney, 1995).  
RMSEA, root-mean-square error of approximation; RMR, root-mean-square 
residual; GFI, good-of-fit index; AGFI, adjusted goodness of fit index; NFI, 
normed fit index; CFI, comparative fit index. 
Source: Calculated by author 
 
To measure reliability, this chapter adopts composite reliability (CR) and average 
variance extracted (AVE). As shown in Table 3.5, the indicators are internally consistent 
because the composite reliability scores for all the constructs exceed the recommended 
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0.70 (O'Rourke & Hatcher, 2013). In addition, reliability is achieved because the AVE for 
each construct exceeds the desired 0.5 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). To assess construct 
validity, convergent validity is assessed by determining whether each indicator’s 
estimated pattern coefficient on its posited underlying construct factor in the measurement 
model is significant (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Marsh & Grayson, 1995). Table 3.5 
shows that convergent validity is assured since all factor loadings for items are greater 
than 0.4 and are statistically significant (p<0.001) (Cabrera-Nguyen, 2010). Moreover, 
for discriminant validity, the average variance extracted for each construct must be greater 
than the squared correlations between the construct and other constructs in the model 
(Nusair & Hua, 2010). Table 3.6 shows that the squared correlations are lower than their 
corresponding AVE for the latent variables. Overall, the measurement model is shown to 
be valid and acceptable. 
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Table 3.5: Confirmatory Factor Model 
Constructs and variables Factor 
loadings 
Composite 
reliability (C.R)a 
Average variance 
extracted (AVE)b 
Tax Avoidance  0.873 0.776 
ETR1 (ETR1_neg) 0.85   
ETR2 (ETR2_neg) 0.92   
Market value performance  0.840 0.643 
Market capitalization 
improvement (MCI) 
0.61   
Price to book ratio (PB) 0.94   
Tobin’s Q (TobinQ) 0.83   
Profitability performance  0.834 0.632 
ROA 0.96   
ROIC 0.74   
ROS 0.65   
Growth performance  0.814 0.613 
Sales revenue growth (SALG) 0.44   
Net income growth (NIG) 0.91   
Sales income growth (SIG) 0.90   
Note: 5,000 bootstrap samples. 
a CR = (∑Standardised loadings) 2/ [(∑Standardised loadings) 2 + ∑εj].             
bAVE = ∑(Standardised loadings2)/[∑(standardised loadings2) + ∑εj], where εj is the 
measurement error. 
Source: Calculated by author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6: Discriminant Validity Matrix 
 Tax avoidance Growth Profitability Market value 
Tax avoidance 0.776 0.009 0.112 0.006 
Growth  0.613 0.062 0.064 
Profitability   0.632 0.179 
Market value    0.643 
Note: The AVE for the respective constructs are shown in bold. 
Source: Calculated by author 
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3.4.2. Structural Model 
The overall structural model fit indices are shown in Table 3.7. All the indices suggest 
an acceptable fit (Jr., Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009), indicating that the model fits the 
data well. Since both models are shown to be valid and reliable, the path relationships 
among the constructs can now be analyzed. 
Table 3.7: Structural Equation Model Indices 
Model  χ2 GFI AGFI CFI NFI RMSEA RMR 
CFA 1790 0.961 0.933 0.957 0.956 0.078 0.024 
Note: 5,000 bootstrap samples.  
RMSEA, root-mean-square error of approximation; RMR, root-mean-square 
residual; GFI, good-of-fit index; AGFI, adjusted goodness of fit index; NFI, 
normed fit index; CFI, comparative fit index. 
Source: Calculated by author 
 
In the multiple-step multiple mediator model (Hayes, 2009), the sampling distributions 
of ab, cd, aed (Figure 3.2.) tend to be asymmetric, with nonzero skewness and kurtosis 
(Bollen & Stine, 1990; Hayes, 2009; Stone & Sobel, 1990). Using the bootstrapping 
method and Mackinnon PRODCLIN2, this chapter found the structural model’s total, 
specific mediation and direct effects to be statistically significant (Hayes, 2009; 
MacKinnon, Fritz, Williams, & Lockwood, 2007; Preacher & Hayes, 2008) (shown in 
Table 3.8), indicating that partial mediation effects existed6.   
                                                        
6 For bootstrapping percentile and bias-corrected methods, and Mackinnon PRODCLIN2, if zero is not between the lower and upper 
bound, then the effect is not zero with 95% confidence. Hayes, A. F. (2009) "Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical Mediation Analysis 
in the New Millennium," Communication Monographs, 76, 408-420. Percentile and bias-corrected methods are used to identify the 
existence of indirect effects. Then, Mackinnon PRODCLIN2 is used to identify and distinguish the specific indirect effects. 
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Table 3.8: Mediation of the Effect of Corporate Tax Avoidance on Market Performance Through Profitability and Growth Performance 
Variables 
Point 
Estimate 
Product of 
Coefficients   
Bootstrapping 
  
Machinnon Prodclin2.    
95% CI Bias-corrected 95% CI Percentile 95% CI 
SE Z Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Total Effect  0.567 0.096 5.906  0.380 0.757 0.375 0.752  0.252 0.606 
Total Direct Effect -0.520 0.094 -5.536  -0.709 -0.340 -0.709 -0.341  -0.697 -0.344 
Total Indirect Effect 1.088 0.061 17.849  0.970 1.211 0.970 1.211    
Specific Indirect Effects 
ab 0.108         0.076 0.143 
cd 0.918         0.824 1.017 
aed 
ae 
0.061 
0.001 61.018  0.005 0.010 0.005 0.010  0.005 0.010 
ed 0.006 0.000  0.059 0.081 0.059 0.081  0.059 0.079 
Note: 5,000 bootstrap sample.  
The results based on unstandardized parameter estimates. CI, Confidence Interval. 
Source: Calculated by author 
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The results (Table 3.8) also show that the specific indirect effects of tax avoidance on 
firm value through profitability and growth are significantly different from zero. Thus, all 
three mediation hypotheses (H3.2a, H3.2b, and H3.3) are supported7. Overall, it is clear 
that profitability and growth are mediators for tax avoidance’s impact on firm value. The 
total indirect effect (total minus direct effect) through the three specific mediation paths 
(ab,cd,aed; shown in Table 3.8), has a point estimate of 1.088 and 95% BC and Percentile 
bootstrap CI of 0.970 to 1.211. This difference is non-zero. The specific indirect effect 
through profitability (Point estimate = 0.918) is larger than that through growth (Point 
estimate = 0.108) and growth*profitability (Point estimate = 0.061). 
Overall, the results of the SEM model summarized in Table 3.9 indicate that firms that 
avoid taxes affect their market value both directly and indirectly, the latter through 
increasing firm’s profitability and growth. The indirect relationship between tax 
avoidance and market value through growth and then profitability (aed, shown in Figure 
3.1.) is positive, because good growth performance can raise market power to enhance 
profits and cash generation. Table 3.9 shows the paths of tax avoidance towards achieving 
the desired market value. 
                                                        
7 In Table 3.8, because zero is not contained in the interval; therefore, the specific indirect effects can be distinguished in terms of 
magnitude. 
Table 3.9: Hypotheses Standardized Regression Paths 
Hypotheses Regression Paths Coefficients 
Standar
d Path 
Results 
H3.1 Tax avoidance→Market value -0.073 support 
H3.2a Tax avoidance→Growth→Market value 0.015 support 
H3.2b Tax avoidance→Profitability→Market value 0.128 support 
H3.3 
Tax 
avoidance→Growth→Profitability→Market 
value 
0.009 support 
Note: All regression parts are significant at 1% level. 
Source: Calculated by author 
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3.5. Chapter Summary 
Tax reforms have been a major pillar of overall economic reforms that many 
governments have pursued to balance government budgets. This chapter analyzed the 
impact of corporate tax management on firm performance in China. Using data on A-
share (main market) public-listed companies, the chapter analyzed how corporate tax 
management impacts market value and mediators of profitability and growth. This is 
necessary as tax avoidance, if unscrupulously pursued, will deny governments revenue 
that will be necessary to finance government expenditure. The results offer three 
important findings that address this chapter’s research sub-questions. 
First, in addressing the first research sub-question in this chapter, the results reveal that 
corporate behavior in China differs from those found in most existing studies, which show 
no direct impact of tax avoidance on firm value (Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika 
Dharmapala, 2009). This chapter shows a significant positive relationship that is made up 
of significant direct (negative) and indirect (positive) impacts. Second, the similarities 
between China and market economies suggest that China’s corporate reforms have moved 
the Chinese corporate environment closer to that of market economies. This answer the 
second research sub-question posited earlier. 
Third, and in answering the third research sub-question in this chapter, the above 
results can be explained by China’s circumstances. The significant negative direct 
relationship between tax management and market value in China’s listed firms is 
consistent with the agency cost theory of tax avoidance and its consequences on 
managerial rent extraction. China’s still evolving market reforms show that there are 
imperfections that require addressing through legal and other provisions to prevent 
managerial rent extraction. However, the positive indirect relationships between tax 
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management and market value through the mediating role of firm profitability and growth 
performance suggest that tax management could be continued but they need to be 
bolstered by legal regulations to reduce the possible negative consequences from 
managerial rent seeking. 
The above results are obtained using the SEM approach which offers a more robust set 
of results than past studies based on traditional regression equations. Also, past studies 
have not investigated the impact of after-tax cash from tax avoiding activities on firm 
value. Hence, this chapter provides direct evidence on how tax avoidance can help 
maximize firm performance. 
What implications can be drawn from the findings? First, with China’s corporate 
reforms applied to an enterprise system that differs from but is converging with the 
structure in most market economies, the question arises as to how urgent it is that China’s 
system should be transformed to the latter, as has been repeatedly advised. Second, and 
more specifically, these findings leave open the question of the relevance of the agency 
perspective under state-ownership for the analysis of tax policy. In China, state ownership 
is an important firm characteristic impacting on firms’ financial decisions, which require 
continued research to track the consequences of enterprise reforms. A third implication 
relates to the types of policies - governance, tax, regulatory, etc. - that can limit the abuses 
of tax avoidance. Given that tax avoidance works directly as well as indirectly to affect 
firm value, it is not sufficient to put in place policies that directly address tax avoidance 
issues. 
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CHAPTER 4:  MARKET OUTCOMES OF CORPORATE TAX 
MANAGEMENT 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Taxation as a significant cost affects firms’ decision-making behavior regarding the 
available choices in the magnitude and structure of output, disposal of net profit, the 
direction of capital investment, amongst many other things. Reducing corporate tax 
burden has become a powerful motivational force in a corporate life. Therefore, corporate 
tax management has emerged as an important financial strategy desired by shareholders 
to improve firm value. But, a series of high-profile corporate accounting scandals, such 
as Enron, Amazon, and Apple, were revealed and managers were accused of using 
complex tax management as a mask to seek personal interests, which injures the interests 
of shareholders and causes immense amount of government tax loss. Hence, the extreme 
consequences of aggressive tax management have aroused much attention by investors, 
governments, and researchers.  
In a traditional theory framework, the main purpose of a business is to achieve the 
maximization of shareholders’ interests over a long term. Managers, who are employed 
to act behalf of shareholders, are required to have a long-term focus and planning. 
However, in practice, there are two different arguments. First, because of an important 
corporate feature of management and ownership separation, managers and shareholders 
are faced with asymmetric information over different time horizons. Managers 
responsible for corporate operators are always better and earlier informed than 
shareholders who meet at most several times a year. At the same time, managers face 
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many short-term powerful incentives and pressures, such as employment contract and 
remuneration, which motivate them to focus their concerns for short-term profitability 
and stock price, and conceal firms’ negative outcomes to realize their personal interests. 
For example, the bonuses and employment contracts of managers are generally more 
linked to firms’ current performance rather than long-term value improvement, and even 
if the managers choose a project that yields little at present but high returns in future 
project, they will not be rewarded in profit-sharing schemes. Thus, instead of achieving 
the long-term return, short-term goals have become the focus of attention of managers. 
Second, recent research reveals that because of the incomplete information and fierce 
competition, shareholders of modern public listed enterprises are more like share traders 
shifting their focus towards a short time horizon, such as quarterly, half yearly, or annual 
profit. And top executives may set a “tone at the top” stressing short-term cost 
minimization and profit maximization. Hence, managerial myopia is becoming a 
pervasive and severe phenomenon on the modern corporations. Unlike reducing operating 
costs, tax saving does not cause direct adverse consequences on a firm’s daily operation. 
More importantly, the complex and opaque nature of tax management also offers 
opportunities to managers and short-sighted investors for earnings manipulation and 
cover up corporate real operating performance to boost short-term stock price, which may 
cause corporate shares to be mispriced. The resulting mispricing would further facilitate 
corporate over-investment and maintain previous inefficient projects that will discount 
corporate future outcomes and raise future unsustainable. Once the true situations are 
exposed to the stock market some time in future, the firm’s stock price will crash.  
China’s case makes for even more challenges. In contrast to developed countries with 
a robust tax system, China’s situation differs from that of most those countries in that 
while reforms saw Chinese corporations made to pay corporate income tax since the 
1980s, the tax system is still in a state of transition. At the same time, enterprises are 
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facing a heavy tax burden. Yet, in the Forbes Tax Misery Index, China has consistently 
ranked among the harshest taxes countries in the world since 2002 (shown in Table 4.1). 
The coverage of the present system is still not comprehensive and has many loopholes 
offering opportunities to corporations to exploit. In addition, the opaque nature of the 
Chinese stock market (Piotroski, Wong, & Zhang, 2015) further provides more space for 
managers to utilize tax management as a medium for earnings manipulation and resource 
diversion. In recent years, many aggressive tax management activities in China, e.g. of 
Gujing Distillery Company (gujing gongjiu), have aroused scrutiny at home and abroad.  
 
Table 4.1: Tax Misery Index Ranking from 2002 to 2009 
Tax Misery 
Index 
Ranking 
2002 2004 2006 2008 2009 
1 Australia  France France France France 
2 Austria Belgium China Netherlands China 
3 Belgium  Sweden Belgium Belgium Belgium 
4 Canada 
(Ontario) 
China Sweden Sweden Sweden 
5 Canada 
(Quebec)  
Italy Italy China Netherlands 
6 China Austria Austria Austria Austria 
7 Denmark Norway Poland Italy Italy 
8 Finland Greece Spain Argentina Argentina 
9 France Spain Argentina Finland Finland 
10 Germany Argentina Slovenia Hungary Greece 
Note:  
1. The index ranking from Tax Misery & Reform Index compiled by Forbes 
magazine. The latest report was published in 2009.  
2. Tax misery indicates the genuine feeling of taxpayers about their tax burden. 
If the government provides high-quality and satisfying public services, 
taxpayers will suffer less from tax misery.  
3. Source from: http://www.ecns.cn/in-depth/2011/09-21/2522.shtml 
 
China represents a case worthy of study also because its development model of state-
led growth that brought it economic success has many state-owned/controlled enterprises 
(SOEs) in business. With their connection with government, SOEs’ executives may be 
68 
 
more motivated to take advantage of the preferential treatment from the government to 
avoid taxes and pursue self-interests, such as political career advancement and cash 
compensations. 
Government ownership of SOEs in China is categorized by several government tiers, 
which are central, provincial, and municipal (includes prefectural city- and county-level) 
SOEs. Central SOEs (yangqi) are generally large and complex organizations in “pillar” 
(key or strategic) industries with support from well-resourced central administration and 
subject to strict auditing. These SOEs are ultimately controlled by the central government 
and their top executives normally have high administrative ranks, which motivates the 
executives to conceal adverse corporate outcomes to ensure their political career remains 
sound. Provincial SOEs are second tier SOEs controlled by provincial governments8 , 
where both the SOEs’ executives and government officials have strong political 
incentives because of the opportunities to leapfrog political ranks from local to central 
positions. In contrast, municipal SOEs are mostly far away from central government 
control, and the executives generally have lower or even no political rank, and lower 
salary, thus giving these executives temptation to use their political connection and/or to 
collude with local government officials to maximize their self-interests through tax 
management activities.  
Considering the above, this chapter attempts to answer the second research question 
of this thesis, i.e. what is the likelihood of extreme market outcomes that corporate tax 
management in China’s listed enterprises can bring about, and how does government 
ownership influence the likelihood of extreme outcomes? Accordingly, there are three 
sub-questions: Is corporate tax management associated with a lower crash risk in the 
                                                        
8 There are 31 provinces in the mainland China, which includes 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions (Tibet autonomous Region, 
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region, Inner Mongolia autonomous region, Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region), and 4 directly administered municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing). 
69 
 
current year and a higher probability of crash risk in the future? Do the different types of 
state ownership affect the relationship between corporate tax management and stock price 
crash? And can investing in listed state-owned/controlled enterprises be considered for 
investors who are risk averse? 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the China context that is 
vital to understanding the estimated relationships in the chapter. Section 4.3 critically 
reviews the related literature and develops testable hypotheses. Section 4.4 describes the 
data and empirical methodology. Section 4.5 reports the empirical results, and Section 4.6 
concludes the chapter by drawing several implications.  
4.2. The China Context 
4.2.1. Economic Reforms in China and State-Controlled Enterprises 
In the traditional context, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China were initially 
ideological organizations established as work units (gongzuo danwei) to support social 
and political rather than economic objectives (Leung & Cheng, 2013). In this situation, 
managers appointed by the government and the SOEs’ staff were seen as owning an ‘iron 
rice bowl’ (tiefanwan) with cradle-to-grave benefits (Hua, Miesing, & Li, 2006). Hence, 
SOEs were viewed as highly inefficient. 
The enterprise reform in China took place step by step since 1978, revealing a process 
of corporatization and privatization to raise funds for expansion and increase revenue. 
During the first two stages, the new non-state firms were allowed into the market, and 
their dynamic growth increased market competitive pressure on SOEs and the 
government bureaucrats responsible for them. Then, the managers of SOEs have been 
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granted more autonomy and compensation incentives to motivate them to improve their 
performance (Kang & Kim, 2012). Meanwhile, the government replaced the old 
command structure of government revenue transfer with a market-oriented system of 
taxation. At present, China adopts a dual system of tax collection and administration, and 
the revenue from corporate taxation is shared by central and local governments, with the 
central government’s share being 60%.9 
A Company Law was promulgated in December 1993 providing a legal framework for 
transforming and corporatizing traditional wholly state-owned enterprises into modern 
corporations, which have clarified property rights (Kang & Kim, 2012; Schipani & Liu, 
2002; Yang, 2007). To focus on strategic enterprises, the SOE reform strategy turned to 
“grasping the large, letting go the small” (zhuada fangxiao). Under this policy, one 
thousand large state enterprises have been selected to have the government maintain 
controlling rights and shape the core of China’s modern enterprise system. At the same 
time, these enterprises started to introduce a modern corporate structure and adopted 
professional management practices. The remaining 300 thousand small and medium 
SOEs were privatized though leases, mergers, sales or liquidation. The State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) was 
established in June 2003 to oversee all SOEs. Corresponding changes in employee 
management policies have taken place. A labor contract system10 was introduced to SOEs, 
and then managers’ wages and salaries in SOEs were tied to their profitability, depending 
on the extent to which the SOEs achieved their key performance targets like sales and 
                                                        
9 The State Administration of Taxation (SAT) is responsible for the collection of corporate tax of central-state enterprises. Local 
governments are responsible for collecting the corporate tax from local state enterprises and all other non-state enterprises, and then 
transfer the 60% revenue collected to the central government (Liu, 2014).  
10 In 2003, “Interim Regulations on Supervision and Management of State-owned Assets of Enterprises” are promulgated by the 
China State Council Article and states that “the state-owned assets supervision and administration authority shall establish a system 
for evaluating the performance of the responsible persons of enterprises, sign performance contracts with the responsible persons of 
enterprises appointed by it, and conduct annual and office-term evaluation of the responsible persons according to the performance 
contract”. More information from http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408035/c1477199/content.html 
And in 2009, the government issued the regulations on top managers’ pay of state enterprises. The cash compensation of a top manager 
in an SOE includes three parts: a bases salary, a performance-based bonus, and an incentive income, while the performance-based 
bonus is flexible and varying based on the firm performance (Xu, Li, Yuan, & Chan, 2014).  
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profit targets.  
Hence, from the perspective of the modern China’s SOEs, the reform has allowed them 
to retain a large part of firm profits together with much more autonomy. SOEs are 
expected to be more profitable and efficient, but in the meanwhile, this is also going to 
spark a conflict of interests in the top executives and the shareholders. The autonomy of 
SOEs executives motivates them to maximize their personal interests as well.  
4.2.2. Aggressive Tax Management in State-owned Enterprises 
The above has been borne out on several occasions. The Accounting Information 
Quality Inspection Announcement (No. 21) of China’s Ministry of Finance (2009) reveals 
that some state-owned enterprises have different degrees of problems paying taxes for 
performance evaluation standards, access to bank loans and other purposes. The report 
alleged that the Changling branch of Sinopec’s asset management firm in Jilin Province 
offered its employees a total of 50.08 million yuan as bonus without approval; in addition, 
Sinopec has also falsely stated 52.06 million yuan as income recorded in its books and 
4.12-million-yuan owner’s equity, accounting irregularities which resulted in failure to 
pay 11.82 million yuan in taxes in 2009. In 2011, the National Audit Office published the 
audit report of 15 central SOEs and stated that they falsified income and profit to the tune 
of 3.825 billion and 5.908 billion yuan, respectively, and seven of them failed to pay 471 
million yuan in taxes. Based on the actual situation of China, managers of SOEs have the 
motivation to do aggressive tax management to show good performance either to be 
promoted if they are political appointees and/or to be rewarded with monetary incentives. 
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4.3.  Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
To date, there is broad concern about and research into corporate tax management 
(Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). In a traditional concept, by being corporate tax efficient, tax 
management is seen as a firm value-maximizing activity, transferring the benefits from 
government to enterprises (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). But from the perspective of 
modern corporations, corporate tax management has been given two alternative views. 
On the one hand, tax management would incorporate more dimensions of the agency 
conflict between owners and managers. Managers can disguise complex tax avoiding 
transactions under the ostensible objective of alleviating firms’ tax burden to conduct 
managerial opportunism and resource diversion (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Mihir A. 
Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009). For example, Badertscher et al., (2013) find that 
managers can use tax management to engage in shirking and rent-extraction activities, 
which increase their self-interests. On the other side, especially in modern listed 
enterprises, there is a clear gap between theory and practice. In theory, shareholders as 
the owners of enterprises should be concerned with enterprises’ long-term interests and 
development. But, because of the information asymmetry, shareholders cannot effectively 
predict long-term cash flows. This preference for what can be obtained with greater 
certainty – the ‘bird-in-hand being better than two-in-the-bush’ mentality may induce 
shareholders to engage in short-termism behavior, like short-term profit maximization 
and higher share price.11 Therefore, managers may be pressured by shareholders to 
improve short-term performance. Thus, managers have been motivated by various 
incentives for short-term performance, and tax management can be employed as a useful 
tool to achieve it. Based on the above views, tax management activities may yield 
different economic consequences from what has been theoretically argued, which attracts 
                                                        
11 Based on the report from ACCA “Myopic management”. 
Source from：http://www.accaglobal.com/za/en/student/exam-support-resources/fundamentals-exams-study-resources/f9/technical-
articles/myopic-management--causes-and-remedies.html  
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considerable interest in the literature.   
Recently, exploring the extreme market outcomes of stock price crash has become a 
hot topic. Jin and Myers (2006) develop a bad news hoarding theory, and empirically 
show that enterprises in an information opaque market are more probability to meet a high 
risk of the stock price crash. More specifically, lack of information transparency gives 
managers variety of motivations to strategically hide and accumulate firms’ bad news for 
their personal interests, such as to secure their compensation and career development. 
When these incentives disappear or the accumulated negative information reaches a 
certain threshold, then all of the undisclosed negative information will be suddenly 
released to the stock market, resulting in a stock price crash. Hutton, Marcus, and 
Tehranian (2009) and Kim, Li, and Li (2014) show the positive relationship between 
opaqueness of financial reports and future crash risk. 
The complex and opaque characteristics of tax management can offer tools and 
opportunities for managers to hide firms’ negative information for a certain period, which 
leads to the high probability of future stock price crash. Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011), using 
U.S. firm-level data, examine the effect of corporate tax avoidance behavior on future 
crash risk. The results show that tax avoidance is positively correlated with the future 
crash risk, but this relationship can be alleviated for firms with a strong external 
monitoring mechanism.   
In comparison with research in developed countries (Abdul Wahab & Holland, 2012; 
Badertscher, Katz, & Rego, 2013; Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009; Mihir 
A Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2009), Claessens and Fan (2002) document corporate 
governance conditions in Asian countries, where agency problems are worsened by low 
corporate transparency accompanied with many rent-seeking and relation-based 
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transactions, extensive group structures, and risky financial structures. Piotroski and 
Wong (2012) show that in addition to concentrated ownership structures, weak legal 
protection, highly politicized institutional arrangements, rent-seeking behavior, and 
corruption, China suffers from opaque information environments and weak corporate 
transparency. Following Jin and Myers (2006), Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang (2011) using 
Chinese data, find that China’s stock market has a significant higher negative skewness 
in daily excess returns than the global average. Hence, since the low information 
transparency in China, the bad news suppression will cause a greater frequency of stock 
return crashes in the future. The following are Hypothesis 4.1 and 4.2 of the chapter.  
Hypothesis 4.1 (H4.1). Corporate tax management is negatively associated with 
contemporaneous stock price crash risk. 
Hypothesis 4.2 (H4.2). Corporate tax management is positively associated with future 
stock price crash risk. 
Most prior studies argue that governments as the controller of the state-
owned/controlled enterprises (SOEs) appoint bureaucrats on behalf of the government to 
serve social and political interests, such as employment and social security (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973; Xu, Zhu, & Lin, 2005). However, this view overlooks the 
complex incentives of individual bureaucrats and managers in modern China’s listed 
state-owned/controlled enterprises (LSOEs). There are two strands of literature related to 
listed state-owned/controlled enterprises of relevance to this chapter. The first strand 
shows that managers of LSOEs mostly are bureaucrats appointed by the government to 
represent government (ultimate controlling shareholders) in firm decision-making. 
Compared with managers in private enterprises, these managers in LSOEs have more 
incentives to seek future political advancement. Advance to a higher level of the political 
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hierarchy will garner more privileges even after they leave their position (Tu, Lin, & Liu, 
2013); hence it is natural that managers in LSOEs try to demonstrate outstanding firm 
performance to the government, which motivates them to conceal adverse operating 
outcomes. The second strand shows that the reforms have gradually improved the 
efficiency of the managerial labor market for SOEs, especially for listed SOEs, and the 
performance-based bonus policy gives the managers of SOEs further incentives to 
withhold negative information and show an outstanding performance. Thus, under the 
modern Chinese SOEs, political concerns and compensation contracts would facilitate 
SOEs’ managers to conceal adverse firm performance.  
Furthermore, China’s economic reform has transformed the country financial system 
from fiscal centralization to fiscal decentralization. The fiscal system is decentralized into 
different levels of governments, which are national, provincial, and municipal 
governments (including cities, prefectures, and counties). Accordingly, government 
ownership is affiliated with different administrative levels of government control. Hence, 
analyzing the agency problem of China’s SOEs, the different level government ownership 
should be considered.  
Since central SOEs play a strategically important role in national economy, the top 
executives are given a higher administrative rank at the vice-ministerial level (fubuji) or 
department-level (zhengtingji), which come with important political privileges (Leutert, 
2016). Therefore, the political benefits are the main incentive of central SOEs’ executives 
that motivate them to hide their firms’ bad news. On the other hand, because of the 
important role of central SOEs in China’s economy, when these SOEs meet financial 
problems, the government sees the need to provide a bailout to contain social unrest 
(Wang, Wong, & Xia, 2008). In this situation, central SOEs are offered a large security 
margin to stave off bankruptcy. 
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Local SOEs generally lack strict and independent accounting auditing and property 
evaluation institutions, which leads a high probability of moral hazard that agents can 
take advantages of information asymmetry to pursue self-interests (Mi & Wang, 2000; 
Piotroski & Wong, 2012; Yang, 2016). On the one hand, Mi and Wang (2000) and Chen, 
Lee, and Li (2008) find that there is a higher collusion between Chinese local government 
and SOEs’ managers, which leads to an abnormally high agency costs and SOEs’ 
inefficiency. More specifically, as an agent of the controlling shareholder, the local 
government officials can directly interfere in the running of their controlling SOEs (Fan, 
Wong, & Zhang, 2007), such as hiring acquiescent auditors to seek private gains (Shleifer, 
1998). Wang, Wong, and Xia (2008) find that Chinese local SOEs are more tend to hire 
small local auditors within the same region that is conducive to hide bad accounting 
information. Moreover, local governments are also deemed as privatization-friendly 
leaders, keen to privatize their SOEs to increase local fiscal revenue and more importantly 
to seek personal benefits from the privatized firms (Liu, Sun, & Woo, 2006). Moreover, 
existing research also find that the local governments are the big players behind a series 
of privatization, especially at the municipal and county levels (Garnaut, Song, Tenev, & 
Yao, 2005; Tenev, Zhang, & Brefort, 2002).  
Under the modern system governing Chinese SOEs, executives have motivations to 
pursue a self-serving agenda (for political career advancement and higher compensation) 
by using tax management to hide bad news and dress up their performance. Compared 
with other enterprises, municipal-SOEs may face a comparatively high risk of closure 
when they meet downturns and financial scandals. Because of the weaker protections 
from governments, the underperforming municipal SOEs are easily abandoned or 
privatized by municipal governments. Therefore, when the accumulated negative 
information releases to the stock market, municipal SOEs would face more crash risk. 
The following is hypotheses 4.3a, 4.3b and 4.3c of the chapter. 
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Hypothesis 4.3a (H4.3a). Firms controlled by central government have a weaker 
correlation between tax management and future risk of stock price crashing. 
 Hypothesis 4.3a (H4.3b). Firms controlled by provincial government have a weaker 
correlation between tax management and future risk of stock price crashing. 
Hypothesis 4.3b (H4.3c). Firms controlled by municipal government have a stronger 
correlation between tax management and future risk of stock price crashing. 
4.4. Data and Empirical Methodology 
4.4.1. Sample and Data 
This chapter uses data for all China’s A-share (main market) listed enterprises in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, excluding enterprises in the finance industry. 
Financial industry firms which according to the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
Industry Classifications (CSRCIC), are heavily regulated and their tax incentives differ 
from firms in other industries, the study excluded enterprises in the financial industry. 
The period covered is from 200812 to 2013. All data are from the China Stock Market 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. In addition, to get more complete and 
accurate ownership data, part of the state ownership data is hand-collected from corporate 
annual reports.  
 
                                                        
12 During the fifth Session of the tenth National People’s Congress (NPC) on March 16, 2007, the new Corporate Income Tax Law 
was approved and became effective on January 1, 2008. The new tax law set a unified tax rate of 25% for both domestic companies 
and foreign invested companies, and changed the current tax holiday, preferential tax treatments and transitional provisions (See more 
detail from: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471133.htm). Under the previous tax law, domestic 
companies had been assessed at a 33% statutory income tax rate; while certain foreign companies enjoyed preferential tax rates of 24% 
or 15%. To mitigate the effect of new Corporate Income Tax Law, the sampling in this chapter began in 2008.  
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In line with Wang, Wong, and Xia (2008), Wu, Wang, Luo, and Gillis (2012), and 
Bradshaw, Liao, and Ma (2012), listed state-owned/controlled enterprises in this study is 
defined as if their ultimate controller is the central, provincial or municipal government. 
If there were two or more types of owners controlling a listed firm, the chapter classified 
the firm’s ownership type based on who was the ultimate largest shareholder. 
In addition, this chapter also excluded data of firms for which firm-year observations 
are fewer than 26 weeks of stock return and have non-positive book values and total assets. 
And, corporate effective income tax rates (ETRs) with negative values or values larger 
than one. With these exclusions, the sample of panel data consisted of 6706 firm-year 
observations. Table 4.2 provides a list of variables used in this chapter. To eliminate the 
effect of outliers, the chapter winsorizes variables at the top and bottom 1%. 
4.4.2. Variables Used  
Four measures of corporate tax management were used to capture different aspects of 
corporate tax management activities. Corporate effective tax rates can reflect all tax 
management transactions, even aggressive tax avoidance through permanent book-tax 
differences (Chen, Chen, Cheng, & Shevlin, 2010). The first measure is corporate current 
effective income tax rate (ETR). It is defined as tax expenses minus deferred tax expenses 
over pre-tax income. In addition, this chapter also looks at a three-year ETR (LETR), 
which is intended to achieve better matching between taxes paid and the income related 
to these taxes (Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2008). The chapter complemented the 
effective tax rate with two additional book-tax difference measures, i.e. book-tax 
difference (BTD) and residual book-tax difference measure (DTAX). The residual book-
tax difference captures more risky tax avoidance associated with tax shelter transactions 
(Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Table 4.2 provides the detailed definitions of these four 
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variables. 
Following Xu, Li, Yuan, and Chan (2014), Kim, Li, and Li (2014), and Xu, Jiang, Chan, 
and Yi (2013), this chapter constructed two measures of stock price crash risk. Both 
measures were constructed on firm-specific weekly returns. The chapter firstly estimated 
firm-specific weekly returns, symbolized by Wi,t.  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑚,𝑡+2 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(4.1) 
Where Ri,t is the return on stock i in week t and Rm,t is the value-weighed A-share 
market return in week t. The firm-specific weekly return for firm i in week t is measured 
by Wi,t=Ln (1+εi,t), where εi,t is the residual in Eq.(4.1). 
The first measure of crash risk is the negative conditional return skewness, denoted by 
NCSKEW. Eq. (4.2) shows the NCSKEW for each firm i in year t.       
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = −[𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
3/2∑𝑊𝑖,𝑡
3 ]/[(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)(∑𝑊𝑖,𝑡
2 )3/2] 
 (4.2) 
The second measure of crash risk is down-to-up volatility (DUVOL), which captures 
asymmetric volatilities between negative and positive firm-specific weekly returns. 
Specifically, the chapter firstly separates all the weeks with firm-specific weekly returns 
into down weeks and up weeks. The down weeks means the firm-specific weekly returns 
lower than the annual mean, and the up weeks are the firm-specific weekly returns higher 
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than the annual mean. The standard deviations for the two subsamples are computed 
separately, and then calculate the DUVOL followed by Eq. (4.3) for firm i in year t.         
𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = ln⁡{[(𝑛𝑢 − 1)∑ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
2 ]/[(𝑛𝑑 − 1)∑ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
2 ]}
𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛
 
(4.3) 
A higher value for NCSKEW and DUVOL is consistent with a greater likelihood of the 
stock price crash risk, and vice versa. 
4.4.3. Model Specification 
To test H4.1 and H4.2, this chapter estimates the following regression model, Eq. (4.4). 
In the model, there are two alternative measures of Crash Risk, which are NCSKEW and 
DUVOL. Four measures of tax management (Tax) are employed: ETR, LETR, DTAX, and 
BTD, and standard errors are two-way clustered by year and firm.  
𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ⁡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 (4.4) 
Eq. (4.5) estimates the moderating effect of government ownership on the relationship 
between tax management and future stock price crash (H4.3a, b, and c). A dummy 
variable of state ownership OWNER, and an interaction term between state ownership and 
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tax management OWNER*TAX are set up. Where, OWNER represents the enterprises’ 
ultimate controller, which is controlled by central, provincial or municipal governments: 
Central, Provincial, and Muni. Table 4.2 shows the detailed definitions. 
𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ⁡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽12𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(4.5) 
Several control variables as potential predictors of crash risk were included. DTURNi,t-
1 is the detrended average monthly stock turnover, which is a proxy for investor 
heterogeneity or for differences of opinion among investors. NCSKEWi,t-1 is the lagged 
negative skewness of firm-specific stock returns. Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) show that 
the last year return skewness is likely to influence the return skewness in the current year. 
The variable SIGMAi,t-1 is the standard deviation of last year firm-specific stock returns, 
and RETi,t-1 is the average firm-specific weekly return in the last year. In addition, several 
standard corporate control variables are included, which are SIZEi,t-1 (the firm's natural 
log of total assets), MBi,t-1 (the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of 
equity), LEVi,t-1 (the ratio of the book value of total liabilities scaled by total assets), and 
ROAi,t-1 (net income divided by total assets). The variable Discacci,t-1 is absolute 
discretionary accruals, which measures accrual manipulation and is estimated from the 
modified Jones model (Patricia M. Dechow, Richard G. Sloan, & Amy P. Sweeney, 1995). 
Moreover, industry and year dummies are also included to control the effects of industry 
and time, respectively. The detailed variable definitions can be found in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Definition of All Variables 
Dependent variables (Stock price crash risk) 
NCSKEW The negative coefficient of skewness, calculated by taking the 
negative of the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns for 
each sample year and dividing it by the standard deviation of firm-
specific weekly returns raised to the third power. See Eq. (4.2) for 
details. 
DUVOL 
 
It captures asymmetric volatilities between negative and positive 
firm-specific weekly returns. Firstly, all the weeks with firm-
specific weekly returns have been separated into down weeks and 
up weeks. In the down weeks, the firm-specific weekly returns are 
below the annual mean, while, in the up weeks, the firm-specific 
weekly returns are above the annual mean. The standard deviations 
for the two subsamples are computed separately and then the log 
of the ratio of the standard deviation of the down weeks to that of 
the up weeks is calculated. See Eq. (4.3) for details. 
Independent variables (Corporate tax management) 
ETR ETR is corporate current effective income tax rate, calculated as 
(income tax expenses-deferred tax expense) / pre-tax income. ETR 
is set to missing when the denominator is zero or negative. This 
chapter truncates ETR to the range [0,1].  
LETR LETR is three years’ average ETR. LETR is set to missing when 
the denominator is zero or negative. This chapter truncates LETR 
to the range [0,1]. 
BTD BTD is the total book-tax difference, which equals book income 
less taxable income scaled by lagged assets. Book income is pre-
tax income. Taxable income is calculated by current tax expenses 
dividing by the statutory tax rate. 
DTAX The residual book-tax difference (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006), 
which equals the residual from the following firm fixed effects 
regression, BTD𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where BTD is the 
total book-tax difference and TACC is total accruals. 
State ownership (OWNER) 
Central:  
 
A dummy variable, 1 if central government is the corporate 
ultimate controller, and 0 otherwise. 
Provincial: 
 
A dummy variable, 1 if provincial government is the corporate 
ultimate controller, which includes 22 provinces, 5 autonomous 
regions, and 4 directly administered municipalities (Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing), 0 is otherwise. 
Muni: A dummy variable, 1 if municipal government is the corporate 
ultimate controller, and 0 otherwise. Where municipal government 
in this chapter refer to prefectural-level cities in China, which are 
administrative level below provincial governments but higher than 
township. 
OWNER*TAX An interaction variable equals OWNER times four different 
measures of corporate tax management, which are Central*ETRi,t-
1, Central*LETRi,t-1, Central*BTDi,t-1, and Central*DTAXi,t-1; 
Provincial*ETRi,t-1, Provincial*LETRi,t-1, Provincial*BTDi,t-1, and 
Provincial*DTAXi,t-1; Muni*ETRi,t-1, Muni*LETRi,t-1, 
Muni*BTDi,t-1, and Muni*DTAXi,t-1.  
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4.5. Empirical Results 
4.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.3 shows the summary descriptive statistics of the variables. In terms of the two 
effective tax rates (ETR and LETR), two indications of the size of corporate tax 
management, the average and median of ETRi,t and LETRi,t are 22% and 21.2%, and 19.7% 
and 19.4%, respectively, below the statutory corporate income tax rate of 25%. Thus, it 
suggests that more than half of the sample firms have a lower corporate effective tax rate. 
Therefore, corporate tax management is a significant strategy of corporate management 
in China’s listed enterprises.  
 
Table 4.2: Continued  
Control variables 
DTURN DTURN is the average monthly share turnover for the current 
fiscal year minus the average monthly share turnover for the 
previous fiscal year. The monthly stock turnover is calculated as 
monthly trading volume divided by the total number of circulating 
shares outstanding during the month. 
SIGMA SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns 
over the fiscal year. 
RET RET is the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal 
year 
SIZE SIZE is the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets 
MB MB is the market-to-book ratio. 
LEV LEV is the firm financial leverage, calculated as total liabilities 
scaled by the book value of assets. 
ROA ROA is firm profitability, calculated as net income divided by total 
assets. 
Discacc It is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, where 
discretionary accruals are estimated from the modified Jones 
model (Patricia M. Dechow, Richard G. Sloan, & Amy P. Sweeney, 
1995). See Appendices A. 
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Table 4.4 shows the correlation coefficients between the dependent variables 
(NCSKEW and DUVOL) and all explanatory variables. The results show that the two 
dependent variables of NCSKEW and DUVOL are mostly significantly and highly 
correlated with four measures of tax management both in year t and t-1. Table 4.5 reports 
the correlation matrix of the independent variables and the control variables. The table 
shows that almost all the correlations between variables are less than 0.6. The correlations 
between ETRt and LETRt, ETRt-1 and LETRt, and ETRt-1 and LETRt-1 are above 0.7, since 
they are used as independent variables in separate models, these do not a problem. Then, 
a further check on multicollinearity is to estimate variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics. 
The results show that the VIF values of all variables are less than 5, which indicates that 
the multicollinearity is not a factor in the following regression analysis.  
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables 
Variables N mean Std. Dev. min p25 Median p75 max 
Crash risk measures        
NCSKEWi,t 6706 -0.558 0.880 -3.062 -1.104 -0.570 0.024 1.601 
DUVOLi,t 6706 -0.100 0.347 -0.909 -0.343 -0.106 0.147 0.697 
Tax management measures       
ETRi,t 6706 0.220 0.140 0.000 0.141 0.197 0.274 0.994 
LETRi,t 6706 0.212 0.123 0.000 0.144 0.194 0.266 0.991 
TSi,t 6706 -0.010 0.197 -0.864 -0.076 -0.004 0.060 0.829 
BTDi,t 6706 0.091 0.099 -0.058 0.031 0.063 0.115 0.609 
ETRi,t-1 4464 0.215 0.129 0.000 0.141 0.196 0.272 0.985 
LETRi,t-1 4464 0.210 0.118 0.000 0.142 0.194 0.265 0.985 
TSi,t-1 4464 0.000 0.195 -0.864 -0.066 0.002 0.066 0.829 
BTDi,t-1 4464 0.099 0.103 -0.058 0.036 0.070 0.126 0.609 
Control variables        
NCSKEWi,t-1 4464 -0.505 0.885 -3.062 -1.079 -0.522 0.108 1.601 
DTURNi,t-1 4464 0.309 0.209 0.034 0.151 0.253 0.416 0.988 
LEVi,t-1 4464 0.493 0.194 0.063 0.353 0.499 0.640 0.940 
MBi,t-1 4464 0.206 0.237 0.001 0.003 0.093 0.393 0.800 
ROAi,t-1 4464 0.054 0.045 -0.058 0.023 0.042 0.073 0.223 
SIZEi,t-1 4464 9.568 0.536 8.287 9.200 9.502 9.887 11.191 
SIGMAi,t-1 4464 0.064 0.021 0.028 0.049 0.061 0.076 0.124 
RETi,t-1 4464 0.002 0.012 -0.023 -0.007 0.000 0.008 0.031 
Discacci,t-1 4464 0.151 0.140 0.002 0.055 0.117 0.210 0.853 
The sample contains from 2008 to 2013 with non-missing values. P25 refers to 
percentile 25, and P75 refers to percentile 75. The variables are as defined in Table 4.2.  
Source: Computed by the authors 
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Table 4.4:Correlation Between Dependent Variables and Explanatory Variables 
  ETRt ETRt-1 LETRt LETRt-1 DTAXt DTAXt-1 BTDt BTDt-1 NCSKEWt-1 
NCSKEWt 0.01 -0.057*** -0.024* -0.040*** 0.037*** 0.057*** 0.035*** 0.131*** -0.083*** 
DUVOLt 0.046*** -0.043*** 0.009 -0.030** 0.044*** 0.063*** -0.030** 0.101*** -0.104*** 
  DTURNt-1 LEVt-1 MBt-1 ROAt-1 SIZEt-1 SIGMAt-1 RETt-1 Discacct-1  
NCSKEWt 0.102*** -0.015 0.008 0.131*** 0.044*** 0.013 0.241*** 0.021  
DUVOLt 0.104*** 0 -0.088*** 0.101*** 0.092*** -0.182*** 0.307*** -0.009  
Note: *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
       Variables are as defined in Table 4.2 
Source: Computed by the author 
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Table 4.5: Correlation Between Independent and Control Variables 
 ETRt ETRt-1 LETRt LETRt-1 DTAXt DTAXt-1 BTDt BTDt-1 NCSKEWt-1 DTURNt-1 LEVt-1 MBt-1 
ETRt-1 0.500***             
LETRt 0.748*** 0.778***            
LETRt-1 0.441*** 0.770*** 0.812***           
DTAXt -0.046*** -0.050*** -0.001 0.000          
DTAXt-1 0.015 -0.039*** -0.003 0.007 0.095***         
BTDt -0.147*** -0.121*** -0.110*** -0.103*** 0.351*** -0.013        
BTDt-1 -0.092*** -0.126*** -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.001 0.385*** 0.560***       
NCSKEWt-1 -0.022 -0.008 -0.038** -0.038** -0.089*** 0.062*** -0.028* 0.039***      
DTURNt-1 0.005 -0.018 -0.008 0.008 0.122*** -0.001 -0.092*** -0.164*** -0.226***     
LEVt-1 0.204*** 0.210*** 0.259*** 0.229*** -0.02 -0.037** -0.230*** -0.222*** -0.059*** 0.019    
MBt-1 -0.037** -0.012 -0.011 -0.001 -0.122*** -0.001 0.071*** 0.188*** 0.074*** -0.156*** -0.011   
ROAt-1 -0.173*** -0.227*** -0.206*** -0.190*** 0.020 0.233*** 0.593*** 0.792*** 0.048*** -0.137*** -0.415*** 0.055*** 
SIZEt-1 0.154*** 0.142*** 0.193*** 0.157*** -0.033** 0.071*** -0.067*** 0.081*** -0.025* -0.340*** 0.386*** -0.006 
SIGMAt-1 -0.036** -0.006 -0.004 0.030** 0.009 -0.003 0.031** 0.007 -0.081*** 0.371*** 0.065*** 0.280*** 
RETt-1 -0.024 -0.064*** -0.026* -0.023 0.164*** -0.061*** 0.164*** 0.076*** -0.537*** 0.436*** 0.024 -0.069*** 
Discacct-1 0.027* 0.027* 0.043*** 0.041*** -0.023 0.140*** 0.026* 0.245*** 0.005 -0.031** 0.194*** 0.175*** 
  ROAt-1 SIZEt-1 SIGMAt-1 RETt-1                 
SIZEt-1 -0.027*             
SIGMAt-1 -0.044*** -0.221***            
RETt-1 0.075*** -0.034** 0.000           
Discacct-1 -0.051*** 0.135*** 0.074*** 0.008                 
Note: *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
      Variables are as defined in Table 4.2 
Source: Computed by the author 
88 
 
4.5.2. Regression Results 
Table 4.6 (Panel A and B) shows the empirical results of the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions with NCSKEWi,t and DUVOLi,t as the dependent variables of crash risk, 
respectively. The independent variable of tax management is proxied by ETR, LETR, 
DTAX, and BTD in year t and t-1, respectively. Regressions also include the following 
control variables: NCSKEWi,t-1, DTURNi,t-1, RETi,t-1, SIGMAi,t-1, SIZEi,t-1, MBi,t-1, LEVi,t-1, 
ROAi,t-1, Discacci,t-1, with industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at both firm level and year level.  
Panel A of Table 4.6 shows the results of NCSKEW as the dependent variable of crash 
risk. In column (1) of Panel A, the coefficient of ETRi,t-1 is highly significant at the 1% 
level with negative sign (-0.330 with t=-3.495), while the coefficient of ETRi,t is 
significant with positive sign (0.325 with t=3.300). Because a lower ETR represents a 
higher level of tax management, the results indicate that tax management in year t is 
negatively correlated with crash risk in year t, but tax management in year t-1 is positively 
correlated with crash risk in year t. The coefficients associated with DTAX and BTD in 
year t under both models (columns (3) and (4) in Panel A of Table 4.6) are negative and 
highly significant at 1% level (-0.190 with t=-13.424, and -0.976 with t=-5.533, 
respectively), while the coefficients of the two proxies in year t-1 are positive and highly 
significant (0.113 with t=2.139, and 0.592 with t=7.232, respectively). Since the higher 
BTD and DTAX represent a higher-level of tax management, the results in columns (3) 
and (4) of Panel A of Table 4.6 are consistent with the results shown in column (1). 
Therefore, the results in Panel A of Table 4.6 support Hypothesis 4.1 and Hypothesis 4.2, 
which means that corporate tax management is negatively associated with 
contemporaneous stock price crash risk, but positively associated with future stock price 
crashes.  
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Panel B of Table 4.6 reports the results of DUVOLi,t as an alternative measure of 
dependent variable, Crash Risk, which is used to test the robustness of the results. The 
results show that DUVOLi,t is significantly positive correlated with ETRi,t and LETRi,t, but 
negatively correlated with ETRi,t-1 and LETRi,t-1 (columns (1) and (2) of Panel B). In 
addition, in columns (3) and (4) of Panel B, DUVOLi,t has significantly negative 
relationships with DTAXi,t and BTDi,t, and a significantly positive relationship with 
DTAXi,t-1 and BTDi,t-1,. Therefore, the results of DUVOL as the dependent variable are in 
line with the results reported in Panel A of Table 4.6, suggesting that the results are robust 
to alternative measure of stock price crash risk. Thus, the findings support Hypothesis 4.1 
and Hypothesis 4.2, indicating that firms with more tax management activities is less 
prone to crash in the current year but more crash prone in the future. 
Therefore, the results support the bad news hoarding theory and agency theory. 
Corporate tax management activities can be used undesirably as a tool to conceal negative 
firms’ news, such as adverse operating outcomes, manipulate management performance 
thereby producing reduced immediate crash risk. When these opportunistic short-term 
behavior is eventually uncovered, the result is future enterprise crash risk. Bad news can 
only be postponed, not eliminated.  
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Table 4.6: Corporate Tax Management and Stock Price Crash Risk (H4.1 and H4.2) 
  (1) ETR (2) LETR (3) DTAX (4) BTD 
Panel A: Dependent variable: NCSKEWi,t  
ETRi,t 0.325***                   
 (3.300)                   
ETRi,t-1 -0.330***                   
 (-3.495)                   
LETRi,t  0.076                  
  (0.676)                  
LETRi,t-1  -0.241**                  
  (-2.454)                  
DTAXi,t   -0.190***                 
   (-13.424)                 
DTAXi,t-1   0.113**                 
   (2.139)                 
BTDi,t    -0.976*** 
    (-5.533)    
BTDi,t-1    0.592*** 
    (7.232) 
NCSKEWi,t-1 0.056* 0.055* 0.055* 0.056*   
 (1.836) (1.805) (1.880) (1.778) 
DTURNi,t-1 -0.170 -0.160 -0.177 -0.223*   
 (-1.391) (-1.333) (-1.393) (-1.840)    
RETi,t-1 16.827*** 16.711*** 17.507*** 18.605*** 
 (2.833) (2.783) (2.961) (3.150) 
SIGMAi,t-1 1.381 1.422 1.401 1.373 
 (0.794) (0.826) (0.829) (0.767) 
SIZEi,t-1 0.105* 0.109** 0.102* 0.082 
 (1.941) (2.058) (1.795) (1.527) 
MBi,t-1 -0.019 -0.020 -0.037 -0.050 
 (-0.414) (-0.457) (-0.855) (-1.016)    
LEVi,t-1 -0.039 -0.028 -0.036 -0.030 
 (-0.487) (-0.369) (-0.412) (-0.313)    
ROAi,t-1 1.634*** 1.638*** 1.555*** 1.727*** 
 (5.083) (5.067) (4.923) (3.698) 
Discacci,t-1 0.062 0.063 0.038 -0.020 
 (0.821) (0.826) (0.498) (-0.309)    
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.005*** -2.058*** -1.970*** -1.713**  
 (-2.785) (-2.877) (-2.617) (-2.365)    
N 4464 4464 4464 4464 
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.221 0.222 0.227 
     
Panel B: Dependent variable: DUVOLi,t 
ETRi,t 0.169***                   
 (4.633)                   
ETRi,t-1 -0.139***                   
 (-3.880)                   
LETRi,t  0.101**    
  (2.034)   
LETRi,t-1  -0.115**    
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Table 4.6: Continued  
  (-2.511)      
DTAXi,t                  -0.067***  
                  (-3.454)  
DTAXi,t-1                  0.051*  
                  (1.924)  
BTDi,t                   -0.534*** 
                   (-8.323) 
BTDi,t-1                   0.234*** 
                   (4.918) 
NCSKEWi,t-1 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.015 
 (1.419) (1.412) (1.491) (1.397) 
DTURNi,t-1 -0.062 -0.058 -0.063 -0.092 
 (-1.010) (-0.953)    (-0.999) (-1.472) 
RETi,t-1 5.720*** 5.656**  5.941*** 6.783*** 
 (2.633) (2.574) (2.710) (3.100) 
SIGMAi,t-1 0.737 0.763 0.753 0.750 
 (1.504) (1.561) (1.574) (1.444) 
SIZEi,t-1 0.053** 0.054**  0.052* 0.042 
 (2.026) (2.100) (1.899) (1.601) 
MBi,t-1 -0.017 -0.018 -0.024 -0.030* 
 (-1.132) (-1.201)    (-1.499) (-1.762) 
LEVi,t-1 -0.042 -0.038 -0.039 -0.035 
 (-1.523) (-1.488)    (-1.349) (-1.068) 
ROAi,t-1 0.335*** 0.341*** 0.289** 0.533** 
 (2.890) (3.110) (2.374) (2.445) 
Discacci,t-1 -0.032 -0.031 -0.043 -0.059** 
 (-1.170) (-1.145)    (-1.416) (-2.058) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.993*** -1.013*** -0.984*** -0.849*** 
 (-3.134) (-3.206)    (-2.953) (-2.597) 
N 4464 4464 4464 4464 
Adjusted _R2 0.341 0.338 0.339 0.351 
Note:  
1. All variables are defined in Table 4.2.  
2. ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
3. t-values are in parentheses  
Source: Computed by the author 
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According to the results of Table 4.6, corporate tax management would cause a high 
likelihood of future crash risk, thus to assess the impact of state ownership on the 
relationship between tax management and future stock price crashes (Hypotheses 4.3 a, 
b, and c), Eq. (4.5) is estimated. State ownership (OWNERi,t-1) and the interaction term of 
OWNER*TAXi,t-1 are included. To increase the power of the test, this chapter uses three 
dummy variables (central, province, and muni) for each level of state ownership, which 
represents Central SOEs, Provincial SOEs, and Municipal SOEs.  
Table 4.7 reports the results of the impact of central government ownership on the 
relationship between tax management and future crash risk. The dependent variable is 
measured by NCSKEW and DUVOL, respectively in Panel A and B. The independent 
variable of tax management is proxied by ETR, LETR, DTAX, and BTD, respectively. The 
interaction terms, Central*ETRi,t-1, Central*LETRi,t-1, Central*BTDi,t-1, and 
Central*DTAXi,t-1 are employed. Moderator is central government ownership, denoted by 
Centrali,t-1. Regressions include the following control variables: NCSKEWi,t-1, DTURNi,t-
1, RETi,t-1, SIGMAi,t-1, SIZEi,t-1, MBi,t-1, LEVi,t-1, ROAi,t-1, Discacci,t-1, with industry fixed 
effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust 
and clustered at both firm and year levels.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 4.7, with NCSKEWi,t as the dependent variable, after 
interaction terms included, tax management in year t is still negatively associated with 
crash risk in year t. Specifically, ETRi,t has a significantly positive coefficient, and DTAXi,t 
and BTDi,t have significantly negative coefficients. The results are consistent with H4.1. 
In addition, ETRi,t-1 and LETRi,t-1 have significantly negative coefficients, and BTDi,t-1 has 
a significantly positive coefficient. Thus, corporate tax management is significantly 
positive correlated with future crash risk, which supports H4.2. Moreover, the coefficients 
of four interaction terms, that is, Central*TAXi,t-1 (Central*ETRi,t-1, Central*LERTi,t-1, 
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Central*DTAXi,t-1, and Central*BTDi,t-1), are not statistically significant. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4.3a has been rejected.  
Panel B of Table 4.7 presents the results when crash risk is proxied by DUVOLi,t, which 
the coefficients of both two main effect terms (Tax Managementi,t and Tax Managementi,t-
1) are highly significant with expected signs, except that only DTAXi,t-1 is the coefficient 
insignificant. In addition, the coefficients of four interaction terms in Panel B of Table 4.7, 
Central*ETRi,t-1, Central*LERTi,t-1, Central*DTAXi,t-1, Central*BTDi,t-1 are also not 
shown statistically significant. Hence, the results reported in Panel A and Panel B of Table 
4.7 suggest that the central government control would not influence future stock price 
crash risk, H4.3a has been rejected.  
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Table 4.7: The Impact of Central Government Ownership on the Relationship 
Between Tax Management and Future Stock Price Crash Risk. (H4.3a) 
  (1) ETR (2) LETR (3) DTAX (4) BTD 
Panel A: Dependent variable: NCSKEWi,t 
ETRi,t 0.325***                   
 (3.292)                   
ETRi,t-1 -0.309***                   
 (-3.033)                   
Central*ETRi,t-1 -0.096                   
 (-0.635)                   
LETRi,t  0.076                  
  (0.647)                  
LETRi,t-1  -0.284**                  
  (-2.560)                  
Central*LETRi,t-1  0.269                  
  (1.150)                  
DTAXi,t   -0.190***                 
   (-15.210)                 
DTAXi,t-1   0.075                 
   (1.035)                 
Central*DTAXi,t-1   0.269                 
   (1.269)                 
BTDi,t    -0.966*** 
    (-5.383)    
BTDi,t-1    0.585*** 
    (6.283) 
Central*BTDi,t-1    0.131 
    (0.261) 
Centrali,t-1 0.059 -0.016 0.039 0.024 
 (0.965) (-0.215) (1.163) (0.353) 
NCSKEWi,t-1 0.056* 0.055* 0.055* 0.056*   
 (1.816) (1.790) (1.873) (1.781) 
DTURNi,t-1 -0.166 -0.162 -0.175 -0.221*   
 (-1.377) (-1.396) (-1.402) (-1.842)    
RETi,t-1 16.837*** 16.826*** 17.509*** 18.588*** 
 (2.838) (2.802) (2.969) (3.169) 
SIGMAi,t-1 1.300 1.356 1.331 1.307 
 (0.727) (0.761) (0.781) (0.709) 
SIZEi,t-1 0.100* 0.103* 0.097 0.078 
 (1.779) (1.866) (1.636) (1.363) 
MBi,t-1 -0.016 -0.020 -0.036 -0.048 
 (-0.345) (-0.436) (-0.845) (-0.980)    
LEVi,t-1 -0.037 -0.021 -0.037 -0.027 
 (-0.462) (-0.272) (-0.422) (-0.288)    
ROAi,t-1 1.668*** 1.668*** 1.592*** 1.728*** 
 (5.062) (5.024) (4.893) (3.648) 
Discacci,t-1 0.066 0.066 0.050 -0.018 
 (0.871) (0.868) (0.623) (-0.284)    
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.966*** -1.996*** -1.926** -1.675**  
 (-2.665) (-2.745) (-2.496) (-2.236)    
N 4464 4464 4464 4464 
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Table 4.7: Continued 
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.221 0.223 0.227 
     
Panel B. Dependent variable: DUVOLi,t 
ETRi,t 0.169***                   
 (4.628)                   
ETRi,t-1 -0.133***                   
 (-3.513)                   
Central*ETRi,t-1 -0.030                   
 (-0.799)                   
LETRi,t  0.101**                  
  (1.998)                  
LETRi,t-1  -0.129**                  
  (-2.268)                  
Central*LETRi,t-1  0.084                  
  (1.424)                  
DTAXi,t   -0.067***                 
   (-3.438)                 
DTAXi,t-1   0.040                 
   (1.123)                 
Central*DTAXi,t-1   0.070                 
   (0.829)                 
BTDi,t    -0.531*** 
    (-8.254)    
BTDi,t-1    0.230*** 
    (4.135) 
Central*BTDi,t-1    0.053 
    (0.380) 
Centrali,t-1 0.021 -0.003 0.015* 0.007 
 (1.446) (-0.125) (1.755) (0.415) 
NCSKEWi,t-1 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 
 (1.408) (1.413) (1.488) (1.397) 
DTURNi,t-1 -0.060 -0.058 -0.062 -0.091 
 (-0.995) (-0.973) (-0.997) (-1.476)    
RETi,t-1 5.725*** 5.694*** 5.945*** 6.777*** 
 (2.638) (2.599) (2.722) (3.110) 
SIGMAi,t-1 0.707 0.737 0.726 0.728 
 (1.434) (1.484) (1.533) (1.385) 
SIZEi,t-1 0.051* 0.052** 0.050* 0.040 
 (1.933) (1.985) (1.809) (1.507) 
MBi,t-1 -0.016 -0.018 -0.023 -0.029*   
 (-1.076) (-1.167) (-1.473) (-1.762)    
LEVi,t-1 -0.041 -0.035 -0.039 -0.034 
 (-1.481) (-1.400) (-1.298) (-1.046)    
ROAi,t-1 0.347*** 0.353*** 0.302** 0.533**  
 (3.077) (3.260) (2.546) (2.471) 
Discacci,t-1 -0.031 -0.030 -0.039 -0.059**  
 (-1.136) (-1.107) (-1.223) (-2.018)    
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.978*** -0.991*** -0.967*** -0.836**  
 (-3.056) (-3.110) (-2.876) (-2.515)    
N 4464 4464 4464 4464 
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Table 4.7: Continued 
Adjusted R2 0.341 0.338 0.339 0.351 
Note:  
1. All variables are defined in Table 4.2.  
2. ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
3. t-values are in parentheses  
Source: Computed by the authors 
 
 
Table 4.8 presents the results of the moderating effect of provincial government 
ownership on the relationship between tax management and future crash risk. Panel A and 
B show the results with NCSKEWi,t and DUVOLi,t as the dependent variables, respectively. 
The independent variable of tax management is proxied by ETR, LETR, DTAX, and BTD, 
respectively. Moderator is Provinciali,t-1. Four interaction terms, Provincial*ETRi,t-1, 
Provincial*LETRi,t-1, Provincial*BTDi,t-1, and Provincial*DTAXi,t-1 are employed. 
Regressions include the following control variables: NCSKEWi,t-1, DTURNi,t-1, RETi,t-1, 
SIGMAi,t-1, SIZEi,t-1, MBi,t-1, LEVi,t-1, ROAi,t-1, Discacci,t-1, with industry fixed effects and 
year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and 
clustered at both firm and year levels. 
The results show that corporate tax management has a significantly negative 
relationship with contemporaneous crash risk, and positive relationship with future crash 
risk, which support H4.1 and H4.2 again. In addition, the coefficients of the four 
interaction terms (Provincial*ETRi,t-1, Provincial*LETRi,t-1, Provincial*DTAXi,t-1, and 
Provincial*BTDi,t-1) in Panel A and B of Table 4.8 are not statistically significant, except 
that only Province*LETRi,t-1 is significantly positive at 10% in Panel B of Table 4.8. 
Therefore, the results suggest that the provincial government control would not 
statistically influence the relationship between tax management and future stock price 
crash risk. Thus, the results of Table 4.8 reject H4.3b.  
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The results of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 reject Hypothesis 3a. Therefore, the firms 
controlled by central and provincial government would not impact the positive correlation 
between tax management and future risk of stock price crashing. For non-financial SOEs, 
government control is exercised mostly through ensuring compliance with government 
policies and strategies. Control is not extended to day-to-day management (Ran & Cheok, 
2016). Hence, tax management is generally left in the hands of SOE management. 
Table 4.8: The Impact of Provincial Government Ownership on The Relationship 
Between Tax Management and Future Stock Price Crash Risk. (H 4.3b) 
  (1) ETR (2) LETR (3) DTAX (4) BTD 
Panel A: Dependent variable: NCSKEWi,t 
ETRi,t 0.318***    
 (3.289)    
ETRi,t-1 -0.376***    
 (-4.022)    
Provincial*ETRi,t-1 0.221    
 (1.643)    
LETRi,t  0.062   
  (0.572)   
LETRi,t-1  -0.290**   
  (-2.470)   
Provincial*LETRi,t-1  0.269   
  (1.476)   
DTAXi,t   -0.186***  
   (-18.585)  
DTAXi,t-1   0.107*  
   (1.869)  
Provincial*DTAXi,t-1   0.037  
   (0.232)  
BTDi,t    -0.974*** 
    (-5.567) 
BTDi,t-1    0.623*** 
    (7.487) 
Provincial*BTDi,t-1    -0.087 
    (-0.248) 
Provinciali,t-1 -0.098** -0.109** -0.048* -0.042 
 (-2.143) (-2.308) (-1.684) (-1.458) 
NCSKEWi,t-1 0.054* 0.053* 0.054* 0.055* 
 (1.825) (1.785) (1.875) (1.763) 
DTURNi,t-1 -0.169 -0.157 -0.179 -0.226* 
 (-1.374) (-1.323) (-1.399) (-1.859) 
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Table 4.8: Continued  
RETi,t-1 16.597*** 16.488*** 17.356*** 18.417*** 
 (2.811) (2.757) (2.968) (3.139) 
SIGMAi,t-1 1.383 1.402 1.427 1.414 
 (0.803) (0.829) (0.835) (0.787) 
SIZEi,t-1 0.113** 0.118** 0.109** 0.089* 
 (2.148) (2.265) (1.982) (1.749) 
MBi,t-1 -0.018 -0.019 -0.036 -0.049 
 (-0.392) (-0.442) (-0.869) (-1.006) 
LEVi,t-1 -0.048 -0.038 -0.042 -0.036 
 (-0.596) (-0.499) (-0.473) (-0.382) 
ROAi,t-1 1.606*** 1.612*** 1.538*** 1.686*** 
 (5.229) (5.180) (5.037) (4.056) 
Discacci,t-1 0.066 0.069 0.040 -0.020 
 (0.869) (0.890) (0.516) (-0.299) 
Industy effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.059*** -2.109*** -2.022*** -1.7735*** 
 (-3.276) (-3.368) (-3.074) (-2.755) 
N 4464 4464 4464 4464 
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.221 0.222 0.227 
     
Panel B. Dependent variable: DUVOLi,t 
ETRi,t 0.167***    
 (4.591)    
ETRi,t-1 -0.151***    
 (-4.309)    
Provincial*ETRi,t-1 0.057    
 (1.135)    
LETRi,t  0.095*   
  (1.895)   
LETRi,t-1  -0.139***   
  (-3.284)   
Provincial*LETRi,t-1  0.128*   
  (1.879)   
DTAXi,t   -0.066***  
   (-3.447)  
DTAXi,t-1   0.046**  
   (2.041)  
Provincial*DTAXi,t-1   0.025  
   (0.436)  
BTDi,t    -0.533*** 
    (-8.294) 
BTDi,t-1    0.250*** 
    (4.537) 
Provincial*BTDi,t-1    -0.049 
    (-0.465) 
Provinciali,t-1 -0.029** -0.046** -0.017** -0.013** 
 (-2.054) (-2.434) (-2.333) (-2.106) 
NCSKEWi,t-1 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 
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Table 4.8: Continued 
 (1.384) (1.340) (1.478) (1.377) 
DTURNi,t-1 -0.062 -0.056 -0.064 -0.092 
 (-1.006) (-0.937) (-1.005) (-1.489) 
RETi,t-1 5.647*** 5.570** 5.892*** 6.714*** 
 (2.602) (2.528) (2.722) (3.086) 
SIGMAi,t-1 0.741 0.749 0.760 0.766 
 (1.504) (1.546) (1.537) (1.449) 
SIZEi,t-1 0.056** 0.058** 0.055** 0.044* 
 (2.124) (2.229) (1.990) (1.717) 
MBi,t-1 -0.017 -0.018 -0.024 -0.030* 
 (-1.116) (-1.202) (-1.556) (-1.758) 
LEVi,t-1 -0.044 -0.042 -0.041 -0.037 
 (-1.567) (-1.540) (-1.393) (-1.119) 
ROAi,t-1 0.326*** 0.331*** 0.283** 0.515** 
 (2.817) (2.994) (2.344) (2.470) 
Discacci,t-1 -0.031 -0.029 -0.042 -0.060** 
 (-1.113) (-1.029) (-1.396) (-2.064) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.011*** -1.031*** -1.002*** -0.872*** 
 (-3.595) (-3.655) (-3.380) (-2.885) 
N 4464 4464 4464 4464 
Adjusted R2 0.341 0.338 0.339 0.351 
Note:  
1. All variables are defined in Table 4.2.  
2. ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
3. t-values are in parentheses  
Source: Computed by the author 
 
Table 4.9 presents the results of the moderating impact of municipal government 
ownership on the relationship between tax management and stock price crash risk. The 
dependent variable of stock price crash risk is measured by NCSKEW and DUVOL, 
respectively in Panel A and Panel B. The independent variable of tax management is 
measured by ETR, LETR, DTAX, and BTD, separately. The moderator is Munii,t-1. There 
are four interaction terms: Muni*ETRi,t-1, Muni*LETRi,t-1, Muni*BTDi,t-1, and 
Muni*DTAXi,t-1. Control variables include NCSKEWi,t-1, DTURNi,t-1, RETi,t-1, SIGMAi,t-1, 
SIZEi,t-1, MBi,t-1, LEVi,t-1, ROAi,t-1, Discacci,t-1, with industry fixed effects and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the 
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firm and time level.  
As reported in Panel A of Table 4.9, when NCSKEWi,t is used as the dependent 
variable, the results of the relationship between tax management and stock price crashes 
again support H4.1 and H4.2. Moreover, the coefficients of the interaction terms 
Muni*ETRi,t-1, Muni*LETRi,t-1, Muni*BTDi,t-1, and Muni*DTAXi,t-1 are statistically 
significant with expected signs in all cases, except that only in one out of four cases is the 
coefficient of the interaction term (Muni*LETRi,t-1) insignificant. Hence, the results 
indicate that municipal listed SOEs would have a higher probability of future stock price 
crashes, supporting Hypothesis 4.3c. 
Panel B of Table 4.9 shows the regression results when the dependent variable of 
stock price crashes is measured by DUVOLi,t. The results show that all the coefficients of 
the interaction terms are statistically significant with expected signs, except that only 
Muni*ETRi,t-1 in column (1) is the coefficient insignificant. As for Panel B, the results 
presented in Table 4.9 also lend support to H4.3c, which means that municipal 
government ownership would strengthen the positive relationship between corporate tax 
management and future stock price crash risk. Thus, the listed enterprises controlled by 
municipal government would have a higher likelihood of future crash risk because of 
corporate tax management. 
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Table 4.9: The Impact of Municipal Government Ownership on The Relationship 
Between Tax Management and Future Stock Price Crash Risk. (H4.3c) 
  (1) ETR (2) LETR (3) DTAX (4) BTD 
Panel A: Dependent variable: NCSKEWi,t 
ETRi,t 0.328*** 
                  
 (3.293) 
                  
ETRi,t-1 -0.279** 
                  
 (-2.329) 
                  
Muni*ETRi,t-1 -0.229* 
                  
 (-1.771)                   
LETRi,t 
 0.077                  
 
 (0.661)                  
LETRi,t-1 
 -0.196*                  
 
 (-1.746)                  
Muni*LETRi,t-1 
 -0.179                  
  (-0.919)                  
DTAXi,t 
  -0.193***                 
 
  (-19.713)                 
DTAXi,t-1 
  0.069                 
 
  (1.266)                 
Muni*DTAXi,t-1 
  0.297*                 
   (1.849)                 
BTDi,t 
   -0.995*** 
 
   (-5.836)    
BTDi,t-1 
   0.480*** 
 
   (3.813) 
Muni*BTDi,t-1 
   0.772**  
    (2.087) 
Munii,t-1 0.030 0.021 -0.021 -0.090*   
 (0.870) (0.740) (-1.064) (-1.799)    
NCSKEWi,t-1 0.056* 0.055* 0.056* 0.057*   
 (1.832) (1.807) (1.915) (1.775) 
DTURNi,t-1 -0.169 -0.158 -0.175 -0.221*   
 (-1.379) (-1.308) (-1.403) (-1.835)    
RETi,t-1 16.896*** 16.779*** 17.564*** 18.759*** 
 (2.832) (2.776) (2.957) (3.097) 
SIGMAi,t-1 1.306 1.347 1.363 1.382 
 (0.769) (0.808) (0.832) (0.799) 
SIZEi,t-1 0.103* 0.108** 0.101* 0.079 
 (1.926) (2.075) (1.807) (1.507) 
MBi,t-1 -0.022 -0.023 -0.042 -0.053 
 (-0.495) (-0.522) (-1.001) (-1.070)    
LEVi,t-1 -0.034 -0.024 -0.033 -0.026 
 (-0.410) (-0.303) (-0.363) (-0.272)    
ROAi,t-1 1.642*** 1.645*** 1.555*** 1.691*** 
 (5.021) (4.994) (4.855) (3.546) 
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Table 4.9: Continued  
Discacci,t-1 0.064 0.064 0.044 -0.014 
 (0.843) (0.844) (0.606) (-0.217)    
Industry effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.990*** -2.041*** -1.961*** -1.667**  
 (-2.777) (-2.886) (-2.631) (-2.356)    
N 4464 4464 4464 4464 
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.221 0.223 0.228      
Panel B. Dependent variable: DUVOLi,t 
ETRi.t 0.170***                   
 (4.622)                   
ETRi,t-1 -0.136***                   
 (-3.175)                   
Muni*ETRi,t-1 -0.017                   
 (-0.526)                   
LETRi,t  0.101**                  
  (2.034）                  
LETRi,t-1  -0.107**                  
  (-2.484)                  
Muni*LETRi,t-1  -0.034*                  
 
 (-1.688)                  
DTAXi,t   -0.068***                 
   (-3.615)                 
DTAXi,t-1   0.034                 
   (1.398)                 
Muni*DTAXi,t-1   0.111*                 
 
  (1.819)                 
BTDi,t    -0.541*** 
    (-8.786)    
BTDi,t-1    0.191*** 
    (3.465) 
Muni*BTDi,t-1    0.296**  
 
   (2.097) 
Munii,t-1 -0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.031**  
 (-0.110) (0.455) (-0.471) (-2.020)    
NCSKEWi,t-1 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.016 
 (1.416) (1.412) (1.527) (1.407) 
DTURNi,t-1 -0.061 -0.057 -0.063 -0.091 
 (-1.016) (-0.955) (-1.023) (-1.494)    
RETi,t-1 5.734*** 5.671** 5.954*** 6.834*** 
 (2.628) (2.569) (2.712) (3.046) 
SIGMAi,t-1 0.721 0.747 0.748 0.763 
 (1.486) (1.553) (1.610) (1.484) 
SIZEi,t-1 0.052** 0.054** 0.052* 0.041 
Table 4.9: Continued 
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 (2.009) (2.078) (1.892) (1.577) 
MBi,t-1 -0.018 -0.019 -0.025 -0.031*   
 (-1.141) (-1.186) (-1.583) (-1.721)    
LEVi,t-1 -0.041 -0.037 -0.038 -0.034 
 (-1.466) (-1.437) (-1.307) (-1.049)    
ROAi,t-1 0.335*** 0.342*** 0.289** 0.519**  
 (2.870) (3.099) (2.386) (2.387) 
Discacci,t-1 -0.032 -0.031 -0.040 -0.057*   
 (-1.164) (-1.134) (-1.392) (-1.898)    
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.989*** -1.010*** -0.982*** -0.834**  
 (-3.104) (-3.174) (-2.939) (-2.567)    
N 4464 4464 4464 4464 
Adjusted R2 0.341 0.338 0.339 0.352 
Note:  
1. All variables are defined in Table 4.2.  
2. ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
3. t-values are in parentheses  
Source: Computed by the author 
 
4.5.3. Robustness Checks: Endogeneity Issue 
Although this chapter controls for firm characteristics and accounting properties 
variables in the regressions, the results may still be biased if the explanatory variables are 
not strictly exogenous and the panel’s time dimension is small (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 
2012). Hence, the endogeneity issue would lead to the regression results having spurious 
correlation between corporate tax management and crash risk. To obtain reliable and 
unbiased results, this chapter implements a dynamic system Generalized Method of 
Moments (system GMM) estimator to reexamine for Eq. (4.4).  
Table 4.10 reports the results of the system-GMM, when the dependent variable is 
measured by NCSKEWi,t. The system GMM model in this section is estimated with 
Windmeijer (2005) corrected robust standard errors shown in parentheses. Then, the table 
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also reports the p-values for four additional specification tests. AR (1) and AR (2) are tests 
for first order and second order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under 
the null of no serial correlation. The results of AR tests suggest that the underlying 
conditional errors are not autocorrelated, where the AR (1) tests are shown to be 
significant, and the AR (2) tests are shown to be non-significant with p-value between 
0.131 and 0.275. The Sargan and Hansen J tests of over-identification has a null 
hypothesis of the instruments as a group is exogenous. The difference in Hansen test of 
exogeneity has a null hypothesis that the levels of instruments in the GMM and the IV 
are exogenous. The results of the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions are non-
significant (the p-values of Hansen test between 0.190 and 0.226), which cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that these instruments are exogenous. Thus, endogeneity is not an 
important concern in the approach used here.  
The results of system GMM (shown in Table 4.10) are in line with the results of Table 
4.6, suggesting that manipulative tax management can be used undesirably as a tool to 
conceal adverse information and manipulate performance for an extended period, which 
shows a negative relationship between tax management and contemporaneous stock price 
crash risk. However, it in turn ultimately causes a possibility of future crash risk.  
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Table 4.10: The Impact of Tax Management on Stock Price Crash Risk Using System 
GMM 
  (1) ETR (2) LETR (3) DTAX (4) BTD 
Panel A: Dependent variable: NCSKEWi,t 
ETRi,t 0.244**                
 (2.106)                
ETRi,t-1 -0.404***                
 (-3.207)                
LETRi,t  -0.050               
  (-0.217)               
LETRi,t-1  -0.316*               
  (-1.657)               
DTAXi,t   -0.205***              
   (-2.701)              
DTAXi,t-1   0.264***              
   (2.823)              
BTDi,t    -0.498**  
    (-2.274)    
BTDi,t-1    2.252*** 
    (4.204) 
NCSKEWi,t-1 0.118*** 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.107*** 
 (3.986) (4.020) (4.082) (3.630) 
DTURNi,t-1 -0.227** -0.209* -0.263** -0.232**  
 (-1.999) (-1.847) (-2.281) (-2.065)    
RETi,t-1 29.211*** 29.269*** 30.400*** 27.943*** 
 (9.172) (9.182) (9.387) (8.731) 
SIGMAi,t-1 6.705*** 6.644*** 6.843*** 6.462*** 
 (4.465) (4.422) (4.557) (4.235) 
SIZEi,t-1 0.219*** 0.225*** 0.207*** 0.170*** 
 (6.811) (7.076) (6.440) (5.443) 
MBi,t-1 -0.183 -0.175 -0.189 -0.271*   
 (-1.295) (-1.251) (-1.356) (-1.820)    
LEVi,t-1 -0.390*** -0.364*** -0.411*** -0.382*** 
 (-3.402) (-3.216) (-3.525) (-3.465)    
ROAi,t-1 -1.537* -1.401* -1.956** -4.590*** 
 (-1.833) (-1.723) (-2.222) (-3.012)    
Discacci,t-1 -0.039 -0.039 -0.123 -0.515*** 
 (-0.307) (-0.307) (-0.914) (-3.291)    
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
constant -2.985*** -3.316*** -3.095*** -2.648*** 
 (-9.316) (-9.838) (-8.973) (-7.444)    
N 4464 4464 4464 4464 
AR (1) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR (2) test 0.165 0.142 0.131 0.275 
Sargan test 0.173 0.158 0.148 0.128 
Hansen test 0.226 0.222 0.225 0.190 
Difference in Hansen 0.197 0.172 0.162 0.179 
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Table 4.10: Continued 
Note:  
1. All variables are defined in Table 4.2.   
2. ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
3. t-values are in parentheses  
Source: Computed by the authors 
 
 
4.6. Chapter Summary  
Based on the data from China’s A-share listed companies during 2008 to 2013, this 
chapter examined the market consequences of corporate tax management though 
investors’ current perceptions of corporate tax management and future extreme market 
outcomes. Given the China-specific characteristics of state-owned/controlled 
shareholding, this chapter further explored the role of government control on the 
relationship between corporate tax management and future stock price crash risk.  
Firstly, this chapter finds that there is a negative relationship between corporate tax 
management and contemporaneous stock price crash risk, which supports the contention 
that corporate tax management can be used to conceal adverse operating outcomes and 
manipulate management performance, which reduces immediate crash risk. However, 
these opportunist short-term behaviors would ultimately increase the future probability of 
corporate stock price crashes, so that the relationship is reversed with the passage of time. 
This result is consistent with the results of Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011), who showed that 
the accumulation of bad news hidden from view through tax management would increase 
the likelihood of future crash risk. Furthermore, the chapter also finds that central and 
provincial listed state-owned/controlled enterprises cannot statistically mitigate the 
positive relationship between tax management and future crash risk, while municipal 
listed SOEs have a higher probability of future stock price crash.  
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Two caveats need to be noted in this conclusion. First, the sample consists primarily 
of A-share listed SOEs, of which government is the ultimate controller. Accordingly, the 
results may not be generalized to wholly state-owned enterprises. Second, even if SOEs 
are found to have a high probability of stock price crash, the reality is that the government, 
with its substantial financial resources, is unlikely to let its enterprises fail, especially for 
central or provincial SOEs. But keeping them afloat implies the wasteful use of public 
resources.  
Thus, the results of this chapter point to the need for action at two levels. At the level 
of the firms, they should strengthen their internal supervision and management ability for 
optimal decision-making in tax planning activities. Having said this, it must be stated that 
tax management is not synonymous with concealment. There are legitimate reasons for 
tax management. However, to the extent that it affords opportunities for managers’ short-
term bias, it is important for firms to be careful with the potential risk that managers will 
behave in a way that might harm the future interests of the enterprises. And at the level of 
government, the current tax system in China is complicated and opaque, which gives 
managers opportunities to undertake aggressive tax management and harms government 
tax revenues and raises the cost of ensuring compliance. The State Administration of 
Taxation Department should strengthen its external supervision and inspection ability to 
reduce the possibility of illegal tax activities to protect the national interests. In addition, 
policymakers should enact effective tax laws to create fair competition. 
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CHAPTER 5:  HOW DOES CORRUPTION AND MARKETIZATION AFFECT 
CORPORATE TAX MANAGEMENT AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Although it is extremely difficult to measure corruption as only those convicted are 
figured in statistics which may or may not be reflected in perceptions, the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) constructed by Transparency International ranked China as the 
79th most corrupt nation among 175 countries in 201613 . Regardless of its veracity, 
corruption is a major social problem in contemporary China. Following the large-scale 
crackdown on corruption in the past few years this topic has moved to the forefront among 
topics of concern and has attracted considerable attention among researchers (Jiang & 
Nie, 2014; Liu, 2016; Wang & You, 2012; Xu & Yano, 2016).  
However, the question of how corruption influences economic activities is contested. 
On the one hand, some researchers support the conventional view that corruption of 
government acts as a “grabbing hand”, creating costs for economic activities and distorts 
resource allocation, thereby negatively affecting long-run economic activities. On the 
other hand, other researchers argue that if a country suffers poor governance and heavy 
regulation, a bribing mechanism actually facilitates the successful completion of 
economic transactions, and hence, can be viewed as a “helping hand” (see Jiang and Nie 
(2014) for both arguments). These contrasting conjectures suggest that the relationship 
between corruption and economic activities may vary in that both theoretical arguments 
                                                        
13 Source from http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016  
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may also be compatible with different levels of corruption. 
How does corruption affect business? It does so through its impact on determinants of 
firm performance. One such determinant is tax management. Using cross-country survey 
data, Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and McClellan (2016) found corruption by tax officials 
affects firms’ tax reporting decisions resulting in an understatement of sales reported to 
tax authorities. Under-reporting of tax liability is part and parcel of tax management, 
defined as efforts to minimize a firm’s tax burden at any time. Although a large body of 
theoretical and empirical research on corruption and tax management separately has 
emerged, the relationship between the two issues has remained a largely unexplored area.   
With the increased focus on corruption, researchers have also started to consider the 
role of the institutional environment in moderating the impact of corruption. For instance, 
using cross-country data, Heckelman and Powell (2010) found that improvements in the 
institutional environment changed the impact of corruption on growth. 
For China, neither the corruption-tax management link nor the role of institutional 
environment has seen much research. Yet, both issues are particularly salient because 
China’s tax system has undergone considerable reforms over the last three decades, but a 
well-developed legal framework to stem corruption is not yet in place, thereby allowing 
enterprises to pursue aggressive tax avoidance to reduce tax costs. From the enterprise 
perspective, managers can bribe to obtain tax preferences and evade legal restrictions. In 
the interest of decentralization, China has also implemented in 1994 a tax sharing system 
that offers opportunities for local officials to pursue new rent-seeking opportunities. This 
has added to the complexity of efforts to analyze the impact of corruption on tax 
management.  
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At the same time, China has undergone a progressive but dramatic economic 
transformation from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy in the space of just 
over three decades. While, by the marketization argument, a reduction in corruption 
should be expected, many commentators believe that corruption is still rife in China 
(Dong & Torgler, 2013; Foo, Wu, & Chin, 2014; You & Nie, 2017). 
The above paradoxes provide the rationale for this Chapter, which, as a complement 
to Chapters 3 and 4, can offer further insight into the opaque world of tax management. 
Thus, this chapter will answer the third research question of this thesis. The following 
sub-questions are addressed. First, what are the effects of corruption on corporate tax 
management? Second, how does marketization moderate the relationship between 
corruption and tax management? Finally, how does corruption affect the relationship 
between tax management and firm performance? In other words, how does corruption’s 
impact on tax management translate into impact on firm performance?  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 reviews the previous 
research and describes the research hypotheses. Section 5.3 presents research 
methodology including the sample details, variables, and model descriptions. Section 5.4 
discusses the empirical results addressing the above questions. Section 5.5 concludes the 
chapter by drawing policy implications.   
5.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Businessmen typically understand corruption as government bureaucrats abusing their 
public power to sell government property, influence or circumvent government regulation 
for private gain (Jiang & Nie, 2014; Ngo, 2008; Petrou & Thanos, 2014).  
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From a theoretical perspective, rational choice theory characterizes an individual  
being rational and self-interested, and pursuing value-oriented activities (Scott, 2000). 
Hence, as rational individuals, firms pay bribes to government officials when they deem 
their benefits reaped from bribes to be higher than their costs. The costs of firms providing 
bribes have at least two parts: bribe-related payments and potential risks of detection and 
punishment once caught. On this basis, the impact of corruption on tax management may 
be non-linear, but instead supports two opposite theoretical views of corruption, the 
“helping hand” view and “grabbing hand” view. On the view of “helping hand”, firms 
can make more profits by paying a bribe premium (Jiang & Nie, 2014; Petrou & Thanos, 
2014; You & Nie, 2017), whereas the “grabbing hand” saddles firms with higher costs.  
In the China context, several developments have heightened the likelihood of 
corruption. First, under fiscal decentralization, the Chinese central government granted 
more autonomy and authority to local governments to give local officials more 
discretionary power. Since the tax-sharing reform in 1994, China has started to adopt a 
dual system of tax collection and administration, and the revenue from corporate taxation 
is shared by central and local governments, with the central government’s share being 
60%14. Under the current taxation system, local governments, especially local taxation 
bureaus, have been granted more taxing authority, giving local officials more 
opportunities to seek bribery (Ngo, 2008).  
Second, in the Chinese economy with extensive government intervention, markets 
have become more relationship-based (guanxi) rather than rule-based (Martinsons, 2005), 
leading to corruption being viewed as “normal” behavior (Jain, 2001). Thus, firms are apt 
to bribe their local government officials to obtain extra economic advantage such as direct 
                                                        
14 The State Administration of Taxation (SAT) is responsible for the collection of corporate tax of central-SOEs. Local governments 
are responsible for collecting the corporate tax from local SOEs and all other non-SOEs, and then transfer the 60% revenue collected 
to the central government. 
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subsidies tax benefits, tax breaks or tax reduction, and grants (Ngo, 2008). 
On the opposite view of “grabbing hand”, firms operating in an environment with 
widespread and rampant corruption have to expend more financial and human resources 
to seek rent via corruption. At the same time, they also have to bear uncertainty risks from 
engaging in corruption that can result in penalties if caught engaging in corrupt practices 
(Jain, 2001), which then reduces income. In this case, covert bribing system acts as a 
“grabbing hand”, where the firms’ net losses/costs via bribing are higher than their net 
profits. As a result, it may affect negatively the enthusiasm of firms for avoiding tax or 
obtaining tax-related benefits via bribe. In light of the above arguments about the variable 
impact of corruption on tax management, Hypothesis 5.1 is posited:  
Hypothesis 5.1 (H5.1). The impact of corruption on corporate tax management is 
inverted U-shaped so that tax management rises when corruption increases from low to 
moderate level, but falls when corruption increases from moderate to high levels.  
Scholars have also begun to consider the impact of the institutional environment on 
corruption (Ali & Isse, 2003). When the government plays an intrusive economic role that 
hurts competition, corruption tends to be more rampant (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Giavazzi 
& Tabellini, 2005). Thus, literature shows that improving marketization leads to 
decreased corruption via the mechanisms of governmental deregulation, simplification of 
regulations, and reduction of bureaucratic discretionary power (Dong & Torgler, 2013; 
Svensson, 2005). Heckelman and Powell (2010) found that in an environment with 
limited economic freedom, corruption plays a beneficial role in promoting growth via 
avoiding inefficient policies and regulations. Therefore, there is expected to be a strong 
correlation between decreased corruption and market development (Goel & Nelson, 2005; 
Heckelman & Powell, 2010). Still, a contrarian conclusion has also been drawn.  
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Recent empirical studies provide evidence of paradoxical co-development of 
marketization and corruption in China. Gong and Zhou (2015) using data from a Chinese 
mid-size city found that the essence of market competition has been often circumvented, 
modified or simply replaced by conditions conductive to corruption. Hence, along with 
the promotion of market-oriented economic reform, local officials have been given more 
discretionary power to influence the setting and implementing of local regulations that 
may increase officials’ rent-seeking activities. Ko and Weng (2012) report that driven by 
a rapidly growing private sector, bribery has become the leading form of corruption in 
China. Dong and Torgler (2013) further found that in the process of transition to a market-
oriented economy, economic development will increase corruption. As a result, the 
transition from communism can lead to new forms and characteristics of corruption 
(Karklins, 2005). 
Given the above opposite views of the impact of the institutional factor on corruption, 
this chapter examines the moderating role of marketization on the relationship between 
corruption and tax management. This leads to the Hypothesis 5.2: 
Hypothesis 5.2 (H5.2). The relationship between corruption and tax management is 
moderated by marketization. 
Few empirical studies examined the impact of corruption on economic outcomes at 
the firm-level, and whatever existed has failed to give an unambiguous answer as to how 
corruption impacts firm performance. On the one side, the broad consensus on corruption 
is its being a pervasive obstacle to economic activities, negatively impacting firm 
performance. For example, Gaviria (2002) examined the impacts of corruption on firm 
performance indicators of Latin American private firms, and the results showed that 
corruption has a negative correlation with firms’ sales growth and reducing firms’ 
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competitiveness. Using survey data on Indian enterprises, Sharma and Mitra (2015) find 
a negative impact of corruption on firms’ profitability and reduce efficiency. Thus, firm 
performance is hindered by corruption 
On the other hand, some recent research supports the argument that corruption has a 
positive effect on firm performance, supporting the view of effective corruption. 
Sahakyan and Stiegert (2012) using survey data from Armenian businesses, found that 
firm of large size and facing less competition are more likely to perceive corruption as 
favorable to firm performance. In the context of the Chinese market, Wang and You (2012) 
found that corruption can benefit firms’ growth. Furthermore, the results of Jiang and Nie 
(2014) show a positive relationship between regional corruption and the profitability of 
Chinese private firms, arguing that such firms through bribing local bureaucrats can avoid 
legal restriction and achieve profit enhancement.  
While the above studies provide support to two alternative views of firm-level 
consequences of corruption, they overlooked how corruption impacts firm performance 
through firms’ specific determinants, such as corporate tax management. Thus, to deepen 
the study, an attempt is made to examine the direct impact of corruption on corporate tax 
management (H5.1), how does corruption interact corporate tax management which in 
turn impacts firm performance needs to be further explored. The results will provide a 
more vigorous understanding of how corruption impacts microeconomic activities in 
China or other emerging countries without a perfect market mechanism. Hypothesis 5.3 
is then: 
Hypothesis 5.3 (H5.3). The relationship between tax management and firm 
performance is moderated by corruption. 
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5.3. Research Methodology 
This section presents the methodology of this chapter, which includes sample selection, 
empirical measures of main variables, moderator variables, and control variables, and 
shows the empirical models used to examine the three hypotheses. 
5.3.1. Sample and Data 
The research period of this chapter is from 2008 to 2013. This chapter contains two 
levels of data, i.e. firm-level and province-level. The focus is on Chinese A-share 
(domestic market) listed companies listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. 
The firm-level data, corporate tax management and other financial control variables (e.g. 
size, leverage, firm age), come from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database15.  
Following Dong and Torgler (2013), Jiang and Nie (2014), and Xu, Li, Liu, and Gan 
(2017), this chapter uses the number of registered cases of corruption per 10,000 officials 
in each province in a given year to measure corruption at the provincial level. Thus, the 
provincial-level panel data for corruption are from the Procuratorial Yearbooks of China 
(published by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of China and listed in the Provincial 
People's Procuratorate websites). Moreover, to measure marketization, this chapter uses 
the indexes of provincial marketization. The data of provincial marketization indexes are 
collected from Marketization Index of China's Provinces: NERI Report 2016 prepared by 
Wang, Fan, and Yu (2017). 
                                                        
15 The CSMAR database is developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Corporation Limited. Co., Ltd., and designed by 
the China Accounting and Finance Research Centre of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. 
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Following Wu, Wu, Zhou, and Wu (2012), Xu and Yano (2016), and Zhang, M, Zhang, 
and Yi (2016), this chapter excludes firms in the financial industry because their financial 
reporting and corporate tax practices differ from firms in other industries. Also excluded 
are the firm-year observations that are labeled as Special Treatment (ST) shares, covering 
firms with financial problems and/or other abnormal challenges. In addition, the sample 
is also limited to firm-year observations with both measures of corporate effective tax 
rates (ETRs) between zero and one, discussed in next section. Finally, the chapter deletes 
firm-year observations with missing information. This leaves 9033 firm-year 
observations. To reduce the effect of extreme outliers, the chapter trims the continuous 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
5.3.2. Variables  
5.3.2.1. Corporate Tax Management 
To capture the overall level of corporate tax management, this chapter uses two 
categories of corporate effective tax rates. Corporate effective tax rates can reflect all 
kinds of tax management transactions, even aggressive tax avoidance through permanent 
book-tax differences (Chen, Chen, Cheng, & Shevlin, 2010). The first category, which is 
the current effective tax rate defined as ETR, is calculated as income tax expenses minus 
deferred tax expenses over pretax profit. It reflects the firms’ overall tax burden. This 
variable has been used in Chapter 3. To adjust the effect of tax deductions in different 
industries, this chapter further uses a second category, which is the industry-adjusted 
effective tax rate defined as ETR_adj, estimated by ETR minus average industry ETR. In 
2008, China enacted a new corporate income tax law, which set a unified corporate 
income tax rate of 25% for both domestic and foreign-funded companies. To support the 
development of special industry, tax preference and incentives are granted to income from 
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these industries, such as new high tech, agriculture, forestry, livestock farming and fishery 
companies.  
5.3.2.2. Corruption 
Following prior studies (Dong & Torgler, 2013; Jiang & Nie, 2014; Xu, Li, Liu, & Gan, 
2017), this chapter uses as the measure of corruption the number of registered cases of 
corruption per 10,000 public officials in a given province in a given year. It is so far the 
most commonly used proxy to measure the extent of Chinese bureaucratic corruption at 
the provincial level (Jiang & Nie, 2014). More importantly, this conviction-rate-based16 
proxy provides a relatively less subjective measure to study Chinese provincial corruption, 
and avoids problems of sampling error and survey non-response (Glaeser & Saks, 2006).  
5.3.2.3. Marketization 
The provincial-level marketization index, obtained from Marketization Index of 
China's Provinces: NERI Report 2016 prepared by Wang, Fan, and Yu (2017), is used as 
a measure of marketization. The marketization index reflects the provincial market 
environment in the registered place of listed enterprises, and reflects the extent of 
provincial institutional transition from a government-based to a market-based economic 
environment. The index has five dimensions: the relationship between the government 
and the market; the development of the non-state sector; the development of the product 
markets; the development of the factor markets; and the development of market 
intermediaries and the legal environment, which together offer a comprehensive 
                                                        
16 Theoretically, the conviction rate and the number of registered cases of corruption are different. But in China, they tend to be highly 
correlated, even not identical. Generally, in most cases in China, suspect officials are first investigated by the discipline inspection 
commission of the Chinese Communist Party and its local branches. Only after they have obtained enough evidence, the discipline 
inspection commission and its local branches will refer corrupt cases to the procuratorates, then the procuratorates will register the 
cases. Moreover, in China, the courts and the procuratorates are both controlled by the government. Thus, except in a few very limited 
circumstances, the courts will not reject public prosecutions against corrupt cases. 
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assessment of the level of regional marketization development. A higher index means the 
provincial environment is more market-oriented. 
5.3.2.4. Other Control Variables 
In addition to the above variables, several other firm-level variables are included as 
control variables: firm size (Size), ROA (ROA), firm age (Age), market/book ratio (MB), 
firm leverage (Leverage), firm sales growth (Growth), largest and top 10 shareholders’ 
shareholdings (Largest and Top10), and discretionary accruals (Discacc).  
Prior studies show that firm size and growth may impact the corporate tax management 
because large firms possess superior resources and political power to lobby and get a 
lower tax rate than smaller firms (Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2008; Minnick & Noga, 
2010; Siegfried, 1973). Thus, Size calculated by the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets 
and Growth measured by firms’ sales growth. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets, and reflects the overall level of firms’ debts. Because of tax-deductible 
interest payments, higher leverage may cause a lower ETRs that may influence corporate 
tax management (Gupta & Newberry, 1997; Richardson, Taylor, & Lanis, 2013).  
ROA is the return on total assets, which employs as a control variable to test H5.1 and 
H5.2. Prior research has shown inconsistent results in the relationship between ROA and 
ETRs. On the one hand, firms with more taxable income can mean that they are more 
profitable leading to a positive relationship between ROA and ETRs (Dyreng, Hanlon, & 
Maydew, 2008). On the other hand firms with higher ROA may mean that they are more 
efficient and have more ability to pay less taxes (Zhang, M, Zhang, & Yi, 2016). MB is 
the market value of equity over the book value of the equity to test H5.1 and H5.2. The 
firm that has a higher MB has more investment opportunities that may impact corporate 
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decisions (Zhang, M, Zhang, & Yi, 2016). Firm age (Age) is the natural logarithm of the 
number of years since the firm went public. The longer the firms have existed, the more 
complex and mature are their corporate management and governance likely to be (Chen, 
2015). Discacc is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, computed using the 
modified Jones model. Prior research shows that there is a relationship between tax 
management and earnings management (Frank, Lynch, & Rego, 2009; Kubick & Masli, 
2016). This chapter also includes the percentage of shareholding by largest and top 10 
shareholders to represent ownership concentration of the listed firms, for which prior 
studies have shown inconclusive results relating to the impact of ownership concentration 
on corporate tax management (Badertscher, Katz, & Rego, 2013; Richardson, Wang, & 
Zhang, 2016).  
To address the potential problem of endogeneity, this chapter has included provincial 
fixed effects in the regressions to avoid unobserved regional characteristics, which may 
affect provincial corruption and tax management estimates. Following prior studies 
(Richardson, Wang, & Zhang, 2016; Zhang, M, Zhang, & Yi, 2016), industry and year 
dummies are added to control for industry and year fixed effects. Table 5.1 shows the 
definition and details of all variables.  
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Table 5.1: Variable Names and Descriptions 
Variable Description 
Panel A: Tax Management  
ETR 
Corporate effective tax rate, corporate tax expenses minus deferred 
tax expenses to the pretax profit. 
ETR_adj 
Corporate industry-adjusted effective tax rate, calculated by 
corporate ETR minus average-industry ETR 
Panel B: Corruption, Marketization and Firm Performance 
Corruption 
Number of registered cases of corruption per 10,000 public officials 
in a province in each year, data stems from Procuratorial Yearbook 
of China and China Statistical Yearbook.  
Marketization 
The overall marketization index in China’s 31 provinces. The 
higher index suggests higher marketization. The indexes are 
obtained from National Economic Research Institute (NERI) Index 
of Marketization of China's provinces in 2016 to measure the 
quality of market-supporting institutions at the provincial level. The 
NERI Index project was sponsored by the National Economic 
Research Institute and the China Reform Foundation and conducted 
by Wang, Fan, and Yu (2017). The NERI indices capture the 
progress of the institutional transition in China’s 31 provinces. 
Appraisals of the regional institutions are made along several 
dimensions, namely, the relationship between the government and 
the market, the development of the non-state sector, the 
development of the factor markets, the development of the product 
markets, and the development of market intermediaries and the 
legal environment. 
ROA Return on total assets, net income/total assets. 
ROE Return on equity, net income/shareholder equity 
Panel C: Other Control Variables 
Size Firm size, natural logarithm of total assets   
Age 
Firm age, the natural logarithm of current year minus the year when 
the firm went public. 
Leverage Firm's overall debt levels, total debts / total assets in book value 
Growth  Firm sales growths, the changes in sales scaled by lag sales. 
MB 
Market-to-book ratio, the market value of equity over book value of 
equity 
Discacc 
The absolute value of abnormal accruals, measured as the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals estimated by the modified Jones 
model. See Appendix A. 
Largest Percentage of shareholding by the largest shareholder. 
Top10 Percentage of shareholding by the top 10 largest shareholders. 
Source: Prepared by author 
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5.3.3. Model Specification 
To examine the relationship between corruption and corporate tax management 
(Hypothesis 5.1), the following regression models, Eq. (5.1) and Eq. (5.2), are employed 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 (5.1)  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
2
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(5.2) 
Eq. (5.1) is used to test the linear relationship between corruption and corporate tax 
management and Eq. (5.2) is used to examine the non-linear relationship between them. 
In the model, TAXi,t represents corporate tax management for firm i in year t, which is the 
dependent variable proxied by ETRi,t and ETR_adji,t. The independent variable, 
Corruptioni,t, is provincial corruption. A set of control variables includes firm size 
(SIZEi,t), return on assets (ROAi,t), firm age (Agei,t), market-to-book ratio (MBi,t), firm 
leverage (Leveragei,t), shareholding by the top 10 shareholders (TOP10i,t), shareholding 
by the largest shareholders (Largesti,t), firm growth rate (Growthi,t), absolute value of 
122 
 
discretionary accruals (Discacci,t). The detailed definition of each variable is shown in 
Table 5.1. In addition, three dummy variables of Province, Industry and Year are also 
included to control for regional, industry and time fixed effects. 
Next, to test the moderating role of marketization on the relationship between 
corruption and tax management (Hypothesis 5.2), the following regression model, Eq. 
(5.3a) and Eq. (5.3b), are used.  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(5.3a) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
2
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(5.3b) 
If the results of Eq. (5.1) are supported, then Eq. (5.3a) will be used to test the 
moderating role of marketization, but if the results of Eq. (5.2) are significant, then Eq. 
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(5.3b) will be used to examine the impact of marketization. In the models of Eq. (5.3a) 
and (5.3b), the dependent variable is corporate tax management, represented by TAXi,t,  
proxied by ETRi,t and ETR_adji,t. The independent variable Corruptioni,t, is as defined 
above. Marketizationi,t the moderator variable, represents the Chinese provincial 
marketization level. Marketization*Corruptioni,t is an interaction term of provincial 
marketization and provincial corruption status. A set of control variables, already defined, 
are firm size (SIZEi,t), return on assets (ROAi,t), firm age (Agei,t), market-to-book ratio 
(MBi,t), firm leverage (Leveragei,t), shareholding by the top 10 shareholders (TOP10i,t), 
shareholding by the largest shareholders (Largesti,t), firm growth rate (Growthi,t), absolute 
value of discretionary accruals (Discacci,t). In addition, three dummy variables of 
Province, Industry and Year are included to control for regional, industry and time fixed 
effects.              
To test the moderating role of corruption on the relationship between tax management 
and firm performance (Hypothesis 5.3), Eq. (5.4) and Eq. (5.5) are specified. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡⁡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽6𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 (5.4) 
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𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡⁡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐴𝑋 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +⁡𝛽7𝑇𝑜𝑝10𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟⁡𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(5.5) 
Eq. (5.4) is used to test the relationship between corporate tax management and firm 
performance, and Eq. (5.5) is used to examine the moderating impact of corruption on the 
relationship between tax management and firm performance. In the model, the dependent 
variable is firm performance, represented by Performancei,t, proxied by ROAi,t  and 
ROEi,t. The dependent variable is corporate tax management, represented by TAXi,t, 
proxied by ETRi,t and ETR_adji,t. Corruptioni,t is the moderator variable, and 
TAX*Corruptioni,t is the interaction term of tax management and provincial corruption. A 
set of control variables includes firm size (SIZEi,t), firm age (Agei,t), firm leverage 
(Leveragei,t), shareholding by the top 10 shareholders (TOP10i,t), shareholding by the 
largest shareholders (Largesti,t), firm growth rate (Growthi,t), absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (Discacci,t). In addition, of Province, Industry and Year as three 
dummy variables are included to control for regional, industry and time fixed effects. 
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5.4.Empirical Results  
5.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.2 displays the distribution of ETRs by industry in the sample. The industrial 
classification is based on specifications of the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). The sample is highly skewed towards manufacturing, which comprises 
approximately 61% of the total sample (5524 out of 9033 firm-years), confirming that 
China is a manufacturing-based economy. In addition, Table 5.2 also shows that the 
different industries have different levels of effective tax rates because of the preferential 
tax policy to support specific industries such as agriculture, forestry, livestock farming 
and fishery industry and high-tech industry. Thus, the chapter controls for industry effects 
by including industry dummies. 
Table 5.3 shows the summary statistics for all corporate financial variables. The mean 
and median ETR are 21.6% and 18.8%, respectively, and the 75th percentile of ETR is 
26.7%. Thus, more than half of the sample firms in this chapter have a lower corporate 
effective tax rate than the 25% statutory rate, and only about one-fourth of the sample 
firms have effective tax rate more than 25%. Therefore, corporate tax management 
appears to have become a common and significant strategy of corporate management in 
Chinese listed enterprises. In addition, the median of ETR_adj is -2.5%, which means 
more than half of the sample firms are below their industry average level, consonant with 
the reported ETR.  
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Table 5.2: Distribution of ETR by Industry 
Industry ETR N 
Agriculture, forestry, livestock farming and fishery  0.097 125 
Mining   0.264 272 
Manufacturing    0.201 5524 
Electric power, heat, gas and water production 0.228 355 
Construction  0.272 247 
Wholesale and retail   0.277 694 
Transportation, storage and post  0.209 368 
Accommodation and catering services 0.248 46 
Information technology and software 0.141 378 
Real estate   0.303 619 
Leasing and commercial service  0.244 90 
Scientific research and technological service  0.190 31 
Water conservancy, environment and public establishment   0.226 101 
Education  0.488 4 
Health and social work 0.293 12 
Communication and culture   0.149 72 
Miscellaneous 0.242 95 
Total 0.216 9033 
Source: Computed by the author   
 
Table 5.3: Summary Statistics of All Corporate Financial Variables 
Variables N mean Sd. p25 p50 p75 
ETR 9033 0.216 0.140 0.140 0.188 0.267 
ETR_adj 9033 0.000 0.133 -0.069 -0.025 0.041 
Size 9033 9.514 0.533 9.120 9.439 9.819 
ROA 9033 0.051 0.040 0.021 0.041 0.070 
Age 9033 1.853 0.931 1.099 2.197 2.639 
MB 9033 0.277 0.271 0.004 0.219 0.517 
Leverage 9033 0.447 0.207 0.287 0.456 0.612 
Top10 9033 57.740 15.930 46.450 59.040 70.210 
Largest 9033 37.060 15.440 24.430 35.580 48.560 
Growth 9033 0.174 0.358 0.006 0.091 0.235 
Discacc 9033 0.146 0.130 0.053 0.113 0.203 
Source: Computed by the author 
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Panel A and Panel B of Table 5.4 display the descriptive statistics of corruption and 
marketization across seven districts during 2008 to 2013, respectively. The results show 
that the corruption degree and marketization process are heterogenous across different 
locations. More specifically, Figure 5.1 shows the degree of provincial corruption in 
China’s seven different districts. The northeast provinces in China are shown highest 
corruption degree with an upward trend during 2008 to 2013. Figure 5.2 shows the NERI 
index of overall marketization in China’s 31 provinces and seven different districts during 
2008 to 2013, published by Wang, Fan, and Yu (2017). The figure presents that the 
regional institutional quality is unequal. Moreover, in Figure 5.2, we can see that the 
overall marketization index shows an upward trend during 2008 to 2013, which means 
that institutional quality has been improved and perfected. In addition, marketization 
degree in southwest and northwest provinces is below the overall average degree, while 
eastern part of China is the most developed district. Therefore, China’s local market 
development shows obvious imbalance.  
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Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics of Corruption and Marketization 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A: Corruption across Seven Districts 
Northern 23.359 24.047 25.892 25.834 27.792 27.679 
Northeast 41.615 43.018 45.797 46.173 49.948 56.965 
East 31.647 30.097 30.930 30.506 33.253 32.614 
central 33.798 32.312 32.375 32.841 30.297 33.893 
Southern 32.203 29.464 30.704 28.664 31.898 32.502 
Southwest 32.366 27.998 28.483 25.447 28.100 25.142 
Northwest 25.508 28.585 30.347 28.230 28.017 27.665 
Total 30.606 29.942 31.185 30.133 32.076 32.284 
Panel B: Marketization across Seven Districts 
Northern 5.700 5.732 5.774 5.960 6.598 6.836 
Northeast 5.717 5.810 5.563 5.700 6.270 6.377 
East 6.967 7.143 7.270 7.521 7.819 7.959 
central 5.613 5.697 5.757 5.970 6.177 6.417 
Southern 5.830 5.830 5.810 5.973 6.667 6.900 
Southwest 4.436 4.388 4.188 4.202 4.368 4.444 
Northwest 3.802 3.758 3.340 3.466 3.702 3.932 
Total 5.482 5.529 5.445 5.604 5.981 6.156 
Note: Seven District Classification 
1. Eastern: Shandong province, Jiangsu province, Anhui province, Shanghai, 
Zhejiang province, Jiangxi province, Fujian province;  
2. Southern: Guangdong province, Guangxi province, Hainan province;  
3. Central: Hubei province, Hunan province, Henan province;  
4. Northern: Beijing province, Tianjin province, Hebei province, Shanxi 
province, Inner Mongolia autonomous region;  
5. Northwest: Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Xinjiang Autonomous Region, 
Qinghai province, Gansu province, Shaanxi Province;  
6. Southwest: Sichuan province, Yunnan province, Guizhou province, Tibet 
Autonomous Region, Chongqing;  
7. Northeast: Liaoning province, Jilin province, Heilongjiang province. 
Source: Computed by the author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The Regional Corruption Degree Across Seven Districts in China During 
2008 to 2013 
(Source: Plotted by authors) 
Note: the seven-district classification is shown in Table 5.4 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: the NERI Index of Overall Marketization 
(Source: Plotted by authors) 
Note: the seven-district classification is shown in Table 5.4 
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Table 5.5 reports the correlation coefficients between all variables. The results show 
that most variables are correlated with the dependent variables, which proxied by ETR 
and ETR_adj. Since the correlations between all independent and control variables are 
less than 0.7, multicollinearity is not a problem in the following regression analysis in 
this chapter (Jr., Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009). Furthermore, the calculated variance 
inflation factor (VIF) statistics show that VIF values of all variables are less than 5, which 
further supports the above results.     
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Table 5.5: Correlations Between All Variables 
 ETR ETR_adj Marketization Corruption Size ROA Age 
ETR_adj 0.951***       
Marketization -0.003 -0.026**      
Corruption 0.021* 0.029*** -0.193***     
Size 0.111*** 0.044*** -0.034*** -0.066***    
ROA -0.285*** -0.258*** 0.044*** -0.068*** -0.062***   
Age 0.156*** 0.086*** -0.159*** 0.051*** 0.307*** -0.157***  
MB -0.088*** -0.059*** 0.056*** -0.033*** -0.159*** 0.137*** -0.582*** 
Leverage 0.244*** 0.158*** -0.127*** 0.059*** 0.515*** -0.407*** 0.448*** 
Top10 -0.068*** -0.057*** 0.123*** -0.073*** 0.147*** 0.220*** -0.454*** 
Largest 0.009 -0.011 0.029*** -0.076*** 0.258*** 0.066*** -0.075*** 
Growth -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.0160 0.080*** 0.208*** -0.083*** 
Discacc 0.021* 0.0140 -0.122*** 0.040*** 0.146*** -0.044*** 0.0100 
 MB Leverage Top10 Largest Growth   
Leverage -0.276***       
Top10 0.519*** -0.137***      
Largest 0.230*** 0.075*** 0.645***     
Growth 0.165*** 0.106*** 0.164*** 0.078***    
Discacc 0.110*** 0.181*** 0.108*** 0.090*** 0.245***   
Note: *Significant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level.  
     The independent and control variables are shown in bold. 
Source: Computed by the authors 
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5.4.2. The Effect of Corruption on Corporate Tax Management  
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 present empirical results of the relationship between corruption 
and tax management (H5.1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed-effect (FE) 
models with two dependent variables, ETR and ETR_adj, respectively. All variables have 
been defined in Table 5.1. All the regressions control for province, industry, and year 
effects. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the 
firm level. A Hausman test has been run to identify whether the fixed or random effects 
model is fitter the data in this section. In this case, it is, and so the fixed effects regressions 
employed and results are shown. 
In column (1) to (4) of Table 5.6, the results show that there is no statistically 
significant linear relationship between corruption and corporate tax management. The 
results suggest that the effect of corruption on firm activities cannot be simply ascribed 
to a monotonic detrimental or beneficial effect. However, by including a linear term 
(Corruptioni,t) and a quadratic term (Corruption squaredi,t) of corruption with two 
measures of tax management (ETR and ETR_adj) in both OLS and fixed-effect (FE) 
regressions, the coefficients of the linear terms are significantly negative indicating that 
corruption leads to a decreasing corporate tax effective rate (Table 5.7, columns (2) to 
(4)). Because of the low corporate ETRs representing a low corporate tax burden, it 
reflects firms with a higher level of tax management. Thus, corruption is positively 
correlated with corporate tax management at low to moderate level of corruption. In 
addition, the quadratic coefficients shown in columns (2) to (4) of Table 5.7 are 
significantly positive indicating that high levels of corruption lead to an increasing 
effective tax rate. Thus, when corruption is over the moderate level, there is a negative 
correlation between corruption and corporate tax management. 
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These results provide evidence of a U-shape relationship between corruption and 
corporate effective tax rates, which indicates that the relationship between corruption and 
corporate tax management is inverted U-shaped. Hence, Hypothesis 5.1 is supported. 
Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 show a quadratic U-shape curve between corruption and 
corporate effective tax rates. The probability values of Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 are 
computed from the estimated models reported in column (2) and (4) of Table 5.7, 
respectively.   
These results also show that when regional corruption is below a certain level, 
corruption plays a positive role to facilitate enterprises engaging in tax management 
activities to reduce firms’ tax burden, indicating that the benefits of firms’ doing such 
activities outweigh the costs and thus supports the “helping hand” view. But when 
corruption exceeds the moderate level, corruption shows a negative effect on tax 
management, indicating that when firms operate in a highly corrupt environment, the 
costs and/or risk of doing tax management would be greater than the benefits, which 
supports the “grabbing hand” view of government.  
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Table 5.6: The Linear Relationship Between Corruption and Corporate Tax 
Management (H5.1) 
 (1) OLS (2) FE (3) OLS (4) FE 
Dependent variable: ETR ETR ETR_adj ETR_adj 
Corruptioni,t  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.43) (0.81) (0.34) (0.73) 
Sizei,t -0.003 0.013 -0.003 0.013 
 (-0.66) (0.65) (-0.60) (0.63) 
Agei,t 0.009*** -0.005 0.009*** -0.005 
 (3.14) (-0.74) (3.06) (-0.80) 
ROAi,t -0.836*** -1.334*** -0.825*** -1.307*** 
 (-14.41) (-16.24) (-14.28) (-15.98) 
Leveragei,t 0.050*** 0.036 0.048*** 0.029 
 (3.39) (1.33) (3.29) (1.09) 
MBi,t -0.000 0.004 0.000 0.005 
 (-0.03) (0.38) (0.06) (0.57) 
Growthi,t 0.005 0.008* 0.005 0.008* 
 (1.06) (1.65) (1.17) (1.69) 
Top10i,t 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.30) (-0.48) (1.16) (-0.49) 
Largesti,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.47) (-0.13) (-0.36) (-0.15) 
Discacci,t -0.013 -0.002 -0.008 0.006 
 (-1.00) (-0.13) (-0.65) (0.41) 
Province effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.118** 0.174 0.013 -0.058 
 (2.53) (0.95) (0.28) (-0.32) 
N 9033 9033 9033 9033 
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.094 0.082 0.079 
Note: ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
     t-values are in parentheses  
Source: Computed by the author 
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Table 5.7: The U-shaped Relationship Between Corruption and Corporate Tax 
Management (H5.1) 
 (1) OLS (2) FE (3) OLS (4) FE 
Dependent variable: ETR ETR ETR_adj ETR_adj 
Corruptioni,t  -0.003 -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* 
 (-1.47) (-1.76) (-1.73) (-1.96) 
Corruption squaredi,t 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 
 (1.60) (1.98) (1.84) (2.16) 
Sizei,t -0.003 0.013 -0.003 0.012 
 (-0.66) (0.63) (-0.61) (0.60) 
Agei,t 0.009*** -0.004 0.009*** -0.004 
 (3.14) (-0.63) (3.05) (-0.67) 
ROAi,t -0.836*** -1.331*** -0.826*** -1.304*** 
 (-14.41) (-16.25) (-14.29) (-15.99) 
Leveragei,t 0.049*** 0.035 0.048*** 0.029 
 (3.38) (1.33) (3.28) (1.08) 
MBi,t -0.000 0.003 0.000 0.005 
 (-0.04) (0.36) (0.05) (0.55) 
Growthi,t 0.005 0.008* 0.005 0.009* 
 (1.08) (1.69) (1.19) (1.73) 
Top10i,t 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.30) (-0.47) (1.16) (-0.47) 
Largesti,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.47) (-0.11) (-0.35) (-0.14) 
Discacci,t -0.013 -0.002 -0.009 0.005 
 (-1.01) (-0.14) (-0.67) (0.39) 
Province effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.147*** 0.217 0.046 -0.011 
 (2.98) (1.19) (0.95) (-0.06) 
N 9033 9033 9033 9033 
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.095 0.082 0.080 
Note: ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
     t-values are in parentheses  
Source: Computed by the author 
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Figure 5.3: The U-shaped Effect of Corruption on Corporate Effective Tax Rate  
(Source: Plotted by author) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: The U-shaped Effect of Corruption on Industry-adjusted Corporate 
Effective Tax Rate 
(Source: Plotted by author) 
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5.4.3. The Moderating Effect of Marketization 
Table 5.8 presents results of the moderating effect of marketization on the inverted U-
shaped relationship between corruption and tax management using OLS and fixed-effect 
models (FE) with two dependent variables, ETR and ETR_adj in column (1) to (4), 
respectively. All the regressions control for province, industry, and year effects. Standard 
errors in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. The 
interaction terms between marketization and linear term of corruption 
(Corruption*Marketizationi,t) and quadratic term of corruption (Corruption 
squared*Marketizationi,t) are the key variables of interest in this section. A Hausman test 
has been run to identify whether the fixed or random effects model is fitter the data in this 
section. In this case, the fixed effects regression is employed and results are shown in 
Table 5.8. 
In column (1) to (4) of Table 5.8, the coefficients of the interaction terms between 
corruption and linear term of corruption (Corruption*Marketizationi,t) are highly 
significant and positive, while the interaction terms of marketization and quadratic term 
of corruption (Corruption squared * Marketizationi,t) are highly significant and negative. 
Thus, these results support H5.2, which indicates that marketization moderates the 
curvilinear relationship between corruption and tax management. More specifically, 
marketization diminishes the impact of corruption on corporate tax management at both 
low to moderate levels of corruption and moderate to high levels of corruption.  
Because the overall NERI Marketization index used in Eq. (5.3) includes five 
dimensions of provincial institutional environments’ development, which are (1) the 
relationship between government and market, (2) development of non-state sectors, (3) 
development of product markets, (4) development of production factor markets, and (5) 
138 
 
development of market intermediaries and legal environment. To obtain a more specific 
and robust results of the moderating effects of marketization, this section also examined 
three dimensions related to this topic, which are the government-market relationship, non-
state sectors development, and market intermediaries and legal environment development. 
The results show that strengthening the role of the non-state sectors in economy and 
improving the market intermediaries and legal environment can mitigate the effect of 
corruption on corporate tax management at both low to moderate levels of corruption and 
moderate to high levels of corruption. In short, the results suggest that to curb the effect 
of corruption, the government should synchronously perfect its market and legal systems. 
Appendix B shows the detailed results of the effects of the three specific dimensions of 
marketization on the relationship between corruption and tax management.  
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Table 5.8: The Impact of Marketization on The Relationship Between Tax Management 
and Corruption (H5.2) 
 OLS OLS FE FE 
Dependent variable: (1) ETR (2)ETR_adj (3) ETR (4)ETR_adj 
Corruptioni,t -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (-2.87) (-2.93) (-2.91) (-2.89) 
Corruption squaredi,t 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (2.78) (2.79) (2.81) (2.75) 
Corruption*Marketizationi,t 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 
 (2.64) (2.63) (2.63) (2.55) 
Corruption squared * 
Marketizationi,t 
-0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (-2.48) (-2.44) (-2.44) (-2.34) 
Marketizationi,t  -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.036*** 
 (-2.65) (-2.81) (-2.76) (-2.87) 
Sizei,t -0.003 -0.003 0.011 0.010 
 (-0.67) (-0.62) (0.53) (0.49) 
Agei,t 0.009*** 0.008*** -0.004 -0.004 
 (3.09) (3.00) (-0.56) (-0.58) 
ROAi,t -0.835*** -0.824*** -1.329*** -1.302*** 
 (-14.38) (-14.26) (-16.16) (-15.90) 
Leveragei,t 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.036 0.030 
 (3.40) (3.30) (1.36) (1.12) 
MBi,t -0.001 0.000 0.003 0.004 
 (-0.08) (0.01) (0.27) (0.46) 
Growthi,t 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.008* 
 (1.05) (1.16) (1.65) (1.70) 
Top10i,t 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.30) (1.16) (-0.45) (-0.44) 
Largesti,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.46) (-0.35) (-0.05) (-0.07) 
Discacci,t -0.013 -0.009 -0.003 0.005 
 (-1.03) (-0.68) (-0.18) (0.35) 
Province Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.378*** 0.292*** 0.472** 0.256 
 (3.71) (2.87) (2.27) (1.24) 
N 9033 9033 9033 9033 
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.083 0.096 0.081 
Note: ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
     t-values are in parentheses  
Source: Computed by the author 
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5.4.4. Corporate Tax Management, Corruption, and Firm Performance 
No less an important question is how corruption affects the relationship between tax 
management and firm performance. To ascertain this requires a two-step process, the first 
being to examine the relationship between tax management and firm performance, and 
the second being to analyze the moderating effect of corruption on the relationship 
between tax management and firm performance.  
Firstly, the relationship between tax management and firm performance has been 
estimated using fixed-effect models, where standard errors in parentheses are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Based on the Hausman test, the 
fixed-effects model is used in this section. The dependent variable of firm performance 
uses two different measures, ROA and ROE. The independent variable of tax management 
uses two measures, ETR and ETR_adj. The results are shown in column (1) to (4) of Table 
5.9, which shows that the coefficients of two effective tax rates (ETR and ETR_adj) are 
highly significant with a negative sign (-0.050, -0.049, -0.109, and -0.109, respectively). 
Since the lower effective tax rates represent a lower tax burden and more tax management, 
the results show that corporate tax management is positively correlated with 
contemporaneous firm performance. 
Next, the moderating effect of corruption on the relationship between tax management 
and firm performance is tested using fixed-effect models (columns (1) to (4) of Table 
5.10). The dependent variable of firm performance and independent variable of tax 
management are as indicated in Table 5.9. In addition, the interaction terms between tax 
management and corruption are ETR*corruptioni,t and ETR_adj*corruptioni,t. The 
coefficients of the equations explaining ETRi,t and ETR_adji,t in column (1) to (4) are 
highly significantly negative at 1% level, which consistent with the results in Table 5.9. 
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Further, the coefficients of interaction terms between tax management and corruption, 
ETR*corruptioni,t and ETR_adj*corruptioni,t, are significant and negative, except for the 
coefficient of the interaction term of ETR_adj*corruptioni,t in column (2) which is 
insignificant. In short, the results suggest that the positive correlation between tax 
management and firm performance can be strengthened by corruption, corroborating the 
argument that corruption could be beneficial to firm performance through tax 
management.  
Table 5.9: The Impact of Corporate Tax Management on Firm Performance 
Dependent variable: (1) ROA (2) ROA (3) ROE (4) ROE 
ETRi,t -0.050***  -0.109***  
 (-18.44)  (-18.40)  
ETR_adji,t  -0.049***  -0.109*** 
  (-18.22)  (-18.30) 
Corruptioni,t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.73) (0.71) (1.42) (1.40) 
Sizei,t -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-1.47) (-1.47) (-0.68) (-0.69) 
Agei,t 0.000 0.000 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.15) (0.13) (2.79) (2.76) 
Leveragei,t -0.074*** -0.075*** 0.027** 0.026** 
 (-12.22) (-12.31) (2.31) (2.21) 
Growthi,t 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (14.87) (14.88) (15.19) (15.19) 
Top10i,t 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (4.94) (4.96) (5.30) (5.32) 
Largesti,t 0.000* 0.000* 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (1.90) (1.90) (3.42) (3.42) 
Discacci,t -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (-3.91) (-3.81) (-3.12) (-3.00) 
Province Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.081** 0.070** 0.018 -0.007 
 (2.37) (2.03) (0.27) (-0.11) 
N 9033 9033 9030 9030 
Adjusted R2 0.239 0.237 0.212 0.211 
Note: ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
     t-values are in parentheses  
Source: Computed by the author 
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Table 5.10: The Moderating Effect of Corruption on The Relationship Between Tax 
Management and Firm Performance (H5.3) 
Dependent variable: (1) ROA (2) ROA (3) ROE (4) ROE 
ETRi,t -0.035***  -0.072***  
 (-3.92)  (-3.86)  
ETR*corruptioni,t -0.001*  -0.001**  
 (-1.75)  (-2.09)  
ETR_adji,t  -0.036***  -0.065*** 
  (-4.04)  (-3.42) 
ETR_adj*corruptioni,t  -0.000  -0.002** 
  (-1.46)  (-2.34) 
Corruptioni,t 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000 
 (1.51) (0.72) (2.30) (1.41) 
Sizei,t -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-1.45) (-1.47) (-0.66) (-0.69) 
Agei,t 0.000 0.000 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (2.73) (2.72) 
Leveragei,t -0.074*** -0.074*** 0.027** 0.026** 
 (-12.23) (-12.33) (2.34) (2.26) 
Growthi,t 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (14.90) (14.90) (15.23) (15.24) 
Top10i,t 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (4.97) (4.98) (5.35) (5.36) 
Largesti,t 0.000* 0.000* 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (1.89) (1.90) (3.40) (3.41) 
Discacci,t -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.021*** -0.020*** 
 (-3.94) (-3.83) (-3.16) (-3.04) 
Province Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.076** 0.069** 0.005 -0.010 
 (2.21) (2.00) (0.07) (-0.16) 
N 9033 9033 9030 9030 
Adjusted R2 0.239 0.238 0.213 0.212 
Note: ***, ** and * are significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
     t-values are in parentheses  
Source: Computed by the author 
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5.5. Chapter Summary 
Corruption is a subject that has become much debated in China, with the conventional 
wisdom being that it is uniformly bad for firm performance. In investigating corruption’s 
role relationship with tax management, this chapter finds this view to be an 
oversimplification. There exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between corruption 
and corporate tax management. The relationship is positive at low to moderate levels of 
corruption but negative as corruption escalates. However, this relationship is mitigated by 
marketization, so that as the economy becomes more market oriented, corruption’s impact 
is reduced. 
Further, in finding a positive relationship between tax management and performance, 
and that corruption strengthens this relationship, the implication is that the level of 
corruption that exists in China is still on the downward-sloping part of the corruption-
ETR curve and has been helpful to firm performance. That, despite the mitigating impact 
of marketization, corruption’s moderating role remains positive may at least partially 
explain why corruption continues to thrive even as China liberalizes. The positive role of 
corruption also suggests the presence of governance and regulatory challenges that resort 
to corruption can surmount. 
Finally, the results of this chapter provide several important implications. From a 
policy perspective, the results suggest that further liberalization will have salutary effects 
in terms of reducing the incentive to resort to corruption. At the same time, efforts to curb 
corruption without the corresponding strengthening of institutions and clarification of 
rules and regulations can have adverse short-term consequences for firm performance.  
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CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION 
6.1. Introduction 
This thesis attempted to provide a systematic analysis of firm-level and market-level 
outcomes of corporate tax management in China’s listed enterprises using quantitative 
analysis to answer three specific questions. These questions are addressed again below. 
The findings of this analysis are synthesized in the next section. Section 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 
discuss implications for theory, policy, and practice, respectively. Lastly, Section 6.6 
proposes the recommendations for future research. 
6.2. Synthesis of Findings 
As an important field, corporate tax management has been researched a great deal in 
western countries. This thesis, however, focuses on China as a special issue. The results 
not only show the consequences of tax management in the Chinese context but also 
addresses the question of whether the economic transition and reforms have moved 
China’s enterprise environment closer to the norm of the developed countries so that the 
outcomes of tax management in China converges with what is found in the latter countries. 
And more important, this thesis should also serve as reference for other emerging 
countries, especially those in the process of transition. 
Two consequences of corporate tax management, - in-firm and market-level outcomes 
- were investigated. This was undertaken through three major research questions.  
Research Question 1: What is the relationship between corporate tax management and 
firm performance in Chinese listed enterprises, and how does the after-tax cash arising 
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from tax management benefit firms’ market value? 
Chapter 3 examined the first research question in this thesis, which is the impact of 
corporate tax management on firm performance via firms’ profitability, growth, and 
market value in China’s listed enterprises. Based on a large sample of Chinese A-share 
listed enterprises from 2004 to 2012, the results reveal that there is a significant positive 
relationship between tax management and firm value, which is made up of significant 
negative direct and positive indirect impacts. More specifically, the significant negative 
direct relationship between tax management and firm value supports the agency theory, 
in which tax management is a hidden managerial rent. The significant positive indirect 
relationship between tax management and market value is achieved through the mediating 
role of increasing firm profitability and growth performance. Therefore, the results 
suggest that tax management as an important firm financial strategy could be continued 
but they need to be bolstered by legal regulations to reduce the possible negative 
consequences from managerial rent seeking. Thus, Chapter 3 provides direct evidence on 
how tax avoidance can help maximize firm value. 
Research Question 2: What are the extreme market outcomes of corporate tax 
management in Chinese listed enterprises, and how does government ownership influence 
these extreme outcomes? 
The results from Chapter 4 answer the second research question. Compared to prior 
studies by Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) and Li, Luo, Wang, and Foo (2016), which focused 
on future extreme outcomes, Chapter 4 investigated the extreme market outcomes of tax 
management during different time periods. Based on the sample of Chinese A-share listed 
enterprises for the period 2008 to 2013, the study finds that there is a negative relationship 
between tax management and contemporaneous stock price crash risk, which means that 
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tax management activities will reduce the immediate possibility of stock price crash. 
However, the study also finds that tax management will increase firms’ future stock price 
crash. Therefore, the results support the bad news hoarding theories. Corporate tax 
management activities can be used undesirably as a tool to conceal negative firms’ news, 
such as adverse operating outcomes, manipulate management performance resulting in a 
stock price crash. These opportunist short-term behaviors would ultimately increase 
future enterprise risk, with the negative relationship reversing with the passage of time.  
Given the specific characteristics of Chinese government controlled shareholding, 
Chapter 4 examined whether listed state-owned/controlled enterprises (LSOEs) carry less 
risks. The empirical results show that central- and provincial-LSOEs cannot statistically 
mitigate the probability of future stock price crashes, while municipal-LSOEs may have 
a higher probability of future stock price crashes. 
Research Question 3: How does corruption and marketization impact corporate tax 
management in Chinese listed enterprises, and how does corruption impact the 
consequence of corporate tax management? 
Chapter 5 first investigated the effect of corruption on corporate tax management, and 
found that there is a U-shaped relationship between corruption and corporate effective tax 
rates during the period of 2008 to 2013, meaning an inverted U-shaped relationship exists 
between corruption and corporate tax management. There is a positive relationship 
between corruption and tax management at low to moderate levels of corruption, and a 
negative relationship between corruption and tax management beyond these levels of 
corruption. Hence, when regional corruption is below a certain level, corruption will 
promote firms to engage in tax management. However, when the firms operate in a high 
level of corruption area over the critical point, it will inhibit tax management.  
147 
 
Moreover, Chapter 5 finds that regional marketization can mitigate the impact of 
corruption on corporate tax management regardless of the level of corruption. 
Furthermore, the results also show that corruption strengthens the positive correlation 
between tax management and firm performance, which could be viewed as evidence 
corroborating the argument that corruption can be undesirably beneficial to firm 
performance through manipulative tax management. 
 
Taken together, the findings suggest that tax management will likely increase given 
the net positive impact on firm performance. This will confer benefits both to listed firms 
and their managements, but revenue losses to the state. However, balanced against these 
benefits is the vulnerability to future crashes as bad news emerge from conduct masked 
through manipulative tax management. If the firm is large, this impact can extend beyond 
the firm to destroy the entire financial market. State ownership or control cannot mitigate 
this vulnerability. Indeed, municipal listed SOEs, being far removed from central 
government control, are actually likely to raise the possibility of future crash risk.   
Corruption, which is an increasingly discussed topic in China nowadays, impacts the 
ease with which tax management can be undertaken, but this impact varies with the 
severity of corruption. At low levels of corruption, tax management can be facilitated 
productively, but this relationship reverses when the level of corruption exceeds a certain 
threshold. This can be explained by the argument that at high levels of corruption, it is 
possible to bypass tax management altogether by blatant bribery, thereby rendering tax 
management ineffective.  
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Regardless of the relationship between corruption and tax management, the former is 
found to affect the positive relationship between tax management and firm performance 
advantageously. The overall assessment of tax management then is that it confers gains 
to firms, which can be enhanced by the existence of corruption. 
6.3. Implications for Theory 
Existing studies on tax management in emerging markets in general and China are still 
in an embryonic stage. Under China’s distinctive context, this thesis contributes to extant 
research by providing a robust and systematic analysis of the consequences of corporate 
tax management. Therefore, the findings of this thesis provide several implications for 
theory. 
Firstly, the result of a negative direct relationship between tax management and market 
value (examined in Chapter 3) supports the agency perspective on corporate tax 
management. The separation of ownership and control inherent in modern corporations 
can raise managerial opportunism resulting in negative consequences from tax 
management (Chen, Chen, Cheng, & Shevlin, 2010; Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika 
Dharmapala, 2009; Kim, Li, & Zhang, 2011). But examining the indirect impact of tax 
management, this thesis shows that it improves firm value through increasing profitability 
and growth, which sheds light into how governance can increase shareholder wealth.  
Secondly, the results from the second research question (examined in Chapter 4) 
supports the bad news hoarding theory developed by Jin and Myers (2006) and Bleck and 
Liu (2007). Most prior studies examining the bad news hoarding theory of stock price 
crash risk of economic activities are based on the time dimension of future (Kim, Li, & 
Zhang, 2011; Li, Luo, Wang, & Foo, 2016; Xu, Jiang, Chan, & Yi, 2013), overlooking 
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how the current outcomes impact future extreme outcomes. The empirical results of lower 
contemporaneous stock price crash risk of tax management provide the empirical 
evidence to support the contention that corporate tax management can be deployed to 
conceal adverse operating outcomes, manipulate management performance thereby 
producing reduced immediate crash risk. Also, when concealed opportunist short-term 
behavior is eventually uncovered, it will result ultimately in future stock price risk. Thus, 
the relationship between tax management and stock price crash risk will change with the 
passage of time. Overall, the results of Chapter 4 are consistent with the notion that tax 
management can offer opportunities to managers to conduct managerial opportunism, 
while bad news hoarding will increase future crash risk.  
Thirdly, the results for municipal listed SOEs show a higher probability of future stock 
price crash (examined in Chapter 4), contrary to conventional wisdom of SOEs as 
stabilizing factors. Thus, the results are not only consistent with the simple conflict of 
interests between shareholders and managers, they also reveal more complicated and 
deeper problems that exist between governments and listed SOEs’ managers. China being 
a transition economy, its state-owned/controlled enterprises account for a considerable 
portion of China’s economy and play an important role in national development. While 
listed state-owned/controlled enterprises have experienced several reforms, unlike the 
wholly state-owned enterprises, they have a more complicated and special principal-agent 
relationship. Thus, the results from this study extend the agency theory by considering 
modern listed SOEs as a feature specific to China. 
Finally, the results of the inverted U-shaped relationship between corruption and tax 
management (examined in Chapter 5) provides empirical evidence to support the 
assumption that corruption in government can play a dual role of both a helping hand and 
a grabbing hand impacting corporate performance. Corruption cannot be simply ascribed 
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to having a monotonic detrimental or beneficial effect. Furthermore, the results confirm 
that for China as a large transition economy, the development of regional institutional 
environment is heterogenous across different locations, unlike in developed countries 
where studies safely assume that the institutional environment is homogenous within a 
country (Aguilera, 2005). Thus, responding to the unbalance market development in 
different regions in China (Zhang & Rasiah, 2015), the extent of government intervention 
and marketization may vary considerably across regions, which causes the different 
impacts of corruption in firms’ decision-making.  
6.4. Implications for Policy 
Tax revenue, as the main source of national revenue, is an important tool in 
macroeconomic regulation, the performance of markets, and decision-making of 
enterprises and investors’ activities. Therefore, the findings of this thesis provide several 
implications for policy. 
Firstly, from the findings, we can conclude that during the last three-decades of 
enterprise reforms, the Chinese corporate environment has moved closer to that of market 
economies. However, it also comes with corporate governance problems, such as the 
conflicting interests of shareholders and managers. Indeed, encouraging state enterprises 
to list on stock exchanges brings with it greater market discipline but also abets tax 
management to the detriment of government finances, an additional area that requires 
careful monitoring. Thus, the government should improve market transparency, reduce 
government intervention, and provide a healthy market mechanism to prevent negative 
consequences of manipulative managerial rent seeking. Taxation has an important role in 
helping to deepen economic and social development. 
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Secondly, China’s privatization approach, although has advantages, also brings 
problems. Instead of full privatization of state enterprises, China introduced partial 
privatization to reform SOEs. Thus, profit-oriented listed state-owned/controlled 
enterprises (LSOEs) has become a phased phenomenon in China’s stock market. 
Compared to the wholly state-owned enterprises that have to bear more social 
responsibilities, LSOEs have profit-seeking as a major objective (Kang & Kim, 2012). 
Because of partial privatization, LSOEs are still ultimately controlled by the different 
levels of governments, which may lead them to be saddled with institutional and agency 
problems. More importantly, local governments are viewed as privatization-friendly. 
When their controlled enterprises are in trouble, they may easily privatize them (Liu, 
2014). At this juncture, local officials and managers of state enterprises may collude with 
each other to utilize the transition process to seek their individual interests and even annex 
national assets. Thus, the findings suggest that policymakers should pay heed to the 
process of state enterprise privatization and prudently assess privatization in local state 
enterprises. Central government also needs to further strengthen state assets’ supervision 
and administration. 
Thirdly, fiscal decentralization has given local governments more autonomy, an 
example being the tax-sharing system giving local governments more financial power and 
discretionary funds, which allows local administrators to engage in rent-seeking and 
maximizing self-interests. It may result in a high probability of potential risk. The findings 
of this thesis imply that while fiscal decentralization is recommended, the central 
government needs to strengthen its supervision system to guarantee that implementation 
is effective while at the same time restricting power abuses and rent-seeking behaviors.  
Fourthly, since China is still in the process of economic and social transformation, 
problems such as weak legal restriction of administrative power, allowing officials to 
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abuse their power eventually leading in their corruption and downfall are inevitable. On 
the other hand, firms resort to corruption when they operate in a weak institutional 
environment, with corruption sought more as “speed money” to gain preferences to 
benefit corporate performance and/or circumvent cumbersome regulations. Thus, 
corruption appears to be a phenomenon that coexists with modernization. With 
continuous improvement of institutions, such as enhancement of marketization, the 
negative rents through corruption will be reduced. The positive role of corruption on tax 
management and firm performance provide another important policy implication for this 
thesis. To succeed in the fight against corruption, the Chinese government must have deep 
and precise insights into the problem of corruption, making proper structural reforms, 
perfecting institutional environment and setting up an effective anti-corruption 
supervision system.  
In relation to the effect of macro-determinants on corporate decision-making, 
corruption and institutional development not only matters for the macroeconomy but also 
for internal corporate activities. It supports the common view that emerging economies 
experience more severe agency problems than developed economies due to the lack of 
forceful legal protection and related governance mechanisms (Li & Xia, 2008; Tu, Lin, 
& Liu, 2013). Hence, when governments make a decision on resource allocation, they 
should synchronously establish a sound monitoring mechanism combined with 
governance monitoring and administrative monitoring.  
6.5. Implications for Practice 
This thesis can be beneficial to senior managers and board members to better 
understand the consequences of engaging in complex tax management issues. Because 
tax management brings benefits to enterprises as well as can lead to potential risks, it may 
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create uncertainty that can influence future corporate outcomes, which may damage the 
firm. Thus, enterprises making decisions on tax management should ensure after-tax 
returns maximization rather than to simply reduce corporate tax burden.   
Besides, this thesis is potentially useful for investment bankers, security analysts, and 
auditors who monitor enterprises because the results imply that tax management activities 
can be used as a mask to help managers manipulate earnings so as to conceal the true 
performance of a firm, which may eventually destroy the long-term value of the firm.  
Moreover, this thesis is also potentially informative for regulators and regulation-
setters because the findings suggest that corporate tax management may facilitate 
managers’ opportunistic behaviors thereby leading to extreme market results. 
Last but not least, China as a socialist market-oriented economy that despite its special 
political, cultural, and social environments has features and characteristics share by other 
developing and transition economies. The results of this thesis can provide useful 
guidelines and lessons for these countries to improve their tax system and promote the 
development of the institution-building.    
6.6. Recommendations for Future Studies 
This thesis examined the outcomes of corporate tax management via firm performance 
and risk of stock price crash, which can generate two types of consequences. These 
consequences are multi-dimensional with macroeconomic implications, such as fiscal 
revenue, reforms, and government effectiveness. Thus, the study suggests future 
researchers or scholars to pay more attention to the macro consequences of tax 
management.  
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In addition, this study uses data from Chinese A-share listed enterprises, including all 
industries except the financial industry, but the study does not compare the differences 
and similarities between these industries. Thus, future studies can be developed further to 
consider industry factors, such as industry protection and competition among industries.  
Moreover, China’s market has the features of weak information disclosure and 
imperfect accounting standards, which make corporate research difficult to ensure the the 
accuracy of results. Compared to non-listed companies, information disclosure of listed 
enterprises is more accurate and up-to-date. To ensure the accuracy of results, this thesis 
has chosen listed enterprises as the target sample. Thus, the results may not be 
generalizable to non-listed companies, especially for small and medium companies, 
which are less likely to suffer interest conflicts between managers and owners. Future 
studies can try to cover these enterprises.  
Finally, this thesis focused on firms’ overall tax management status, using corporate 
effective tax rates as the main measures of corporate tax management. Future studies can 
use more specialized tax management measures to examine the different outcomes. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Measurement of Firm-Specific Earnings Management (Discacc) 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 employed the modified Jones model (Patricia M Dechow, 
Richard G Sloan, & Amy P Sweeney, 1995) to estimate discretionary accruals, which is 
a common measure of earnings management. 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽1
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(A.1) 
The estimated coefficients from Eq. (A.1) are then used to compute discretionary 
accruals (Discaccit) using the equation. 
Discacc𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
− (𝛼0
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽1
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1
) 
                         
(A.2) 
where TAi,t is total accruals for firm i in year t, calculated as operating profits minus 
cash flow from operations; Asseti,t-1 is the book value of total assets for firm i at the 
beginning of year t; ΔSalesi,t is the change in total revenue of firm i in year t; ΔReci,t is the 
change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t; and PPEi,t is the gross amount of fixed 
assets for firm i at the end of year t. The variable Discacci,t is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals for firm i at year t. 
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APPENDIX B: The Impacts of Three Specific Dimensions of Marketization on The 
Relationship Between Corruption and Tax Management 
 
Figure B1: The three specific dimensions of marketization during 2008 to 2013 
(Source from: Marketization Index of China's Provinces: NERI Report 2016; Plotted by 
authors) 
Note: Blue line of overall means the overall marketization index in China’s 31 provinces. 
The detail information see Table 5.1. 
      Red line of non-state means the index of the development of the non-state sector 
in China’s 31 provinces. The index reflects the ownership structure of the economy and 
the transition from public ownership to private ownership.  
      Grey line of legal means the index of market intermediaries and the legal 
environment development. The index captures the establishment of intermediate 
institutions such as law offices, accounting and auditing firms, and the institutional 
environment ensuring enforcement of contracts and protecting property rights.  
      Yellow line of government means the index of Government and market 
relationship. The index refers to the size of government interventions in local markets. 
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Table B1: The Impact of Three Specific Dimensions of Marketization on The Relationship Between Corruption and Tax Management 
 Government and market 
relationship 
 market intermediaries and the legal 
environment development 
 non-state sector development 
 (1) ETR (2) ETR_adj  (3) ETR (4) ETR_adj  (5) ETR (6) ETR_adj 
Corruptioni,t -0.005* -0.005*  -0.006** -0.007**  -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (-1.67) (-1.68)  (-2.24) (-2.49)  (-3.43) (-3.53) 
Corruption squaredi,t 0.000 0.000  0.000** 0.000**  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (1.39) (1.44)  (2.32) (2.54)  (3.44) (3.51) 
Corruption*Govmarki,t 0.000 0.000       
 (0.81) (0.64)       
Corruption squared * Govmarki,t -0.000 -0.000       
 (-0.41) (-0.32)       
Govmarki,t  -0.004 -0.004       
 (-0.60) (-0.53)       
Corruption*legali,t    0.001** 0.001**    
    (2.01) (2.11)    
Corruption squared * legali,t    -0.000* -0.000*    
    (-1.84) (-1.93)    
Legali,t    -0.010** -0.010**    
    (-2.31) (-2.46)    
Corruption*Nonstatei,t       0.002*** 0.002*** 
       (3.21) (3.19) 
Corruption squared * Nonstatei,t       -0.000*** -0.000*** 
       (-3.22) (-3.20) 
Nonstatei,t       -0.023** -0.023** 
       (-2.35) (-2.34) 
Sizei,t -0.003 -0.003  -0.003 -0.003  -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.64) (-0.59)  (-0.67) (-0.62)  (-0.67) (-0.62) 
Agei,t 0.009*** 0.009***  0.009*** 0.008***  0.009*** 0.008*** 
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Table B1: Continued 
 (3.14) (3.06)  (3.12) (3.03)  (3.11) (3.02) 
ROAi,t -0.836*** -0.826***  -0.836*** -0.825***  -0.835*** -0.824*** 
 (-14.41) (-14.29)  (-14.40) (-14.28)  (-14.39) (-14.27) 
Leveragei,t 0.049*** 0.048***  0.049*** 0.048***  0.050*** 0.048*** 
 (3.38) (3.28)  (3.38) (3.28)  (3.40) (3.30) 
MBi,t -0.000 0.001  -0.000 0.000  -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.02) (0.07)  (-0.05) (0.04)  (-0.05) (0.05) 
Growthi,t 0.005 0.005  0.005 0.005  0.004 0.005 
 (1.05) (1.17)  (1.11) (1.23)  (0.99) (1.10) 
Top10i,t 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (1.30) (1.16)  (1.29) (1.15)  (1.29) (1.15) 
Largesti,t -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.46) (-0.35)  (-0.47) (-0.35)  (-0.44) (-0.33) 
Discacci,t -0.013 -0.009  -0.013 -0.009  -0.013 -0.008 
 (-1.01) (-0.67)  (-1.03) (-0.68)  (-1.01) (-0.66) 
Province 0.009 0.015  0.001 0.004  0.014 0.018 
Industry 0.123*** 0.010  0.123*** 0.010  0.123*** 0.010 
Year 0.002 -0.003  0.006 0.003  0.000 -0.004 
Constant 0.174** 0.071  0.214*** 0.118**  0.307*** 0.206** 
 (2.56) (1.05)  (3.70) (2.05)  (3.78) (2.54) 
N 9033 9033  9033 9033  9033 9033 
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.082  0.164 0.082  0.164 0.083 
Note: t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Govmark= Government and market relationship; legal= Development of market intermediaries and the legal environment; Nonstate= Development 
of the non-state sector 
Source: Computed by the author 
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